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Abstract
In Chapter 1, I build a macroeconomic model that features chronic excess capacity. In
my model, if one firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, it “steals” profitable
demand from others. This capacity competition externality can cause an over-investment
in capacity. I show that with the existence of chronic excess capacity, capital resources
can be slack and consumption demand shocks can generate realistic business cycles. If
consumption demand increases, more capacity will be utilized, heating up the capacity
competition: firms invest with haste until the capacity utilization rate falls back to normal.
If consumption demand decreases, more capacity will be left idle, cooling down the capacity
competition: firms dis-invest with haste until the capacity utilization rate goes back to
normal.
In Chapter 2, I show that the above results cannot be obtained in models with efficient
utilization of capital or capacity. In these models, there is no capacity competition ex-
ternality. None of these models could feature chronic excess capacity nor capital resource
slackness. Thus, the response of output to demand shocks is limited and it is difficult to
obtain demand driven business cycles in these models.
In Chapter 3, I study what kind of goods market structure features the capacity compe-
tition externality that can cause chronic excess capacity. The following assumptions are
identified. First, if a firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, it can “steal”
demand from others. Second, firms can charge a sufficiently high price to make a posi-
tive net profit. These two assumptions imply a negative capacity competition externality
and are sufficient to cause long-term capacity underutilization at the firm-level. Third,
if the invested capital has no positive externality that can potentially offset the negative
externality, the capacity competition externality will be dominant and the economy will
exhibit chronic excess capacity. I present several different ways to micro-found this kind
of goods market structure, demonstrating the generality of the results obtained in the
previous chapters.
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Chapter 1
Excess Capacity and Demand
Driven Business Cycles
1.1 Introduction
Capacity utilization varies substantially over the business cycles and capacity on average
is never fully utilized. Figure 1.1 shows the capacity utilization rate in the U.S. published
by the Federal Reserve Board. During a recession, the capacity utilization rate can be
as low as 65%. During a boom, it is still likely to be less than 90%. At the micro-level,
the Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization (QSPC) shows that a large share of
plants in the U.S. operate below capacity (Boehm et al., 2017). Similar results are found
in the firm-level data for Switzerland (Ko¨berl and Lein, 2011). Like unemployment, the
underutilization of capacity suggests that there are always some slack resources in the
economy and more so during recessions.
The vast majority of firms covered in the QSPC cites insufficient demand as the main
reason for capacity underutilization (Boehm et al., 2017). Intuitively, when demand goes
up, more capacity is utilized; when demand goes down, more capacity is left idle. The
existence of resource slackness and the observation that demand is important for capacity
utilization raise the possibility that demand is important for business cycles.
Recently, demand driven business cycles have received renewed interests, reviving the ideas
put forward strongly by Keynes. The standard New Keynesian (NK) literature makes
monetary demand shocks matter by assuming sticky prices. This paper shows that real
demand shocks can drive business cycles in an economy where prices are perfectly flexible
13
Capacity Utilization Rate in the U.S.
Figure 1.1: The data is from the Board of Governance of the Federal Reserve System. The solid
line is for manufacturing. The dash-dotted line is for total industries. Shaded areas indicate the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dated recessions.
but capacity is generally in excess. In my model, firms invest in capacity to compete
for buyers. Long term capacity underutilization is an equilibrium result of this capacity
competition. Furthermore, when capacity is not fully utilized, capital resources are slack
and the real marginal cost curve is flat. As a result, output can be highly responsive to
real demand shocks.
The model has two main assumptions that deviate from the standard real business cycle
(RBC) model. First, I assume that the production technology is Leontief. Thus, firms
can produce with a constant real marginal cost until they are constrained by capacity.
Second, I assume that when buyers search for capacity to satisfy their demand, they need
to process some price information and are subject to an information processing cost as
in the rational inattention literature (e.g., Mattsson and Weibull, 2002 and Mateˇjka and
McKay, 2015). If the unit cost of processing information is zero, buyers will conduct
a directed search and purchase only the cheapest goods. In this case, the goods market
becomes perfectly competitive. If the unit cost of processing information is infinite, buyers
will not process any price information, but conduct an undirected search for capacity. In
this case, firms that have a larger capacity are more likely to be visited. In general, the
unit cost of processing information is positive but finite and the behavior of the buyers
is somewhere between the directed search and the undirected search. Thus, firms that
charge a lower price and have a larger capacity are more likely to be visited.
Although all goods are perfect substitutes, firms can charge a positive net markup as in the
14
standard Dixit-Stiglitz market structure because buyers are not fully attentive to prices.
Furthermore, as a result of the rational inattention, the behavior of buyers is somewhat
undirected. Hence, the demand allocated to each firm is not only a function of the relative
price but also a function of the relative capacity. If a firm expands its capacity relative to
that of other firms, it “steals” demand from its competitors. Each unit of demand stolen is
profitable as firms are able to charge a positive net markup. Thus, capacity expansion in
one firm has a negative externality on others. There is a great pressure on firms to expand
capacity: no one wants to be left behind. Chronic excess capacity is an equilibrium result
of this capacity competition externality.
The inclusion of chronic excess capacity is important for the model dynamics. As output
has not yet reached the capacity limit, capital resources are slack and the real marginal
cost curve is flat locally around the steady state according to the assumed Leontief tech-
nology. Hence, output can be highly responsive to demand shocks and the real wage rate
is acyclical.
This contrasts sharply with the standard RBC model, in which capital resources are tight.
When demand rises, the increase in output is limited because capital as a production factor
is scarce, and the real wage rate falls as the marginal productivity of labor falls. Similarly,
when demand drops, the decrease in output is limited because any capital resource freed
up is a valuable production factor that increases the marginal productivity of labor and
the real wage rate.
There is a large literature that incorporates variable capital utilization into an otherwise
standard RBC model. Capital may not be fully utilized because firms are subject to
a convex capital utilization cost.1 However, I show that aggregate capacity is still fully
utilized in steady state, even though capital may not. Furthermore, capital resources are
tight as an increase in capital can still reduce the real marginal cost by lowering the capital
utilization rate. After all, capital is not utilized precisely because it is too costly to be
utilized. Thus, the standard variable capital utilization model does not feature chronic
excess capacity nor capital resource slackness.
As a result, when demand increases, more capital needs to be utilized and the real marginal
cost rises in the standard variable capital utilization model. The upward sloping real
1Greenwood et al. (1988) and Basu and Kimball (1997) assume that the depreciation rate of capital
is increasing and convex in terms of the utilization of capital. Kydland and Prescott (1988), Burnside
et al. (1993), and Bils and Cho (1994) assume that the overtime premium paid to workers is increasing
and convex in terms of the utilization of capital. Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007)
assume that the resources consumed by firms to utilize capital is increasing and convex in terms of the
utilization of capital.
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marginal cost curve dampens the response of output to demand shocks and causes a coun-
tercyclical real wage rate. The evidence documented in the literature, however, suggests
that the real wage rate should not be too countercyclical (e.g., Bils, 1985 and Solon et al.,
1994).
One can try to reduce the capital resource tightness by reducing the convexity of the
utilization cost function. This could make the real wage rate less countercyclical and
consumption more responsive. However, the volatility of investment under consumption
demand shocks does not increase.2 The reason is the following. Under consumption de-
mand shocks, firms want to adjust their capital precisely because capital resources are tight
so that there is a pro-cyclical upward pressure on the real marginal cost that firms can ad-
just their capital to mitigate. Hence, removing capital resource tightness not only removes
the curb on capital adjustment but also removes the impetus for capital adjustment. Con-
sequently, if capital resources are less tight, consumption becomes more responsive but
investment does not, and the relative volatility of investment to consumption falls. Thus,
it is difficult to get a large relative volatility of investment to consumption without causing
a strongly countercyclical real wage rate under consumption demand shocks.
By contrast, in my model, capital resources are slack locally around the steady state
and the real wage rate is acyclical. Despite the capital resource slackness, when future
demand is expected to increase, firms have a strong incentive to increase their capital
because each unit of capacity installed is expected to attract more demand. Thus, in
my model, removing capital resource tightness does not remove the impetus for capital
adjustment. Hence, the response of investment to consumption demand shocks can be
very large. With some capital and investment adjustment costs, the relative volatility of
investment to consumption in my model can be consistent with that in the U.S. data.
To assess the importance of demand for business cycles quantitatively, I allow for the
possibility that business cycles are driven both by demand shocks and by labor produc-
tivity shocks. In particular, I consider three types of real demand shocks: consumption
demand shocks that change the marginal utility of consumption relative to the marginal
dis-utility of labor, investment demand shocks that change the subjective discount fac-
tor, and exogenous expenditure shocks that change the government expenditure. I use
Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate my capacity underutilization model.
I find that the capacity underutilization model attributes most of the business cycle fluctu-
2Under investment demand shocks, consumption, investment, and hours will move in different direc-
tions. This is known as the Barro-King curse in the literature (Barro and King, 1984).
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ations to demand shocks. Labor productivity shocks account for only 2% of the variation
in output and 13% of the variation in hours. Among the three types of demand shocks,
consumption demand shocks are dominant. Consumption demand shocks alone explain
more than 72% of the variance in consumption, 78% of the variance in investment, and
60% of the variance in hours, and generate the correct business-cycle co-movement among
consumption, investment, hours, and the Solow residual. The results resonate with two
recent empirical papers which suggest that business cycles are mainly driven by a single
type of demand shock (e.g., Andrle et al., 2017 and Angeletos et al., 2018).
Summing up, this paper has two major contributions. First, by extending the standard
neoclassical framework with rationally inattentive buyers who tend to search for capacity
undirectly, I present a new model that can explain long-term capacity underutilization as
observed in the data. Second, when viewed through the lens of the model, real demand
shocks have the potential to be the main driving force of business cycles, and when the
model is estimated to match the U.S. macro data, that turns out to be the case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection discusses the related lit-
erature. Section 1.2 establishes a basic capacity underutilization (CU) model. Section 1.3
studies the properties of the basic CU model. Section 1.4 compares the basic CU model
with a standard variable capital utilization model. Section 1.5 extends the basic CU model
to a full CU model, estimates the full CU model using Bayesian estimation techniques,
and discusses the quantitative results. Section 1.6 concludes.
Related Literature
Cooley et al. (1995) and Gilchrist and Williams (2000) assume that plants are subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Low productivity plants will be left idle to save labor
cost. Fagnart et al. (1997) and Fagnart et al. (1999) assume that firms are subject to
idiosyncratic demand shocks. Extra capacity will be held by firms as a precaution to save
the cost in case demand is high. Bai et al. (2012) incorporate search and matching frictions
into the goods market. They use a competitive search framework as in Moen (1997). The
capacity utilization rate measures the tightness of the goods market. Having some capacity
underutilized saves the cost for buyers to purchase goods from a tight market. In all these
models, however, plant or capacity is underutilized for a cost-saving reason. Hence, there
is no capacity competition externality. From an aggregate perspective, capacity is not in
excess, capital resources are tight, and the dynamic properties of these models are similar
to those of the standard variable capital utilization model (see Chapter 2 for further
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discussions).
In addition, the precautionary capacity model developed by Fagnart et al. (1997) has a
difficult time to match the micro-level data on capacity utilization. In their model, the
idiosyncratic demand shocks are so large that the capacity constraint is frequently binding
and a large proportion of firms are running at full capacity each period. Otherwise,
the extra capacity held by firms as a precaution would be very small. The standard
deviation of the year-over-year (YoY) quarterly sales growth rate at the firm-level needs
to be about 60% to generate a capacity utilization rate of 87% on average, and each
quarter 47% of firms are running at full capacity. In the real world, however, the average
firm-level volatility of the YoY quarterly sales growth rate is about 15% to 25% (e.g.,
Comin and Philippon, 2005, Buch et al., 2009, Kelly et al., 2013, and De Veirman and
Levin, 2018); and roughly less than 20% of the firms or plants surveyed report running
at full capacity each quarter (e.g., Ko¨berl and Lein, 2011 and Boehm et al., 2017). My
capacity underutilization model has a better chance to fit the micro-level data. Because of
a capacity competition pressure, all firms in my model are willing to hold extra capacity
even when there is no demand uncertainty at all.
Michaillat and Saez (2015) also incorporate search and matching frictions into the goods
market to explain capacity underutilization. They use a random matching framework.
Hence, firms can use capacity to steal profitable demand as in my model. Their paper,
however, focuses on monetary demand shocks in an economy with nominal rigidity. Since
prices are negotiated after matching takes place, Michaillat and Saez (2015) have the
freedom to choose the bargaining protocol and they choose it to be such that all prices
are fixed. By contrast, my paper focuses on real demand shocks in an economy with
perfectly flexible prices which are determined by profit maximizing firms before matching
takes place.
The literature on industrial organization documents the possibility of established firms
holding excess capacity to deter entry (e.g., Spence, 1977, Dixit, 1980, and Bulow et al.,
1985). Established firms invest in capacity to protect demand from being stolen by po-
tential entrants. In my model, firms invest in capacity to steal demand from others. Both
mechanisms allow capacity to have a positive effect on demand. Because of the complex
strategic interactions involved, the entry deterrence mechanism is rarely incorporated into
macroeconomic models. However, the capacity competition mechanism proposed by this
paper can be easily incorporated into the existing macroeconomic framework.
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1.2 A Basic Model of Capacity Underutilization
This section presents a basic capacity underutilization (CU) model. The model has two
features. First, the production technology is Leontief. Second, buyers have a limited capa-
bility to process price information when they search for capacity to satisfy their demand.
1.2.1 Technology
There is a unit mass of identical firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. All goods produced are perfect
substitutes and can be used either as consumption or investment. At the beginning of each
period, each firm has some capital stock inherited from the last period. The law of motion
for capital is standard:
kj,t+1 = kj,t (1− δ) + ij,t, (1.1)
where ij,t is the investment made by firm j at time t, kj,t is the capital stock of firm j at
the beginning of the period, and parameter δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate.
The production technology is assumed to be Leontief:
yj,t = min
{
lj,t
αv
, Akj,t
}
, (1.2)
where yj,t is the amount of goods produced by firm j, lj,t is the variable labor hired by
firm j, parameter αv > 0 is the variable labor required per unit of output, and parameter
A > 0 is the productivity of capital.
Capacity is defined as the output level at which the short run average total cost (SRAC)
curve is tangent to the long run average total cost (LRAC) curve (e.g., Morrison, 1985).
Along the LRAC curve, one minimizes its average total cost by adjusting both the variable
factors, such as labor, and the short run fixed factors, such as capital. Along the SRAC
curve, one minimizes the same average total cost, adjusting only the variable factors.
At the point of tangency, where full capacity utilization is achieved, the average total
cost could not be further minimized even when short run fixed factors can be adjusted.
Capacity defined in this way is also known as the economic measure of capacity in the
literature (e.g., Nelson, 1989).
In practice, capacity is considered as the maximum level of output that a firm can produce
within a given period of time under a realistic working schedule, taking into account normal
downtime (e.g., Corrado and Mattey, 1997). If the production technology is of constant
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returns to scale, the LRAC curve is flat. In this case, the economic measure of capacity
is the output level at which the SRAC curve achieves its minimum, capturing partly
the practical notion that extraordinary efforts are required to produce beyond capacity.
Eiteman and Guthrie (1952) conduct a survey and find that the short run average total
cost curve is typically downward sloping until a point near or at capacity. This suggests
that the practical notion of capacity is roughly consistent with the theoretical definition
of capacity when production technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
With a Leontief technology, the SRAC curve of firm j is given by:
SRAC (yj,t, kj,t;wt) = wtαv + (r + δ)
kj,t
yj,t
, (1.3)
where wt is the real wage rate, r > 0 is the real interest rate in steady state, and yj,t ∈
(0, Akj,t] must be positive but no larger than the production limit. Note that the SRAC
curve is downward sloping in output until it reaches the production limit.
The LRAC curve is the minimum of the SRAC when capital can be adjusted:
LRAC (wt) = wtαv +
r + δ
A
, (1.4)
which is flat as the Leontief technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
Capacity y¯j,t is the output level at which the SRAC curve reaches its minimum and is
tangent to the flat LRAC curve. We have
y¯j,t = Akj,t. (1.5)
which shows that capacity is simply the maximum output that can be produced within a
given period of time. Because the amount of capital stock is predetermined, capacity may
not be fully utilized when demand is not high enough.
I find that it is both theoretically appealing and empirically plausible to start with a simple
Leontief technology. Theoretically, the concept of capacity is naturally clear with Leon-
tief technology, consistent with both the theoretical definition and the practical notion.
Thus, people that explicitly model capacity utilization often assume that firms produces
with some Leontief technology at least in the short run (see, e.g., Fagnart et al., 1997,
Fagnart et al., 1999, and Boehm et al., 2017). This is also a standard assumption in the
management science and operations research literature.3
3For some papers in the management science and operations research literature on capacity utilization,
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Empirically, Leontief technology is not uncommon. For example, drivers and cars are
perfect complements in a taxi company; cooks and cookers are perfect complements in
a restaurant. At the micro-level, firms are likely to operate with fixed input-output co-
efficients especially in the short run because these coefficients are much dictated by the
technologies embodied in capital and are carefully designed by modern engineers (Eite-
man, 1947). The observation that input-output coefficients are fixed in the short run also
motivates the putty-clay technology introduced by Johansen (1959). Indeed, numerous
empirical evidence based on accounting, engineering, or questionnaire data suggest that
marginal cost at the micro-level is typically constant at least up until some point close to
capacity (see Walters, 1963, for a literature survey).
1.2.2 Buyers and the Goods Market Structure
The purchasing process takes two steps. First, a household or a firm decides how many
goods shall be consumed or invested in period t based on the aggregate price Pt. Second,
the household or the firm sends out a buyer to purchase the goods. All buyers are identical.
If a buyer chooses to purchase from firm j, the payoff for the buyer is a strictly decreasing
function of the real price Pj,t/Pt charged by the firm:4
vt (j) = − ln
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
. (1.6)
In principle, buyers want to purchase only the cheapest goods that yields the highest
payoff. However, as in Mattsson and Weibull (2002), I assume that it is costly for buyers
to implement the desired outcome because they need to process some price information in
order to direct their actions towards the desired.
Without exerting any information processing effort, buyers can only purchase blindly and
randomly. The purchasing behavior in this case is called the default purchasing behavior,
which is the most inattentive behavior of buyers. I assume that the default purchasing
behavior is an undirected search for capacity, a behavior that results in a random matching
see Florian and Klein (1971), Kalish (1983), and Deng and Yano (2006). For some textbooks on operations
management, see Stevenson (2002), Kumar and Suresh (2006), and Gupta and Starr (2014).
4It will become clear later that the logarithm functional form helps generate a demand curve of constant
elasticity. However, the results of this paper will not be affected as long as the payoff function is strictly
decreasing in the real price of the goods purchased (see section 3.3 of Chapter 3). In addition, although
buyers purchase on behalf of households and firms, the buyers have their own payoffs. This assumption is
convenient as it greatly simplifies the aggregation problem by allowing buyers to be homogeneous across
potentially different households and firms. In section 3.3 of Chapter 3, I show that a homogeneous pur-
chasing problem can be obtained directly as a sub-problem of households and firms, if the information
processing cost is proportional to the amount of goods purchased and is paid in terms of goods or services.
In this case, the payoff of purchasing a unit of goods from firm j decreases linearly rather than log-linearly
in the real price charged by the firm. However, the results of this paper remain unchanged.
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between the demand from buyers and the capacity supplied by firms.
The rationale behind the above assumption is as follows. Each matching process can be
described by a probability density function ft. ft (x) gives the likelihood that a unit of
capacity x ∈ [0, y¯t] is matched with a unit of demand, where y¯t ≡
∫ 1
0 y¯j,tdj is the total
amount of capacity supplied by firms. If a buyer pays no attention to prices, the matching
between the demand from the buyer and the capacity supplied by firms should be the
most disordered. The disorder of the matching process can be measured by the entropy of
ft, which is given by
−
∫ y¯t
0
ln ft (x) ft (x) dx. (1.7)
For all distributions with a support limited to the interval [0, y¯t], the maximum entropy
distribution is the uniform distribution: ft (x) = 1/y¯t. Hence, the most disordered matching
process is that each unit of capacity has an equal probability to be matched.
Thus, without exerting any information processing effort, the probability density that a
buyer purchases from firm j is proportional to the capacity of the firm:
n∗t (j) ≡
y¯j,t
y¯t
, (1.8)
and n∗t is called the default probability density function as it describes the default pur-
chasing behavior.
If a buyer wants to deviate from the default n∗t , she has to process some price information
and incurs some information processing cost. Let nt be the probability density function
eventually obtained by a buyer. nt (j) gives the likelihood that the buyer purchases from
firm j. As in the rational inattention literature, I assume that the information processing
cost is proportional to the amount of information processed measured by the relative
entropy of nt with respect to n
∗
t . Relative entropy is also known as Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence, which is non-negative, convex, and obtains its minimum value zero if nt = n
∗
t :
DKL (nt||n∗t ) ≡
∫ 1
0
nt (j) ln
(
nt (j)
n∗t (j)
)
dj. (1.9)
Intuitively, the more different nt is from n
∗
t , the more information is needed to be processed.
The buyer’s problem is to maximize the expected payoff net of the information processing
cost:
max
nt≥0
∫ 1
0
vt (j)nt (j) dj − Λ
(∫ 1
0
nt (j) ln
(
nt (j)
n∗t (j)
)
dj
)
, (1.10)
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subject to ∫ 1
0
nt (j) dj = 1, (1.11)
where Λ > 0 is the unit cost of processing information.
Note that n∗t is exogenous to the buyer’s problem because the default purchasing behavior
is not a rational choice of the buyer.
Mattsson and Weibull (2002) show that the unique solution to the above problem is:
∀j ∈ [0, 1] : nt (j) = n
∗
t (j)e
vt(j)
Λ∫ 1
0 n
∗
t (j)e
vt(j)
Λ dj
. (1.12)
Equation (1.12) says that the optimal probability of purchasing from firm j is proportional
to the default probability n∗t (j) and moderated by the payoff of purchasing from firm j.
The higher the payoff is, the higher the probability that firm j would be chosen by the
buyer. We can substitute the buyer’s payoff function (1.6) for vt (j) in equation (1.12) and
obtain:
∀j ∈ [0, 1] : nt (j) =
n∗t (j)P
− 1
Λ
j,t∫ 1
0 n
∗
t (j)P
− 1
Λ
j,t dj
. (1.13)
If all prices are equal, buyers will be indifferent between choosing any two firms and have
no incentive to do any costly information processing. In this case, buyers will simply follow
the undirected search for capacity and will be distributed across firms according to the
default probability density function n∗t .
If prices are different, firms that charge a relatively low price can attract additional buyers.
However, because of a positive information processing cost, not all buyers will purchase
the goods of the lowest price. Even the goods of the highest price will still be purchased
by some buyers, as we can see from equation (1.13) that nt (j) is always positive as long
as Pj,t remains finite. Intuitively, since buyers have a limited capability of processing
price information, they rationally choose to be partially inattentive to prices rather than
to purchase always the cheapest goods. Hence, buyers allow themselves to make some
“mistakes” with positive probabilities in order to save the information processing cost.
Since all buyers are identical, demand aggregation is a trivial task. The demand for the
goods produced by firm j is the multiplication of the total demand yt from buyers and the
share of buyers that purchase from firm j: yj,t = nt (j) yt. Substitute the buyer’s solution
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(1.13) for nt (j); we have
yj,t =
n∗t (j)P
−ε
j,t∫ 1
0 n
∗
t (j)P
−ε
j,t dj
yt =
kj,tP
−ε
j,t∫ 1
0 kj,tP
−ε
j,t dj
yt, (1.14)
where ε ≡ Λ−1 is the price elasticity of demand. The second equality comes from equations
(1.5) and (1.8). The former says that capacity is proportional to capital. The latter says
that the default probability of purchasing from firm j is proportional to the capacity of
the firm.
The aggregate price Pt must satisfy the following aggregation condition:
Ptyt =
∫ 1
0
Pj,tyj,tdj, (1.15)
which ensures that the money spent on aggregate goods is equal to the money earned by
firms. Since all goods are perfect substitutes, Pt is simply the average price of the goods
purchased by buyers: Pt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,tnt (j) dj.
With a positive information processing cost, buyers act as if the same goods produced by
different firms are imperfect substitutes.5 The lower the information processing cost is, the
more competitive the market is. In one extreme where Λ→ 0 and ε→∞, buyers are fully
attentive to prices, the search process is fully directed, and the goods market is perfectly
competitive. In the other extreme where Λ → ∞ and ε → 0, buyers pay no attention
to prices, the search process is fully undirected, and the demand that goes to each firm
no longer depends on relative prices. Hence, the model spans both directed search and
undirected search as well as the intermediate cases where the search is partially directed.
The parameter Λ controls the degree to which the search is directed.
In addition to prices, the default purchasing behavior n∗t plays an important role in deter-
mining the relative size of demand. n∗t is endogenously affected by the relative capacity of
the firm (see equation (1.8)). Because of this feature, a firm not only can lower its relative
price but also can expand its relative capacity to compete for buyers. For a given amount
of total demand from buyers, if a firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, it
“steals” demand from others. Thus, in addition to the usual price competition, there is a
capacity competition among firms.
For example, Starbucks can expand its market share by opening more brick-and-mortar
coffee stores than its competitor Costa. A printing store can expand its market share
5This may explain why in reality firms that sell near homogeneous goods, such as oil, steel, and sugar,
can still charge a markup to compensate for their fixed costs.
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by installing more printing machines than other printing stores. Intuitively, firms with
a larger capacity are more likely to be visited by buyers who are not fully attentive to
prices and thus search for capacity in a somewhat undirected way. In the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition model, however, capacity has no effect on the allocated
demand. Therefore, the demand curve in my model is fundamentally different from that
in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz setup, though they do share some similarities.
1.2.3 Households
There is a unit mass of identical households. Consider a representative household who
maximizes her expected lifetime utility
max
{ct,lt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (zc,t, ct, lt) , (1.16)
subject to the budget constraint of the household
ct = wtlt + dt, (1.17)
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, zc,t is a preference parameter that varies
with time, ct is the amount of consumption goods that the household asks her buyer to
purchase, lt is the labor supply, wt is the real wage rate, and dt is the amount of dividends
received from firms. I assume that the labor market is perfectly competitive. Hence, the
household takes the real wage rate wt as exogenous.
The functional form of the one-period utility is assumed to be
u (zc,t, ct, lt) =

φezc,t
(ct/(φezc,t))
1−γ−1
1−γ − ω¯lt, γ 6= 1
φezc,t ln (ct/(φezc,t ))− ω¯lt, γ = 1
(1.18)
where φ > 0 is a scaling parameter, γ−1 > 0 is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution,
and ω¯ > 0 is the marginal dis-utility of labor. The assumption that the marginal dis-utility
of labor is a constant follows from the indivisible labor theory proposed by Hansen (1985)
and Rogerson (1988).
The preference parameter zc,t is interpreted as consumption demand. An increase in zc,t
is an increase in the marginal utility of consumption relative to the marginal dis-utility of
labor. I assume that zc,t follows an AR(1) process zc,t = ρczc,t−1 + ec,t, where ρc ∈ [0, 1)
is a persistence parameter and ec,t is a shock to the consumption demand.
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The first order conditions (FOCs) of the household’s problem are
ω¯ = λtwt, (1.19)
λt =
(
ct
φezc,t
)−γ
, (1.20)
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier for the household’s budget constraint (1.17) and
can be interpreted as the shadow price of goods measured in terms of utils, or simply, the
price in utils. The optimal labor supply condition (1.19) shows that the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is infinite. However, an interior solution is still possible because an increase
in the supplied labor relaxes the budget constraint of the households (1.17) and causes a
decrease in the marginal utility of consumption.
1.2.4 Firms
Each firm aims to maximize its firm value, which is the present value of the firm’s dividend
flows dj,t:
max
{Pj,t,dj,t,yj,t,ij,t,kj,t+1}∞t=0
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
dj,t
)
, (1.21)
subject to the demand curve (1.14), the resource constraint of the firm
dj,t + ij,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
− wtαv
)
yj,t, (1.22)
the capacity constraint
yj,t ≤ Akj,t, (1.23)
and the law of motion for capital (1.1). Because firms are owned by households, the
stochastic discount factor that discounts the value at time t + 1 to time t is given by
βλt+1/λt and the real interest rate in steady state is r = β−1 − 1.
To prevent firms from charging an infinitely high price, the unit cost of processing in-
formation Λ should not be too large. I assume that Λ is less than one; thus, the price
elasticity of demand is larger than one: ε = Λ−1 > 1.
The FOCs of the firm’s problem are
Pj,t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1 (wtαv + µj,t) , (1.24)
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1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
(
Pj,t+1
Pt+1
1
ε
Auj,t+1 +Aµj,t+1 + 1− δ
))
, (1.25)
where µj,t ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier of the capacity constraint (1.23) and uj,t+1 ≡
yj,t+1/y¯j,t+1 = yj,t+1/Akj,t+1 is the capacity utilization rate of the firm.
Equation (1.24) says that the firm sets its price according to a constant markup rule. If the
firm operates below its capacity limit, the price charged by the firm will be proportional
to the firm’s marginal cost: wtαv. Once the demand hits the firm’s capacity limit, the
price will be raised up so as to equate the demand yj,t to the capacity: yj,t = y¯j,t = Akj,t.
Equation (1.25) shows that there are two reasons for a firm to invest in capital. First,
capital investment relaxes the capacity constraint. This value is captured by the term
Aµj,t+1, which is the shadow value of relaxing the capacity constraint. Second, capital
investment makes the goods produced by the firm more likely to be purchased by buyers.
This value is captured by the multiplication of the demand attracted per unit of capital
Auj,t+1 and the profit contributed by each unit of demand attracted (Pj,t+1/Pt+1) ε
−1.
1.2.5 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, if a variable is of the form xj,t, we have xi,t = xj,t for all
i, j ∈ [0, 1]. After obtaining the FOCs, we can omit the subscripts that index a variable to
a particular firm. The symmetric equilibrium is a stable stochastic process of nine variables
(ct, λt, it, wt, µt, lt, ut, kt+1, and yt) that satisfies the household’s FOCs (1.20)-(1.19),
the firm’s pricing condition
1 =
ε
ε− 1 (wtαv + µt) , (1.26)
the firm’s investment condition
1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
(
1
ε
Aut+1 +Aµt+1 + 1− δ
))
, (1.27)
the measure of the capacity utilization rate
ut =
yt
Akt
, (1.28)
the complementary slackness condition for the capacity constraint
µt (Akt − yt) = 0, (1.29)
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where µt ≥ 0 and Akt − yt ≥ 0, the amount of labor hired according to the Leontief
production function
lt = αvyt, (1.30)
the law of motion for capital
kt+1 = kt (1− δ) + it, (1.31)
and the aggregate resource constraint
ct + it = yt, (1.32)
which follows from the budget constraint of the household (1.17) and the resource con-
straint of the firm (1.22).
1.3 Properties of the Basic Capacity Underutilization Model
In this section, I show the following properties of the basic CU model. First, the de-
centralized equilibrium is generally inefficient because buyers are not fully attentive to
prices. Second, if the degree of inattention is large enough, capacity will be underutilized
in steady state and the economy will exhibit chronic excess capacity. Third, locally around
the steady state where capacity is in excess, capital resources are slack. Finally, because
of the capital resource slackness, the real wage rate is acyclical and output is highly and
much more responsive to demand shocks than in the standard RBC model.
1.3.1 Inefficiency and Capacity Competition Externality
Given the technology and the preference of my basic CU model, the efficient allocation
can be obtained by solving a corresponding social planner’s problem:
max
{ct,it,yt,lt,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (zc,t, ct, lt) , (1.33)
subject to the Leontief production function (1.2), the law of motion for capital (1.31), and
the aggregate resource constraint (1.32).
The solution to the social planner’s problem is a stable stochastic process of eight variables
(ct, λt, it, µt, lt, ut, kt+1, and yt) that satisfies the optimal consumption condition (1.20),
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the optimal trade-off between the benefit and the cost of production
λt = ω¯αv + λtµt, (1.34)
the Euler’s equation that gives the optimal investment
1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
(Aµt+1 + 1− δ)
)
, (1.35)
the complementary slackness condition for the capacity constraint (1.29), the required
labor followed from the Leontief production function (1.30), the law of motion for capital
(1.31), and the aggregate resource constraint (1.32).
The conditions that characterize the efficient allocations are the same as those that char-
acterize the decentralized equilibrium except for conditions (1.34) and (1.35). In the
decentralized equilibrium, the trade-off between the benefit and the cost of production is
given by the firm’s pricing condition (1.26) combined with the household’s labor supply
condition (1.19):
λt =
ε
ε− 1 (ω¯αv + λtµt) ; (1.36)
and the firm’s investment condition is given by equation (1.27).
Hence, the equilibrium of the basic CU model is efficient if and only if ε→∞ or Λ→ 0.
In this case, the basic CU model is reduced to a standard RBC model with a Leontief
production technology, or a Leontief-RBC model for short, where buyers are fully attentive
to prices and the goods market is perfectly competitive.
In general, as long as buyers are not fully attentive to prices (ε = Λ−1 > 1 or Λ ∈ (0, 1)),
the equilibrium of the basic CU model is inefficient.
First, the rational inattention of buyers allows firms to enjoy some market power. Hence,
the real wage rate is depressed and the price in utils λt is inflated by the markup charged
by firms. As a result, consumption level tends to be inefficiently low.
Second, when buyers are not fully attentive to prices, they search for capacity in a some-
what undirected way.6 Hence, firms can expand their relative capacity to compete for
buyers. If a firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, the firm is stealing de-
mand from others. Furthermore, each unit of demand stolen is profitable because firms
6In a symmetric equilibrium, since all firms charge the same price, the behavior of the buyers is
completely undirected as there is no need to process any price information. This, however, does not mean
that the presence of information processing cost is not important because it allows firms to charge a positive
net markup and to steal demand from each other.
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can take advantage of the inattentive buyers to charge a positive net markup. Thus, capac-
ity expansion has a negative externality. From an individual firm’s perspective, capacity
expansion not only relaxes the capacity constraint but also steals profitable demand from
its competitors (see equation (1.27)). From an aggregate perspective, however, the return
of capacity is only derived from the value of relaxing the capacity constraint (see equa-
tion (1.35)). Because of this capacity competition externality, firms tend to over-invest in
capacity.
The first mechanism is usual, which also shows up in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz setup. The
second mechanism characterizes the basic CU model and is important for us to understand
why there is long-term capacity underutilization in the economy.
1.3.2 Long-term Capacity Underutilization and Chronic Excess Capac-
ity
Let us focus on the steady state of the basic CU model. If a variable is of the form xt, its
value in steady state is denoted by x.
If the unit cost of processing information is large enough Λ ∈ ( r+δA , 1), according to the
firm’s investment condition (1.27), we have:
u =
r + δ
AΛ
− µ
Λ
≤ r + δ
AΛ
< 1, (1.37)
which says that there is capacity underutilization in steady state.
If Λ→ 0, however, the basic CU model is reduced to the Leontief-RBC model and the allo-
cation of the economy becomes efficient. In this case, according to the optimal investment
condition (1.35), we have
µ =
r + δ
A
> 0, (1.38)
which means that capacity must be fully utilized in steady state: y = Ak.
The comparison between the basic CU model and the Leontief-RBC model highlights how
a single modification on the assumption of the behavior of buyers can cause a substantial
change.
In the Leontief-RBC model, buyers pay full attention to prices. Thus, capacity has no
effect on demand. The only reason for firms to invest in capital is to relax the capacity
constraint. If the capacity constraint is not binding in steady state, the marginal value of
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relaxing the capacity constraint is zero: Aµ = 0. The only value of capital disappears but
holding capital is costly. Hence, the firm will reduce its capital holding until its capacity
constraint is binding in steady state.
In the basic CU model, however, buyers are not fully attentive to prices, and thus, search
for capacity in a somewhat undirected way. Hence, firms can expand their capacity to
compete for buyers and steal demand from each other. The limited capability of buyers
to process price information (Λ ∈ (0, 1)) also provides firms with a monopolistic power,
which allows firms to earn a profit for each unit of demand stolen: ε−1 = Λ > 0. This
monopolistic profit is a lure for firms to hold extra capacity. Even though capacity is not
fully utilized, as long as the monopolistic profit rate is large enough, firms will not want
to reduce their capacity to lose demand to others, justifying the existence of long-term
capacity underutilization in the basic CU model.
From an aggregate perspective, however, the only value of capital is to save cost by relax-
ing the capacity constraint. If firms hold more capacity than that could be justified by
minimizing the aggregate total cost, we say that capacity is in excess.
Definition 1.1. (Excess capacity) Capacity is said to be in excess if and only if aggregate
capacity is underutilized.
Definition 1.2. (Aggregate capacity) Aggregate capacity is the aggregate output level at
which the aggregate short run average total cost (SRAC) curve is tangent to the aggregate
long run average total cost (LRAC) curve. The aggregate SRAC is given by
SRAC (yt, kt;wt) = C (yt, kt;wt) + (r + δ) kt
yt
, (1.39)
where C is the aggregate variable cost as a function of aggregate demand and capital. The
aggregate LRAC is the minimum of the aggregate SRAC when aggregate capital can be
adjusted.
In the basic CU model, the aggregate variable cost function is given by
C (yt, kt;wt) = min{lj,t,yj,t,kj,t≥0}j∈[0.1]
wt
∫ 1
0
lj,tdj, (1.40)
subject to the aggregation condition yt =
∫ 1
0 yj,tdj, the Leontief production technology
(1.2), and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt. Since all firms are identical and all
variable costs are paid by firms, the aggregate variable cost function is the same as the
variable cost function at the firm-level: C (y, k;w) = wαvy, for all y ≤ Ak.
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Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium, if capacity is underutilized at the firm-level, aggregate
capacity is also underutilized. By Definition 1.1, the economy exhibits chronic excess
capacity when the unit cost of processing information Λ is large enough.
In the rest of the paper, I assume that the consumption demand shocks are small and that
Λ is large such that the capacity constraint (1.23) never binds.7 With this assumption,
I can ignore the occasionally binding capacity constraint to focus on the local dynamic
properties of the basic CU model around the steady state where capacity is in excess.
1.3.3 Capital Resource Slackness
To explain how the existence of unused capacity affects the model dynamics, I introduce
the concept of capital resource tightness (or slackness), which captures the scarcity of
capital as a production factor.
Definition 1.3. (Capital resource tightness) If a marginal decrease in capital stock makes
the current output level infeasible or leads to an increase in the real marginal cost (MC),
I say that capital resources are tight. If a marginal decrease in capital stock has no effect
on the real MC, I say that capital resources are slack.
Capital resource tightness can be measured by the negative capital elasticity of the real
MC. If the production technology is of constant returns to scale, the measure of capital
resource tightness is also equal to the output elasticity of the real MC, i.e., the steepness
of the real MC curve. Let ζ be the measure of capital resource tightness in steady state.
We have
ζ ≡ −∂ ln Cy (y, k;w)
∂ ln k
=
∂ ln Cy (y, k;w)
∂ ln y
, (1.41)
where Cy gives the real MC.
The upper left panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship between the real MC and
capital, and the upper right panel of Figure 1.2 shows the real MC curve.
In the basic CU model, aggregate capacity is underutilized in steady state. Hence, the
real MC curve is flat and capital resources are slack locally around the steady state. In
the Leontief-RBC model, where aggregate capacity is fully utilized, the real MC curve is
vertical and capital resources are infinitely tight locally around the steady state. Finally,
7It might be interesting to note that if the capacity constraint never binds, one can regard my model as
equivalent to a standard monopolistic competition model where the production function is simply linear in
labor, unaffected by any physical capital, and firms accumulate a “marketing capital” that affects demand.
This analogy breaks down, of course, if the capacity constraint binds occasionally.
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the dotted lines in Figure 1.2 are for the standard RBC model with a Cobb-Douglas (CD)
production technology, or the CD-RBC model for short, in which capital resources are
tight but not infinitely tight.
Capital Resource Slackness vs. Capital Resource Tightness
Figure 1.2: The circle marker is the steady state of the basic CU model and the cross marker is
the steady state of the Leontief-RBC model and the CD-RBC model.
1.3.4 Acyclical Real Wage Rate and Large Responses to Demand
Capital resource slackness implies an acyclical real wage rate and allows output to be highly
responsive to demand shocks, while capital resource tightness implies a countercyclical real
wage rate and dampens the response of output to demand shocks.
In the Leontief-RBC model, for example, capital resources are infinitely tight. When
demand increases, output cannot increase, but the marginal value of relaxing the capacity
constraint µt increases, creating a pressure for the real MC to increase. According to the
firm’s pricing condition (1.26), this pressure is transmitted to a decrease in the real wage
rate. The lower left panel of Figure 1.2 shows this relationship between the real wage
rate and output in a short run equilibrium. The countercyclical real wage rate will then
cause a pro-cyclical price in utils λt according to the household’s labor supply condition
(1.19). The lower right panel of Figure 1.2 shows this short run equilibrium relationship.
As is clear from the household’s consumption condition (1.20) and the firm’s investment
condition (1.27), the pro-cyclical price in utils λt reduces the responses of consumption
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and investment to demand shocks.
By contrast, in the basic CU model, capital resources are slack. If there is a higher demand,
more output can be produced without causing any pressure for the real MC to increase.
The real wage rate wt and the price in utils λt are both locally constant under demand
shocks (see the solid lines of the lower two panels of Figure 1.2). Hence, the responses of
consumption and investment to demand shocks are not reduced.
To see this clearly, I log-linearize the household’s consumption condition (1.20) and the
firm’s investment condition (1.27) of the basic CU model around the steady state where
capacity is in excess. Let xˆt ≡ lnxt − lnx be the log-deviation of xt from its steady state
x. The log-linearized consumption condition is
0 = zc,t − cˆt, (1.42)
and the log-linearized investment condition is
0 = Et (uˆt+1) = Et
(
yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
)
, (1.43)
where kˆt+1 follows a log-linearized capital law of motion: kˆt+1 = (1− δ) kˆt + δiˆt.
Equation (1.42) shows that consumption responds one-to-one to changes in consumption
demand. Equation (1.43) shows that if there is an expected increase in future demand,
investment shoots up so that capacity can match with the increased demand in the next
period. Although capital is not scarce as a production factor, firms still have a strong
desire to invest because the amount of demand that can be attracted by each unit of
capacity invested increases with the expected aggregate demand Et (yˆt+1). Since capital
resources are slack, all the induced investment can and will be made immediately in the
first period. Therefore, the response of investment to a persistent increase in consumption
demand will be very large in the basic CU model.
1.3.5 Calibration
To illustrate the above results quantitatively, I calibrate the basic CU model at a quarterly
frequency.
We have eight parameters to calibrate. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to match
the average ratio of gross private domestic investment to private fixed assets from 1947 to
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Table 1.1: Parameters and Calibration Targets – Basic CU Model
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 1.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
φ 0.8300 Price in utils normalized to 1
ω¯ 0.6798 Output normalized to 1
β 0.9747 Capacity utilization rate 0.8
A 0.1544 Investment to output ratio 0.17
αv 0.9120 Labor underutilization rate 0.088
Λ 0.3800 Labor share of income 0.62
2016 in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) prepared by the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). The inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
γ is chosen to be 1, a value that implies a commonly used log utility. One can see from
equation (1.42) that the value of γ actually does not affect the dynamic properties of the
basic CU model.
The rest of the six parameters are jointly calibrated to achieve the following targets in
steady state.
The marginal utility of income in steady state λ is normalized to 1. This target is mostly
associated with the scaling parameter φ in the representative household’s utility function.
The size of output in steady state y is normalized to 1. This target is mostly associated
with the dis-utility of labor ω¯, which affects the size of the economy through the supply
of labor.
The labor underutilization rate in steady state is defined as one minus the ratio of the
labor hours actually utilized to the total labor hours that the representative household
can potentially supply: 1 − l, where the total hours that the representative household
could supply is normalized to one. I choose the average of U-5 and U-6 from 1994 to 2016
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as a target for the labor underutilization
rate.8 This target is mostly associated with the required labor per unit of output αv, which
determines the demand for labor.
The investment to output ratio in steady state i/y is matched to the average ratio of
gross private domestic investment to gross domestic product (GDP) from 1947 to 2016 in
8According to the BLS, U-5 is defined as total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other
persons marginally attached to the labor force, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all persons
marginally attached to the labor force. U-6 is defined as total unemployed, plus all persons marginally
attached to the labor force, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian
labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force.
35
NIPA. This target is mostly associated with the productivity of capital A, which affects
the capital to output ratio.
The capacity utilization rate in steady state u is matched to the average of the total
industry capacity utilization rate from 1967 to 2016 reported by the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB). This target is mostly associated with the subjective discount factor β, which affects
the opportunity cost of holding capacity.
The labor share of income in steady state wl/y is matched to the average labor share of
income estimated by the BLS from 1946 to 2016. This target is mostly associated with
the unit cost of processing information Λ or the demand elasticity ε = Λ−1, which affects
the size of the monopolistic profit and thus the labor share of income.
Table 1.1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and their mostly associated targets.9
1.3.6 Impulse Responses and Discussions
Figure 1.3 plots the impulse response functions (IRFs) for the basic CU model together
with those for the Leontief-RBC model and those for the CD-RBC model. The first two
rows of Figure 1.3 show the case where the change in consumption demand is completely
transitory (ρc = 0), while the last two rows of Figure 1.3 show the case where the change
in consumption demand is highly persistent (ρc = 0.99).
Indeed, although the only difference between the Leontief-RBC model and the basic CU
model is the assumption on the behavior of buyers, the local dynamics of the two models
are drastically different.
In the Leontief-RBC model, the capacity constraint is binding and capital resources are
infinitely tight. Output is restricted by capacity and cannot be changed immediately.
Hence, consumption and investment must move in opposite directions. If there is a one-off
increase in consumption demand (ρc = 0), a 1% increase in consumption demand can
only lead to a 0.84% increase in consumption, and the increase in consumption must be
satisfied by a sharp decrease in investment. If the increase in consumption demand is
highly persistent (ρc = 0.99), it is worthwhile to invest so that households can enjoy a
higher consumption in the long run. However, the induced investment must be satisfied
9For comparison, I also calibrated the Leontief-RBC model and the CD-RBC model. I do not use the
observed capacity utilization rate as a calibration target for the RBC models because capacity turns out
to be fully utilized in steady state. The other calibration targets are the same as in the basic CU model.
See Appendix 4.1 for details.
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Impulse Responses for the Basic CU Model and the RBC Models
Figure 1.3: Responses to a 1 percentage point increase in demand disturbance ec. The solid lines
are for the basic CU model. The dashed lines are for the Leontief-RBC model. The dotted lines
are for the CD-RBC model. All variables are expressed as log deviations from steady state.
by a temporary decrease in consumption. Besides, the real wage rate correlates negatively
with demand shocks and the Solow residual is acyclical.10 In the U.S. data, however,
consumption and investment co-move, the real wage rate is weakly pro-cyclical or acyclical,
and the Solow residual is strongly pro-cyclical. These illustrate the typical difficulties of
demand driving business cycles in an economy where capacity is fully utilized.
In the basic CU model, capacity is in excess and capital resources are slack. Consumption
and investment can now move in the same direction. If changes in consumption demand
are completely transitory (ρc = 0), a 1% increase in consumption demand can lead to
a 1% increase in consumption and no investment has to be sacrificed.11 If changes in
consumption demand are persistent (ρc = 0.99), a 1% increase in consumption demand
10Throughout this paper, the Solow residual is calculated by assuming a CD production function for
the final products and a CD labor share of 0.62.
11The one-off response of consumption does not mean that consumption smoothing motive is absent.
Consumption smoothing motive does not say that a household always wants her consumption to be stable
but says that she wants her marginal utility of consumption to be stable. Since the demand shock is a
preference shock that increases the marginal utility of consumption φeγzc,tc−γt only in the first period, to
smooth out the marginal utility of consumption across time, the best thing to do is to consume more in
the first period, offsetting the effect of the increased zc,t, and then to consume normally as zc,t goes back
to normal. This is exactly what happens in the basic CU model.
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can lead to a 1% increase in consumption and also a huge increase in investment. Firms
want to increase their investment because the amount of demand that can be stolen by
each unit of capacity invested increases. A 1% increase in future consumption encourages
roughly a 1% increase in capacity, which in turn requires roughly a (1/δ) % = 48% increase
in investment. Since capital resources are slack, investment can be made immediately so
that capacity is raised up as soon as possible to compete for the increased demand.12
Because of the induced investment, a 1% persistent increase in consumption demand is
amplified to more than 8% increase in output. Capital resource slackness also allows the
real wage rate to be acyclical. Finally, as a result of a pro-cyclical capacity utilization, the
Solow residual is highly pro-cyclical under demand shocks.
In the CD-RBC model, capital resources are tight but not as tight as in the Leontief-
RBC. Hence, the response of output to demand shocks is larger than in the Leontief-RBC
model, but still much smaller than in the basic CU model. Particularly, the response of
investment is as limited as in the Leontief-RBC model. In addition, the real wage rate
correlates negatively with demand shocks and the Solow residual is acyclical.
To sum up, the basic CU model exhibits a positive co-movement between consumption,
investment, and hours, a large fluctuation in investment, an acyclical real wage rate, and
a pro-cyclical Solow residual, even though all fluctuations are driven by demand shocks.13
These results are difficult to be obtained in the standard RBC models.
1.4 Comparison with a Standard Variable Capital Utiliza-
tion Model
In this section, I introduce a standard model that features variable capital utilization (VU).
In the standard VU model, capital is not fully utilized because of a convex utilization
cost. However, unlike the basic CU model, the standard VU model does not feature
any capacity competition externality. There is only a price competition among firms and
the only role of capital in the standard VU model is to save the aggregate total cost.
12This lack of persistence in the response of investment in the basic CU model follows from capital
resource slackness caused by the existence of unused capacity, but does not depend on the linear rela-
tionship between the capacity and capital. Suppose that the production function of the firm is given by
yj,t = min
{
lj,t/αv, Ak
α
j,t
}
, where α ∈ (0, 1). In this example, even though capacity is given by a non-
linear function of capital, y¯j,t = Ak
α
j,t, we still have that the response of investment to demand shocks
concentrated in the first period.
13A drawback of the basic CU model is that the response of investment lacks persistence. This issue,
however, can be easily resolved by including capital and (or) investment adjustment costs (see section
1.5.1, for further discussions).
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Based on this observation, I show that despite capital underutilization in the standard
VU model, aggregate capacity is fully utilized in steady state and capital resources are
tight locally around the steady state. Hence, the real wage rate under demand shocks
must be countercyclical and the response of output to demand shocks is dampened.
1.4.1 The Standard VU Model
Setup
The setup of the households is exactly the same as in the basic CU model (see section
1.2.3).
The goods market is characterized by the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition market
structure. There is a continuum of identical firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each produces a
certain type of differentiated goods. The aggregate goods are composed of the differenti-
ated goods:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
j,t dj
) ε
ε−1
, (1.44)
where yj,t is the amount of differentiated goods produced by firm j, yt is the amount of
aggregate goods, and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods.
Households and firms demand only aggregate goods. The goods demand faced by firm j
is given by
yj,t = yt
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ε
, (1.45)
where Pt is the price of aggregate goods: Pt =
(∫ 1
0 P
1−ε
j,t dj
) 1
1−ε
.
Each firm operates with a production technology that is of constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) between capital and labor:
F (θj,tkj,t, lj,t) =
α( lj,t
αv
) k−1
k
+ (1− α) (θj,tAkj,t)
k−1
k

k
k−1
, (1.46)
where θj,t is the capital utilization rate, α ∈ (0, 1) is the production weight of labor, and
k ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. When k → 0, the
CES production function converges to the Leontief production function as in the basic
CU model; and when k → 1, the CES production function converges to the usual CD
production function.
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Following Christiano et al., 2005 and Smets and Wouters (2007), it is costly to utilize
capital. The capital utilization cost is paid in terms of goods, increasing and convex in the
capital utilization rate, and proportional to the size of capital: a (θj,t) kj,t, a ≥ 0, a′ > 0,
and a′′ > 0.
1. Cost Minimization. For a given level of output and capital, the firm minimizes its
variable cost by choosing its labor input and its capital utilization rate:
C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) = min
lj,t,θj,t≥0
wtlj,t + a (θj,t) kj,t, (1.47)
subject to its production constraint yj,t ≤ F (θj,tkj,t, lj,t). By the envelope theorem and
the implicit function theorem, C is non-negative, twice differentiable, and homogeneous
of degree one; and Cy > 0, Ck < 0, and Ckk > 0.
2. Firm Value Maximization. Taking the variable cost function C as given, the firm
maximizes its firm value
max
{Pj,t,dj,t,yj,t,ij,t,kj,t+1}
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
dj,t
)
, (1.48)
subject to the demand curve (1.45), the resource constraint of the firm
dj,t + ij,t =
Pj,t
Pt
yj,t − C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) , (1.49)
and the law of motion for capital kj,t+1 = kj,t (1− δ) + ij,t.
Symmetric Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is a stable stochastic process of eight variables (ct, λt, wt, it,
θt, kt+1, lt, and yt) that satisfies the household’s FOCs (1.20)-(1.19), the firm’s pricing
condition
1 =
ε
ε− 1Cy (yt, kt;wt) , (1.50)
the firm’s capital utilization condition
Cy (yt, kt;wt)FK (θtkt, lt) = a
′ (θt) , (1.51)
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the firm’s investment condition
1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
(−Ck (yt+1, kt+1;wt+1) + 1− δ)
)
, (1.52)
the production function (1.46), the law of motion for capital
kt+1 = kt (1− δ) + it, (1.53)
and the resource constraint
ct + it = yt − a (θt) kt = Yt, (1.54)
where Yt is the final product.
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1.4.2 Properties of the Standard VU Model
No Capacity Competition Externality
The only source of inefficiency in the standard VU model is the monopolistic power of
firms. If and only if the goods market is perfectly competitive (ε → ∞), the economy
is efficient. However, the price competition is the only competition among firms. Unlike
firms in the basic CU model, firms in the standard VU model cannot expand capacity
to compete for buyers. It is shown in the rest of this subsection that without a capacity
competition externality, the monopolistic distortion alone does not imply chronic excess
capacity nor capital resource slackness.
No Chronic Excess Capacity
Claim 1.4. Capacity at the firm-level is fully utilized in steady state.
Proof. Consider a representative firm in the steady state of a symmetric equilibrium.
According to the firm’s investment condition (1.52), in steady state, the capital level k
should be such that solves
1 = β (−Ck (y, k;w) + 1− δ) , (1.55)
14In the basic CU model, the Leontief-RBC model, and the CD-RBC model, no intermediate goods
are used as a cost of capital utilization; thus, the final product is simply given by the amount of goods
produced by firms: Yt = yt = ct + it.
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or, equivalently, minimizes the total cost: C (y, k;w) + (r + δ) k, where r = β−1 − 1. By
definition, the capacity of the firm y¯ is the output level at which the short run average
total cost (SRAC) curve is tangent to the flat long run average total cost (LRAC) curve.
Note that the tangency point is unique because C is strictly convex. Since the point (y, k)
is on both the SRAC curve and the LRAC curve, we have y¯ = y, meaning that capacity
is fully utilized in steady state.
Intuitively, when capacity has no effect on demand, the only reason for firms to invest in
capital is to reduce the total cost of production. If capacity is underutilized in steady state,
it is capital reduction rather than expansion that reduces the total cost. Hence, firms will
decrease their capital stock until their capacity is no larger than sales, restoring the full
utilization of capacity in steady state. This is true despite capital underutilization. In
the standard VU model, capital is not fully utilized because doing so is too costly. Hence,
before the full utilization of capital, the average total cost has already reached its long run
minimum.
The following claim says that aggregate capacity is also fully utilized in steady state.
Claim 1.5. Aggregate capacity is fully utilized in steady state. Thus, the economy does
not exhibit chronic excess capacity.
Proof. The aggregate capacity Y¯t is the output level at which the aggregate SRAC is
tangent to the aggregate LRAC. The aggregate SRAC is given by
SRAC (Yt, kt;wt) = C (Yt, kt;wt) + (r + δ) kt
Yt
, (1.56)
where C is the aggregate variable cost incurred to satisfy the aggregate demand Yt. When
there is a production network and firms have some monopolistic power, the aggregate
variable cost function will be distorted and is given by:
C (Yt, kt;wt) = min{θj,t,lj,t,yj,t,kj,t≥0}j∈[0,1]
wt
∫ 1
0
lj,tdj +
1
ε
∫ 1
0
a (θj,t) kj,tdj, (1.57)
subject to the aggregate resource constraint Yt ≤
(∫ 1
0 y
ε−1
ε
j,t dj
) ε
ε−1
− ∫ 10 a (θj,t) kj,tdj, the
production function yj,t ≤ F (θj,tkj,t, lj,t), and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt,
where ε−1 is a “shadow tax” on intermediate goods, capturing the monopolistic distor-
tion. It is easy to verify that C is strictly convex and that in a symmetric equilibrium
Ck (Yt, kt;wt) = Ck (yt, kt;wt). Hence, in the steady state of a symmetric equilibrium, we
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have
1 = β (−Ck (Y, k;w) + 1− δ) , (1.58)
which imples that the aggregate capital in steady state minimizes the aggregate SRAC.
By definition, we have Y¯ = Y , meaning that aggregate capacity is fully utilized in steady
state. Thus, the economy does not exhibit chronic excess capacity.
Capital Resource Tightness
By the envelope theorem and implicit function theorem, one can show that the aggregate
variable cost function C (1.57) is twice differentiable and CY k < 0, which means that
a marginal decrease in capital would cause an increase in the real marginal cost (MC).
Intuitively, when there is a decrease in capital, either the remaining capital has to used
more intensively or the labor to capital ratio has to increase. Both will cause an increase
in the real MC. Thus, capital resources are tight in the standard VU model.
When there is a production network and monopolistic distortions, the aggregate variable
cost function incorporates a “shadow tax” on intermediate goods (see the second term in
equation (1.57)). Hence, capital resource tightness shall not be measured directly by the
increase in the real MC after a decrease in capital.15 Instead, capital resource tightness
can be measured by a decrease in the real wage rate (or the marginal product of labor)
that keeps the real MC unchanged after a decrease in capital.16 Because the production
function (1.46) is of constant returns to scale, the measure of capital resource tightness
is also equal to a decrease in the real wage rate (or the marginal product of labor) that
keeps the real MC unchanged after an increase in aggregate output.
In the standard VU model, the magnitude of capital resource tightness in steady state is
given by
ζ ≡ −CY kkCY ww =
CY Y Y
CY ww (1.59)
=
1− α
α
ξ
1 + kξ − ψ (1− α)
Y
Y + a (θ) k
> 0,
where ξ ≡ a′′(θ)θa′(θ) > 0 measures the convexity of the capital utilization cost function in
steady state and ψ ≡ 1− ε−1 is the real MC in steady state.
15When there is a “shadow tax” on intermediate goods, a percentage increase in the real MC after a
percentage decrease in capital underestimates the decrease in the marginal product of labor.
16This new measure is the same as the old measure (1.41) when the aggregate variable cost does not
contain any “shadow tax”.
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The more convex the capital utilization cost function is, the tighter the capital resources.
The upper panels of Figure 1.4 illustrate how capital resource tightness is affected by the
convexity of the capital utilization cost function ξ in a standard VU model with a CD
production function (k = 1) and a perfectly competitive market (ε→∞), or the CD-VU
model for short. Intuitively, when the capital utilization cost becomes more convex, an
increase in output would cause a larger increase in the marginal cost of utilization. Hence,
it becomes more difficult to squeeze output out of the production system.
Similarly, if the relative importance of labor in production α or the substitutability between
labor and capital k is smaller, it becomes more difficult to squeeze output out of the
production system using labor. The parameter α also controls the relative importance
of capital utilization in production. A smaller α implies that the production system
relies more on using intermediate goods to utilize capital. Hence, more goods have to be
produced to satisfy an extra unit of aggregate demand. Because of this amplification effect
due to the production network, it becomes more difficult to squeeze a final product out of
the production system. Finally, the existence of market power (ψ < 1) dis-encourages the
use of intermediate goods, reduces the amplification effect due to the production network,
and relaxes capital resource tightness.
Capital Resource Tightness in the CD-VU Models
Figure 1.4: The circle marker indicates the steady state of the CD-VU models and ξ measures
the convexity of the capital utilization cost.
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Countercyclical Real Wage Rate and Limited Responses to Demand
Capital resource tightness implies a countercyclical real wage rate and limits the response
of output to demand shocks.
In the standard VU model, since capital resources are tight, an increase in output generates
a pressure for the real MC to increase. This pressure will be transmitted to a decrease in
the real wage rate according to the firm’s pricing condition (1.50). The lower left panel of
Figure 1.4 shows this relationship between the real wage rate and output in a short run
equilibrium. At a first order approximation, we have
wˆt = −ζ
(
Yˆt − kˆt
)
. (1.60)
The countercyclical real wage rate will then cause a pro-cyclical price in utils λt according
to the household’s labor supply condition (1.19). The lower right panel of Figure 1.4 shows
this short run equilibrium relationship. Finally, the pro-cyclical price in utils reduces the
responses of consumption and investment to demand shocks.
To see this point clearly, I log-linearize the household’s consumption condition (1.20)
ζ
(
Yˆt − kˆt
)
= λˆt = γ (zc,t − cˆt) , (1.61)
and the firm’s investment condition (1.52)
ζ
(
Yˆt − kˆt
)
= λˆt = Et
((
1 + β
wl
k
)
ζ
(
Yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
))
. (1.62)
Equations (1.61) and (1.62) show that the pro-cyclical price in utils λt reduces the re-
sponses of consumption and investment.
If the magnitude of capital resource tightness converges to zero (ζ → 0), the real wage
rate is almost acyclical and consumption is almost as responsive as in the basic CU model.
One might think that investment can also be almost as responsive as in the basic CU
model if capital resource tightness is negligible. This conjecture, however, is not true.
Suppose that the magnitude of capital resource tightness is reduced. On one hand, the
price in utils λt is less pro-cyclical so that the dampening effect becomes weaker (see the
left hand side of equation (1.62)). On the other hand, the return of capital also becomes
less pro-cyclical so that firms have less incentive to adjust capital (see the right hand side
of equation (1.62)). These two effects cancel out.
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In fact, firms want to adjust capital precisely because capital resources are tight so that
there is a pro-cyclical upward pressure on the real MC that firms can adjust their capital
to mitigate, or equivalently, a countercyclical real wage rate that firms can adjust their
capital to take advantage of. If capital resources are less tight, firms will have less incentive
to adjust capital. In other words, removing the curb on capital adjustment also removes
the impetus for capital adjustment. Therefore, the response of investment in the standard
VU model is always much limited.
As capital resources become less tight, consumption will be more volatile while investment
will not. Thus, the relative volatility of investment to consumption declines. Hence, it
is difficult to achieve a large relative volatility of investment to consumption as observed
in the U.S. data without causing a strongly countercyclical real wage rate, restricting the
role of consumption demand shocks in driving business cycles.
1.4.3 Calibration
To document the above results quantitatively, I calibrate the CD-VU model, where k = 1
and ε → ∞. Since capacity is fully utilized in steady state, I do not use the observed
average capacity utilization rate as a calibration target. Also note that capital productivity
A is not identified because for each value of A > 0, there exists a value of αv such that
the total factor productivity (TFP) α−αv A1−α is the same. I choose A such that the ratio
y/Ak is normalized to 1. Capital utilization rate in steady state θ is normalized to 1. As in
Smets and Wouters (2007), the capital utilization cost in steady state a (θ) k is normalized
to 0.17 The convexity of the capital utilization cost function in steady state ξ is set to 0.1,
1, or infinity, for a sensitivity analysis. The other calibration targets are the same as in
the basic CU model.
Table 1.2 lists the calibrated parameter values and their mostly associated calibration
targets.
17It is theoretically flawed to set a (θ) k to 0 as it implies a negative utilization cost if the capital
utilization rate is smaller than that in steady state. Quantitatively, for any value of a (θ) k ≥ 0, there
exists a value of ξ > 0 such that the magnitude of capital resource tightness ζ remains unchanged; thus,
the local dynamics of consumption, investment, and real wage rate are not affected. The local dynamics of
hours are also unaffected if markets are perfectly competitive. If there is a market power, a larger value of
a (θ) k would cause hours to be slightly more pro-cyclical under demand shocks. However, in the standard
VU model, hours are already too pro-cyclical, implying a countercyclical output to labor ratio. Hence, by
following the convention in Smets and Wouters (2007), I do not overstate the difficulties of demand driving
business cycles.
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Table 1.2: Parameters and Calibration Targets – CD-VU Model
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 1.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
φ 0.8300 Price in utils normalized to 1
ω¯ 0.6798 Output normalized to 1
β 0.9747 Investment to output ratio 0.17
α 0.6200 Labor share of income 0.62
αv 0.9120 Labor underutilization rate 0.088
A 0.1235 y/Ak normalized to 1
θ 1.0000 θ normalized to 1
a (θ) 0.0000 a (θ) normalized to 0
1.4.4 Impulse Responses and Discussions
Figure 1.5 shows the IRFs for the CD-VU model with different degrees of capital resource
tightness. Generally speaking, despite having a variable capital utilization, the dynamic
properties of the CD-VU model are not too different from those of the standard CD-RBC
model.
If the convexity of the capital utilization cost converges to infinity (ξ →∞), the CD-VU
model converges to the CD-RBC model, in which case capital resources are quite tight, the
real wage rate is strongly countercyclical, and the response of output to demand shocks is
quite limited.
Table 1.3: Initial Responses and Relative Volatility of Investment to Consumption
ρc = 0 ρc = 0.99
c i Y σi/σc c i Y σi/σc
Basic CU 1.00% 0.00% 0.83% 0.00 1.00% 43.0% 8.13% 31.63
Leontief-RBC 0.84% -4.12% 0.00% 4.57 -0.53% 2.58% 0.00% 4.36
CD-RBC 0.95% -4.12% 0.09% 4.34 0.48% 2.58% 0.84% 5.07
CD-VU (ξ = 1) 0.96% -4.12% 0.10% 4.31 0.63% 2.58% 0.97% 3.99
CD-VU (ξ = 0.1) 0.99% -4.12% 0.12% 4.24 0.90% 2.58% 1.18% 2.86
The U.S. data 6.49 6.49
Note: Initial responses to a 1 percentage point increase in demand disturbance ec are expressed
as log deviations from steady state. σi/σc stands for the relative volatility of investment to con-
sumption. The U.S. data is from the BEA. A path of 5,000 quarters is simulated to calculate the
statistics for each calibrated model. Logarithms of the original series are Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1,600 to calculate the relative volatility.
If ξ is smaller, capital resources are less tight, the real wage rate is less countercyclical, and
consumption is more responsive. However, regardless of the magnitude of capital resource
tightness, the response of investment to consumption demand shocks is always as small
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Impulse Responses for the CD-VU Models
Figure 1.5: Responses to a 1 percentage point increase in demand disturbance ec. The solid lines
are for the CD-VU model with ξ = 0.1. The dashed lines are for the CD-VU model with ξ = 1.
The dotted lines are for the CD-RBC model or the CD-VU model with ξ →∞. All variables are
expressed as log deviations from steady state.
as in the CD-RBC model, which is dwarfed if compared to that in the basic CU model
(see Table 1.3). Since consumption is more responsive but investment is not, the relative
volatility of investment to consumption decreases. As a result, to achieve a large relative
volatility of investment to consumption as in the U.S. data, capital resources must be tight
enough. Table 1.3 shows that among the CD-VU models, the standard CD-RBC model
(ξ → ∞) actually has the highest relative volatility of investment to consumption.18 In
this case, however, the real wage rate is highly countercyclical. Hence, the standard VU
model fails to generate a large relative volatility of investment to consumption without
causing a strongly countercyclical real wage rate.19
Finally, the Solow residual is always acyclical, despite a pro-cyclical capital utilization rate.
Although an increase in capital utilization increases output for a given amount of capital
18The relative volatility of investment to consumption in the CD-RBC model is still a bit smaller than
that observed in the U.S. data.
19If investment adjustment cost is introduced to help obtain a hump-shaped impulse response of invest-
ment, it becomes even more difficult to achieve a large relative volatility of investment to consumption in
the standard VU model under consumption demand shocks.
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and labor, the cost of capital utilization also increases. These two have opposite effects on
the Solow residual, and at a first order approximation, they cancel out. It turns out that
the Solow residual is a good estimation of the true total factor productivity (TFP) when
the economy is perfectly competitive.
To sum up, in the standard VU model, capacity is fully utilized in steady state and capital
resources are tight. Unlike the basic CU model, the standard VU model fails to generate
a large movement in investment, an acyclical or pro-cyclical real wage rate, and a strongly
pro-cyclical Solow residual under consumption demand shocks.
1.5 Estimating the Capacity Underutilization Model
In this section, I extend the basic CU model to a full CU model. I estimate the full CU
model using Bayesian estimation techniques. Based on the estimated results, I show that
demand shocks are the main driving forces of business cycles. Particularly, consumption
demand shocks alone can explain most of the business cycle fluctuations and generate the
correct co-movement among consumption, investment, hours, and the Solow residual in
the full CU model.
1.5.1 Model Extensions
The full CU model is obtained by extending the basic CU model with home production,
indirect labor, capital and investment adjustment costs, and exogenous expenditure.
Home Production
I assume that households use their time to produce goods or services at home. The total
number of hours available is normalized to one. The amount of home produced goods
or services is given by ch,t = Zh,t (1− lt), where Zh,t is the productivity of time spent at
home. The one-period utility function of the representative household is now given by
u (zc,t, ct, ch,t) =

φezc,t
(ct/(φezc,t))
1−γ−1
1−γ + ω¯ch,t, γ 6= 1
φezc,t ln (ct/(φezc,t )) + ω¯ch,t, γ = 1
(1.63)
which replaces the utility function (1.18) in the household’s problem. The inclusion of
home production enriches the model dynamics: an increase in the productivity at home
49
increases the opportunity cost of supplying labor and thus reduces the labor supply.
Later in section 1.5.1, I will relate the productivity at home to the labor productivity of
firms zl,t: Zh,t = e
φlzl,t . The parameter φl is usually set to zero in standard models. In this
case, an increase in labor productivity does not increase the opportunity cost of supplying
labor. Hence, output moves positively with labor productivity. However, if φl is positive,
an increase in labor productivity also increases the productivity at home and reduces the
labor supply. Particularly, if φl is equal to one, an increase in labor productivity will not
cause an increase in output but will be fully absorbed by a decrease in working hours.
Hence, the magnitude of φl affects the importance of labor productivity shocks in driving
business cycles. I will estimate φl later in section 1.5.2.
Indirect Labor
I also assume that the Leontief production function of firm j ∈ [0, 1] at time t is now given
by
yj,t = min
{
Akj,t,
lf,j,t
αf,t
,
lv,j,t
αv,t
}
, (1.64)
where lv,j,t is the amount of direct labor, lf,j,t is the amount of indirect labor, and the
inverse of αf,t is the productivity of the indirect labor.
Direct labor produces goods or services directly. The hours of direct labor fluctuate with
output and can be easily adjusted within a period. Examples of direct labor positions are
machine operators, assembly line operators, and cleaners.
Indirect labor, by contrast, supports the production process of firms, but is not directly
involved in the active conversion of materials into finished products. Like capital stock, in-
direct labor is predetermined. Examples of indirect labor positions are production supervi-
sor, managerial and various administrative labor positions, such as accounting, marketing,
and human resource positions.
By definition, the production capacity of firm j at time t is determined by the short run
fixed factors, i.e., indirect labor and capital stock:
y¯j,t = min
{
Akj,t,
lf,j,t
αf,t
}
, (1.65)
where αf,t can also be understood as the amount of indirect labor required to form a unit
of capacity.
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The introduction of indirect labor allows output to be more volatile than labor. Hence,
labor productivity measured by output to labor ratio can be pro-cyclical under demand
shocks.
Capital and Investment Adjustment Costs
To get a persistent and hump-shaped investment response, I introduce capital and invest-
ment adjustment costs. The capital stock of firm j is accumulated according to
kj,t+1 = kj,t (1− δ) + ij,t (1− S (ij,t, ij,t−1, kj,t)) , (1.66)
where S is the adjustment cost function.
Following Hayashi (1982) and Christiano et al. (2005), I assume that the adjustment cost
function is given by
S (ij,t, ij,t−1, kj,t) =
φi
2
(
ij,t
ij,t−1
− 1
)2
+
φk
2
(
ij,t
kj,t
− δ
)2 kj,t
ij,t
, (1.67)
where φk ≥ 0 and φi ≥ 0 are parameters that capture the curvature of the capital and
investment adjustment costs respectively.
This functional form implies that to change investment or to deviate from the investment
level that maintains the current level of capital is costly. Hence, the adjustment costs are
zero in steady state, but the dynamics around the steady state will be influenced by the
curvature of these two adjustment cost components.
Exogenous Expenditure
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), government spending and net exports are treated
as exogenous expenditure. I abstract away from the crowding-out and (or) crowding-
in effects of government spending on consumption and investment by assuming that the
exogenous expenditure is produced by an independent sector that requires direct labor
only. Let gt be the exogenous expenditure and lg,t be the corresponding labor hired. We
have lg,t = αg,tgt, where αg,t is the direct labor required per unit of exogenous expenditure.
The final product of the economy is Yt = ct+ it+gt and the total amount of hours worked
is lt = lf,t + lv,t + lg,t.
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Exogenous Shocks
I introduce four types of exogenous shocks in total.
First, the exogenous expenditure is given by gt = ge
zg,t , where zg,t follows an AR(1)
process with an i.i.d. Normal disturbance: zg,t = ρgzg,t−1 + eg,t. eg,t is a shock to the
exogenous expenditure.
Second, the labor productivity zl,t determines the productivity of all types of labor. Specif-
ically, αv,t = αve
−zl,t , αf,t = αfe−zl,t , and αg,t = αge−zl,t . In addition, the productivity
of the time spent at home is also affected by the labor productivity: Zh,t = e
φlzl,t . zl,t is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an i.i.d. Normal disturbance: zl,t = ρlzl,t−1 +el,t.
el,t is a shock to the labor productivity.
Third, there is an investment demand zi,t that affects the subjective discount factor,
i.e., the importance of the present relative to the future. The lifetime preference of the
representative household is now given by:
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
βte−zi,tu (zc,t, ct, ch,t)
)
. (1.68)
I assume that zi,t follows an AR(2) processes with an i.i.d. Normal disturbance: zi,t =
ρi,1zi,t−1 + ρi,2 (zi,t−1 − zi,t−2) + ei,t. The assumption is designed to capture both the low-
frequency movement and the high-frequency zigzag pattern in investment. ei,t is a shock
to the investment demand.
Finally, as in the basic CU model, there is a consumption demand zc,t that affects the
marginal utility of consumption relative to the marginal dis-utility of labor. I assume that
zc,t follows an AR(1) process with an i.i.d. Normal disturbance and is also affected by
the disturbance to the investment demand as follows: zc,t = ρczc,t−1 + ec,t + ρciei,t. The
parameter ρci allows us to capture the divergence between consumption and capital in the
U.S. from 1968 to 1993.20 ec,t is a shock to the consumption demand.
All shocks, ec,t, ei,t, eg,t, and el,t, are mutually uncorrelated.
20Appendix 4.4 gives some further discussions and shows the estimated consumption series under in-
vestment demand shocks ei,t.
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1.5.2 Estimation
I use Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate the full CU model.21 Having four exoge-
nous shocks, I am able to match four detrended U.S. macro time series: real consumption,
real investment, real exogenous expenditure, and the amount of hours worked.22
To alleviate the burden on estimation, I choose nine calibration targets that must be
matched throughout this estimation procedure. The elasticity of inter-temporal substitu-
tion (EIS) is calibrated to 0.5. In the literature, the estimated EIS ranges roughly from
0 to 2 with a mean about 0.5 (e.g., Hall, 1988, Gruber, 2013, Havra´nek, 2015, and Best
et al., 2020). The exogenous expenditure to output ratio in steady state is matched to the
average ratio of the exogenous expenditure to GDP from 1947 to 2016 in the BEA NIPA.
The other seven calibration targets are the same as described in section 1.3.5.
Because of these targets, nine parameter values are not free to pick. Six parameters are
fixed as their values follow directly from the nine calibration targets. Three parameters
can be expressed as functions of other parameters and the nine calibration targets:
β = ((1− ω¯αv)Au− ω¯αfA+ 1− δ)−1 , (1.69)
αf = (l − αv (c+ i)− αgg) δ
Ai
, (1.70)
Λ = 1− ω¯αv. (1.71)
Table 1.4 summarizes these nine parameters and their mostly associated calibration tar-
gets.
The other parameters are estimated and their priors are assumed as follows. The standard
errors of the innovations follow an inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 0.03 and a
standard deviation of infinity. The persistence parameters of the stochastic processes, ρc,
ρg, ρi,1, and ρl, follow a uniform distribution which ranges from -1 to 1. The parameter ρi,2
that allows the investment demand to have a zigzag pattern and the parameter ρci that
allows the investment innovation to have an effect on the consumption demand both follow
a Normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.2. The parameter φl
that controls the relationship between the productivity at home and the productivity of
labor is uniformly distributed within the range from -1 to 1. The curvature of the capital
adjustment cost φk is normally distributed around 2 with a standard deviation of 1. The
21The model is log-linearized around the steady state and the estimation procedure is done with the
software platform Dynare.
22See Appendix 4.2 for a description of the data.
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Table 1.4: Parameters Pinned down by the Calibration Targets – Full CU Model
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 2.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 0.5
A 0.1235 Investment to output ratio 0.17
g 0.2000 Exogenous expenditure to output ratio 0.2
ω¯ 0.6798 Output normalized to 1
φ 0.6300 Price in utils normalized to 1
β Eq. (1.69) Capacity utilization rate 0.8
αf Eq. (1.70) Labor underutilization rate 0.088
Λ Eq. (1.71) Labor share of income 0.62
curvature of the investment adjustment cost φi is normally distributed around 0.2 with
a standard deviation of 0.1. The direct labor required per output in private sector αv
and the direct labor required per exogenous expenditure αg are both normally distributed
around 0.6 with a standard error of 0.3.
Table 1.5 summarizes the priors and shows the mode, the mean, and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distribution of the parameters obtained by the Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) algorithm.23
Based on the posterior modes of the structural parameters and the nine calibration targets,
the subjective discount factor β is 0.99, the indirect labor required per unit of capacity αf
is 0.20, and the unit cost of processing information Λ is 0.49, which implies that the price
elasticity of demand ε = Λ−1 is 2.06.
1.5.3 Variance Decomposition
What are the main driving forces of business cycles? Table 1.6 gives the forecast error
variance decomposition of output, consumption, investment, hours, and the capacity uti-
lization rate at a 10-year horizon based on the posterior modes of the parameters of the
full CU model.
According to the estimated full CU model, business cycle movements are primarily driven
by three types of demand shocks, i.e., the consumption demand, the investment demand,
and the exogenous expenditure shocks. Labor productivity shocks account for only 2.23
percent of the variation in output and 13.42 percent of the variation in hours. Among
these three types of demand shocks, consumption demand turns out to be the main driving
23Total number of MH draws is 100,000 and the acceptance ratio is about 23.5%.
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Table 1.5: Bayesian Estimation – Full CU Model
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean Std Dev Mode Mean 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
σc Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
σi Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05
σg Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
σl Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ρc Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
ρi,1 Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99
ρi,2 Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.25 -0.28 -0.38 -0.17
ρg Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
ρl Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.99
ρci Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.07
φl Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.39 0.92
φk Normal 2.00 1.00 2.01 2.17 1.20 3.07
φi Normal 0.20 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.26
αv Normal 0.60 0.30 0.76 0.75 0.63 0.86
αg Normal 0.60 0.30 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.67
Note: Std Dev stands for standard deviation (of the priors). The sample period is from the first
quarter of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017.
Table 1.6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (%)
Full CU Model Full VU Model
ec ei eg el ec ei eg el
Output Y 56.53 15.00 26.25 2.23 33.40 4.30 22.09 40.21
Consumption c 72.66 26.44 0.00 0.01 64.70 15.89 0.00 19.41
Investment i 78.70 12.75 0.00 8.56 12.58 0.74 0.00 86.69
Hours l 60.85 14.80 10.93 13.42 66.59 11.58 11.38 10.44
CU Rate u 71.50 22.03 0.00 6.47 27.50 10.54 0.00 61.96
Note: The forecast error variance decomposition for the estimated models at a 10-year (40-quarter)
horizon. CU Rate stands for capacity utilization rate.
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force of business cycles as most of the variations in consumption, investment, hours, and
the capacity utilization rate are explained by innovations to consumption demand.
For comparison, I extend the standard VU model described in section 1.4.1 by including
home production, capital and investment adjustment costs, exogenous expenditure, and
the four exogenous shocks in the same way as I did for the basic CU model. The extended
VU model is called the full VU model. The calibration and estimation procedure of the
full VU model is set to be as close as possible to that of the full CU model.24 The variance
decomposition results of the full VU model are listed in Table 1.6.
Consistent with the standard business cycle literature, a larger fraction of the variation in
output and most of the variation in investment are driven by labor productivity shocks.
However, labor productivity shocks cannot explain most of the variation in hours (see
Smets and Wouters, 2007, for a related discussion). In addition, consumption is not
volatile enough under labor productivity shocks (see Bai et al., 2012, for similar results
found in a standard RBC model). Therefore, standard models often rely on multiple types
of shocks to explain business cycles.
1.5.4 Impulse Responses and Discussions
To understand the variance decomposition results better, I plot the IRFs for both the full
CU model and the full VU model in Figure 1.6 based on the parameter values evaluated
at the posterior modes.
In the full CU model, a positive innovation to consumption demand leads to large in-
creases in consumption, investment, output, and hours. Not surprisingly, innovations to
consumption demand drive business cycles. A positive innovation to investment demand
leads to an increase in investment but a small decrease in consumption because the pa-
rameter ρci = −0.14 is estimated to be negative. A positive innovation to exogenous
expenditure increases output and hours but has no effect on private consumption and
investment because the exogenous expenditure is assumed to be produced independently
of the private sector. Finally, since φl is estimated to be about 0.64, which is quite close to
1, a positive innovation to labor productivity has only a small effect on consumption and
investment. As output does not increase that much, labor is displaced by the improved
labor productivity. The estimation result shows that the full CU model prefers to shut
down the effect of labor productivity shocks on output by setting φl close to 1 because
24See Appendix 4.3 for a detailed description of the calibration and estimation of the full VU model.
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Estimated Impulse Responses for the Full CU Model and the Full VU Model
Figure 1.6: Responses to a 1 percentage point increase in disturbances ec, ei, eg, and el. The solid
lines are the impulse responses for the full CU model. The dashed lines are the impulse responses
for the full VU model. All variables are expressed as log deviations from steady state.
the consumption demand channel works better than the labor productivity channel and
is powerful enough to explain most of the business cycle fluctuations.
In the full VU model, a positive innovation to consumption demand generates sizable
increases in consumption and hours but fails to generate a large increase in investment. A
positive innovation to investment demand or to exogenous expenditure does not generate
the desired business cycle co-movement for the same reason as in the full CU model.
Finally, φl is estimated to be about -0.02 in the full VU model, which is very close to 0.
Thus, a positive innovation to labor productivity can have a large effect on output. The
estimation result shows that the full VU model requires the labor productivity channel
to explain the business cycle fluctuations. However, the number of hours worked fails to
increase much under a positive labor productivity shock because there is an income effect
that dampens the response of hours to changes in the labor productivity. Hence, no single
type of shock in the full VU model is able to drive most of the business cycles fluctuations.
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1.5.5 Consumption Demand Drives Business Cycles
To highlight the role of consumption demand shocks in driving business cycles, I shut
down all the other types of shocks and feed only the consumption demand shocks into the
models. The structural shocks of the estimated models are backed out from the U.S. data
using the Kalman smoother technique.
Model Fitted Values Under Consumption Demand Shocks
Figure 1.7: The solid lines are for the full CU model. The dash-dotted lines are for the full VU
model. The dotted lines are the U.S. data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated recessions. The
data is from the BEA, the BLS, and the FRB. All variables are logarithms of the original series.
Figure 1.7 shows the model fitted values under consumption demand shocks. The full CU
model fits the U.S. data very well. In the full VU model, however, investment has little
response to consumption demand shocks and the Solow residual almost does not fluctuate.
Table 1.7 compares the main business cycle statistics of the fitted values with those of
the U.S. data. The business cycle properties of the full CU model under consumption
demand shocks are quite close to those of the data. Consumption demand shocks not only
generate sizable business cycle fluctuations but also generate the correct business cycle co-
movement among the key aggregate variables. Particularly, investment is highly volatile,
and consumption, investment, hours, and the Solow residual are as pro-cyclical as in the
U.S. data. Because of capital resource slackness, the real wage rate in the full CU model
is independent of demand and is fully determined by labor productivity. Hence, the real
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Table 1.7: Business Cycle Statistics
The U.S. Data Full CU Model (ec) Full VU Model (ec) Full VU Model (el)
Std Dev Cov w Y Std Dev Cov w Y Std Dev Cov w Y Std Dev Cov w Y
Output 1.62 1.00 1.76 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.58 1.00
Consumption 1.16 0.57 1.04 0.57 0.83 1.05 0.64 0.39
Investment 7.55 3.95 6.75 3.78 1.59 1.99 7.01 4.42
Hours 1.68 0.89 1.47 0.83 1.25 1.58 0.81 0.47
Solow Resid 1.00 0.39 0.89 0.48 0.03 0.02 1.16 0.72
Real Wage Rate 0.90 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.28 -0.35 1.25 0.77
Note: Std Dev stands for standard deviation. Cov w Y stands for covariance with output. Solow
Resid stands for Solow residual. Covariance with output is reported relative to the variance of
output. The U.S. data is from the BEA and the BLS. All variables are HP-filtered logarithms of
the original series.
wage rate is naturally acyclical under consumption demand shocks.
I also calculate the main business cycle statistics for the fitted values generated by the full
VU model under labor productivity shocks. The results are listed in the last three columns
of Table 1.7. Although labor productivity shocks in the full VU model can generate large
fluctuations in investment and the Solow residual, they fail to generate large movements
in hours and consumption. Hence, the full CU model under consumption demand shocks
not only outperforms the full VU model under consumption demand shocks but also
outperforms the full VU model under labor productivity shocks.
To sum up, the full VU model primarily relies on labor productivity shocks to generate
a volatile investment, but hours and consumption are not volatile enough under labor
productivity shocks. By contrast, when viewed through the lens of the full CU model,
consumption demand shocks can explain most of the business cycle fluctuations.
1.6 Conclusion
I build a macroeconomic model with chronic excess capacity. Buyers are not fully attentive
to prices as they are subject to an information processing cost. Because of this friction,
buyers search for capacity in a somewhat undirected way. Hence, firms with a larger
capacity are more likely to be visited by buyers. For a given amount of total demand
from buyers, if a firm expands its capacity relative to that of others, it steals demand from
its competitors. Furthermore, each unit of demand stolen is profitable because firms can
take advantage of the inattentive buyers to charge a positive net markup. Hence, from an
individual firm’s perspective, capacity expansion not only relaxes the capacity constraint
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but also steals profits from other firms. From an aggregate perspective, however, the only
value of capacity is to relax the capacity constraint. This capacity competition externality
encourages firms to over-invest in capacity and causes the economy to exhibit chronic
excess capacity.
When capacity is in excess, capital resources are slack and output is highly responsive to
demand shocks. I estimate a version of the capacity underutilization model. Quantita-
tively, consumption demand shocks can explain most of the business cycle fluctuations,
generating large responses in consumption, investment, and hours, an acyclical real wage
rate, and a pro-cyclical Solow residual, whereas labor productivity shocks explain only a
small fraction of the variations in output and hours. Hence, when viewed through the
lens of the capacity underutilization model, demand is the main driving force of business
cycles.
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Chapter 2
Difficulties of Demand Driving
Business Cycles in Efficient
Utilization Models
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study what prevents demand shocks from driving business cycles in
models with efficient capital or capacity utilization. Demand shocks can be divided into
two broad categories: real demand shocks and monetary demand shocks. This chapter
focuses on the role of real demand shocks in driving business cycles.
Investment demand shocks, such as news shocks, discount factor shocks, and investment
specific technology shocks are widely considered in the business cycle literature (e.g.,
Greenwood et al., 2000, Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009, and Justiniano et al., 2010). However,
Barro and King (1984) show that if consumption and leisure are both normal goods,
investment demand shocks fail to generate a positive co-movement among consumption,
investment, and hours in standard neoclassical models. The intuition is simple. If an
increase in investment causes an increase in hours, in the short run, the marginal product
of labor falls and the marginal dis-utility of labor rises relative to the marginal utility of
consumption. The former effect can be regarded as a result of capital resource tightness,
while the latter effect can be interpreted as a result of labor resource tightness. As it
becomes more difficult to obtain goods after an increase in investment, consumption is
crowded out. This mechanism is known as the Barro-King curse in the literature.
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Consumption demand shocks, such as taste shocks that change the marginal utility of
consumption relative to the marginal dis-utility of labor are not subject to the Barro-King
curse. If the desire for consumption increases, it is worthwhile for the economy to work
more. With a Cobb-Douglas production technology, labor can substitute capital fairly
easily. Thus, enough output can be squeezed out for consumption when more hours are
worked. If the increase in consumption demand is persistent enough, firms would also have
an incentive to invest for future, making consumption, investment, and hours to move in
the same direction.
However, the lack of resource slackness still limits the role of consumption demand shocks
in driving business cycles. Because of resource tightness, it is more difficult to obtain
goods in boom and much easier to obtain goods in recession; thus, the response of output
to demand shocks is dampened. Furthermore, because of capital resource tightness, the
marginal product of labor is countercyclical and the real wage rate is countercyclical, while
most of the evidence in the literature suggests that the real wage rate is either acyclical
or pro-cyclical (e.g., Bils, 1985, Solon et al., 1994, and Brandolini, 1995). Finally, the
labor productivity is countercyclical and the Solow residual is acyclical in the standard
neoclassical models under demand shocks.
Facing these difficulties, it is reasonable to think that if capital or capacity underutilization
can be introduced explicitly, we may be able to describe an economy with capital resource
slackness. Hence, the problems associated with demand-driven business cycles can be
alleviated or even removed.
Four different ways to model capital or capacity utilization existing in the literature are
reviewed in this chapter. First, capital may not be fully utilized because of a convex
utilization cost (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005 and Smets and Wouters, 2007). Second, if
plants are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, plants with a low productivity
ex post may be left idle (e.g., Cooley et al., 1995). Third, if firms face idiosyncratic
demand shocks, extra capacity is held as a precaution in case demand is high and firms
that experience a low demand ex post can have their capacity underutilized (e.g., Fagnart
et al., 1997 and Fagnart et al., 1999). Finally, if there are matching frictions in the goods
market, capacity expansion can reduce the tightness of the goods market and lower the
purchasing cost for buyers. Thus, firms have an incentive to supply extra capacity (e.g.,
Bai et al., 2012).
A common feature to these models is that capital, plant, or capacity is underutilized for a
cost-saving reason. In the variable capital utilization model, capital is unused because of
62
an increasing marginal cost of utilization. In the variable plant utilization model, plants
are left idle because the productivities of those plants are too low to compensate the cost
of labor. In the precautionary capacity model, extra capacity saves the expected cost
incurred to satisfy a unit of aggregate demand. In the competitive goods market search
model, extra capacity reduces market tightness and saves the purchasing cost for buyers.
Hence, none of these underutilization phenomena would mean that too much capital is
accumulated. In fact, I show that the capital stock chosen by firms minimizes the present
value of aggregate costs. This is true even when there are monopolistic distortions. In the
sense that the present value of aggregate costs is minimized, I say that capital accumulation
is partially efficient and these models are called efficient utilization models.1
I prove that as long as capital accumulation is partially efficient, aggregate capacity must
be fully utilized in the long run and capital resources must be tight locally around the
steady state. Hence, the efficient utilization models fail to incorporate chronic excess
capacity nor capital resource slackness. As a result, they tend to face the same issues as
the standard real business cycles (RBC) model does. For example, the response of output
to demand shocks is dampened and the real wage rate is countercyclical. Although the
magnitude of capital resource tightness can be made arbitrarily small in efficient utilization
models, making the real wage rate less countercyclical and consumption more responsive,
the response of investment to consumption demand shocks is inherently small. Intuitively,
precisely because capital resources are tight, there is a pro-cyclical upward pressure on the
real marginal cost that firms want to adjust their capital stock to mitigate. Thus, if capital
resources are not tight, firms will have no incentive to adjust capital. It turns out that
to generate a large relative volatility of investment to consumption under consumption
demand shocks, the efficient utilization models have to rely on capital resource tightness
to dampen the response of consumption and to provide an incentive for firms to adjust
capital. This, however, would cause the real wage rate to be too countercyclical.
Because of these difficulties, the existing literature has mainly turned to supply channels or
use multiple types of shocks to generate stylized business cycle fluctuations. For example,
Smets and Wouters (2007) emphasize on various types of supply shocks such as productiv-
ity shocks and markup shocks. Greenwood et al. (2000) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)
assume that if capital is used more intensively, it depreciates increasingly faster. This de-
preciation in use assumption allows investment specific technology shocks to work as labor
productivity shocks.2 In Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) and Ascari et al. (2019), nominal
1The name, “partial efficiency”, is based on the idea that capital accumulation is efficient in a partial
equilibrium, though not efficient in the general equilibrium.
2Johnson (1994) uses post-war data on the U.S. manufacturing sector to test the standard depreciation
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rigidities and accommodating monetary policy allow a decrease in markup to boost aggre-
gate supply after a positive investment demand shock.3 Justiniano et al. (2010) rely on
both productivity shocks and investment specific technology shocks to generate business
cycles. In Bai et al. (2012), the matching technology and the production technology com-
bined is of increasing returns to scale, and the model relies on both consumption demand
shocks and investment demand shocks to generate business cycle fluctuations.
The capacity underutilization (CU) model developed in Chapter 1 is not subject to the
difficulties that efficient utilization models have to face. In the CU model, firms are en-
couraged to over-invest in capital because capacity expansion can steal profitable demand
from other firms. I show that because of this capacity competition externality, capital
accumulation is not partially efficient, the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity, and
capital resources can be slack. A calibration exercise is conducted to show that consump-
tion demand shocks alone can generate realistic business cycle fluctuations in the CU
model. The theoretical finding that a single type of demand shock can explain most of
the business cycle fluctuations resonates with two recent empirical papers (e.g., Andrle
et al., 2017 and Angeletos et al., 2018). The results suggest that the capacity competition
externality is a powerful mechanism that can alleviate the dependence on supply channels
to drive business cycles, reviving the original idea proposed by Keynes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces a standard one-
good economy in which capital accumulation is partially efficient, a framework that is
often used in the business cycle literature. Section 2.3 reviews the four efficient utilization
models and shows that they are special cases of the standard one-good economy. Section
2.4 studies the properties of the standard one-good economy under consumption demand
shocks. First, I prove that when capital accumulation is partially efficient, aggregate
capacity must be fully utilized in steady state and capital resources must be tight locally
around the steady state. I then illustrate the difficulties of demand driving business cycles
in the standard one-good economy. Particularly, either investment is not volatile enough or
the real wage rate is too countercyclical under consumption demand shocks. In addition,
the labor productivity is too countercyclical and the Solow residual is not pro-cyclical
enough. Section 2.5 presents and calibrates a capacity underutilization model and shows
in use (DIU) model and finds that DIU is not the source of the observed variations in utilization. It is also
questionable whether depreciation is an important variable cost in the real world. A convex variable cost
of depreciation would imply a pro-cyclical share of depreciation cost in gross domestic product (GDP).
The ratio of consumption of fixed capital (CFC) to GDP published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
however, is strongly countercyclical. The usual business practice also considers depreciation as mainly a
fixed cost rather than a variable cost.
3Whether markups are countercyclical or not, however, is controversial in the literature (e.g., Nekarda
and Ramey, 2013).
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that the inclusion of a capacity competition externality is a possible solution to the above
difficulties. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A Standard One-Good Economy
In this section, I present a standard one-good economy model in which monopolistic dis-
tortions and price stickiness are the only sources of inefficiency. However, capital accumu-
lation decisions are not directly distorted. In this sense, I say that capital accumulation
is partially efficient. The economy is then viewed from an aggregate demand-aggregate
supply (AD-AS) perspective. Within this framework, monetary demand shocks, real de-
mand shocks, and supply shocks are formally defined. The definitions are consistent with
the common notions in the business-cycle literature. I show that with nominal rigidities,
monetary demand shocks work via a supply channel because they affect real aggregate
supply by affecting markups. Without nominal rigidities, the standard one-good economy
is subject to the Barro-King curse. At the end of this section, a standard RBC model is
calibrated and simulated as an example to illustrate the business-cycle properties of the
standard one-good economy under different types of shocks.
2.2.1 Setup
Households
Consider a continuum of identical households indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. Each provides a differ-
entiated labor service. The labor demanded by firms is an aggregation of the differentiated
labor services
lt =
(∫ 1
0
l
εw,t−1
εw,t
h,t dh
) εw,t
εw,t−1
, (2.1)
where lh,t is the amount of labor supplied by household h, lt is the amount of aggregate
labor, and εw,t > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two types of differentiated
labor services. Hence, the aggregation is of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
The labor demand faced by household h is given by
lh,t = lt
(
wh,t
wt
)−εw,t
, (2.2)
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where wh,t is the real wage rate charged by household h and wt =
(∫ 1
0 w
1−εw,t
h,t dh
) 1
1−εw,t is
the real wage rate of aggregate labor.
Each household aims to maximizes her expected lifetime utility
max
{ch,t,lh,t,wh,t,bh,t+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
βτ−1
)(
zc,tu
(
ch,t
zc,t
)
+ ω¯tv (1− lh,t)
)
, (2.3)
subject to her labor demand curve (2.2) and her budget constraint
ch,t + bh,t+1 = wh,tlh,t + dt +
bh,tPt−1
Pt
It, (2.4)
where βt−1 > 0 is the subjective discount factor that discounts the utility at time t to time
t − 1, zc,t > 0 and ω¯t > 0 are preference shocks, ch,t is the consumption of household h,
bh,t+1 is the real value of the risk free bonds that household h aims to carry to time t+ 1,
dt is the amount of dividends received from firms, Pt is the price of aggregate goods, and
It is the gross nominal interest rate.
Let λh,t ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian multiplier for the household’s budget constraint. Since all
households are identical, we have ∀h, λh,t = λt; and λt could be interpreted as the shadow
price of aggregate goods measured in terms of utils, or simply, the price in utils.
Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm produces a certain
type of differentiated goods. The aggregate goods demanded by households or firms are a
CES aggregation of the differentiated goods:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
εp,t−1
εp,t
j,t dj
) εp,t
εp,t−1
, (2.5)
where yj,t is the amount of differentiated goods produced by firm j, yt is the amount of
aggregate goods, and εp,t > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two types of
differentiated goods. The goods demand faced by firm j is given by
yj,t = yt
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−εp,t
, (2.6)
where Pj,t is the price charged by firm j and Pt =
(∫ 1
0 P
1−εp,t
j,t dj
) 1
1−εp,t is the price of
aggregate goods.
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The amount of labor lj,t that needs to be hired by firm j to produce yj,t units of dif-
ferentiated goods depends on the production technology used and the capital stock kj,t
held:
lj,t = z
−1
l,t L (yj,t, kj,t) , (2.7)
where zl,t > 0 is the labor productivity and L is the effective labor required as a function
of output and capital. Suppose that the labor cost is the only variable cost for the firm.
The variable cost function of the firm can be written as:
C (yj,t, kj,t; zl,t, wt) =
wt
zl,t
L (yj,t, kj,t) . (2.8)
I assume that the production technology is such that the variable cost function C satisfies
the following regularity conditions:
1. (Standard properties) The variable cost function C is non-negative, continuous, con-
vex, increasing in terms of output, and decreasing in terms of capital.
2. (Necessity of capital) The domain of the variable cost function dom (C) is either
given by {(y, k) | y ≥ 0, k ≥ χy}, where χ > 0, or given by {(y, k) | y ≥ 0, k > χy} ∪
{(0, 0)}, where χ ≥ 0. In the latter case, if y > 0 and k → χy, the variable cost
function converges to infinity: C (y, k; zl, w)→∞.
3. (Constant returns to scale) The variable cost function C is homogeneous of degree
one.
4. (Smoothly diminishing marginal returns to capital) If for a given y, there exists an
interval [a, b] on which the variable cost function is strictly decreasing in capital, then
C is twice differentiable in capital k on the interval (a, b) such that Ck (y, k; zl, w) < 0
and Ckk (y, k; zl, w) > 0.
Note that if χ > 0, there is a production limit which is the smallest upper bound on output:
y ≤ χ−1k. The Leontief production technology, the Cobb-Douglas production technology,
and the production technology with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between
capital and labor smaller than one, are all special cases of the technology described above.
Each firm aims to maximize the present value of dividend flows dj,t:
max
{yj,t,Pj,t,dj,t,ij,tkj,t+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
Qτ
)
dj,t, (2.9)
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subject to the demand curve (2.6), the resource constraint
dj,t + ij,t =
Pj,t
Pt
yj,t − C (yj,t, kj,t; zl,t, wt)− 1
2
φpyt
(
Pj,t
Pj,t−1
− 1
)2
, (2.10)
and the law of motion for capital
kj,t+1 = kj,t (1− δ) + zi,tij,t, (2.11)
where Qt+1 = βtλt+1/λt is the stochastic discount factor that discounts the value at time
t+ 1 to time t, ij,t is the investment made by firm j, φp ≥ 0 is a parameter that controls
the price stickiness, δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate, and zi,t > 0 is an investment specific
technology shock.
Monetary Policy, Aggregation, and Market Clearing
The central bank sets the gross nominal interest rate according to a simple Taylor rule:
It = zm,tΠφpit
(
yt
y
)φy
, (2.12)
where zm,t is a monetary policy shock, Πt ≡ PtPt−1 is the gross inflation rate, φpi > 1 and
φy ≥ 0 are parameters, and y is the aggregate output in steady state.
The aggregate demand should be equal to the aggregate supply:
ct + it +
1
2
φpyt
∫ 1
0
(Πj,t − 1)2 dj = yt, (2.13)
where ct =
∫ 1
0 ch,tdh is the aggregate consumption, it =
∫ 1
0 ij,tdj is the aggregate invest-
ment, and Πj,t ≡ Pj,tPj,t−1 is the gross inflation rate of firm j.
The aggregate labor demand should be equal to the aggregate labor supply:
∫ 1
0 lj,tdj = lt.
The risk free bonds are of zero net supply:
∫ 1
0 bh,tdh = 0.
The total amount of dividends received by households is equal to the total amount of
dividends distributed out by firms: dt =
∫ 1
0 dj,tdj.
Finally, the eight exogenous shocks, zc,t, ω¯t, εp,t, εw,t, zl,t, zi,t, βt, and zm,t, are mutually
independent and each follows a log-AR(1) process.
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2.2.2 Log-linearized Symmetric Equilibrium
Consider a symmetric equilibrium. If a variable is of the form xj,t, we have xi,t = xj,t for all
i, j ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, after obtaining the equilibrium conditions, we can omit the subscripts
that index a variable to a particular household or firm. Furthermore, if a variable is of
the form xt, its value in steady state is denoted by x. Let xˆt ≡ lnxt − lnx denote the
log-deviation of xt from its steady state x. The log-linearized symmetric equilibrium is
a stable stochastic process of nine variables (cˆt, λˆt, iˆt, wˆt, lˆt, kˆt+1, yˆt, Iˆt, and Πˆt) that
satisfies the household’s consumption condition
γ (zˆc,t − cˆt) = λˆt, (2.14)
where γ ≡ − u′′(c/zc)cu′(c/zc)zc > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, the
household’s labor supply condition
λˆt + wˆt = ˆ¯ωt + ηlˆt + µˆw,t, (2.15)
where η ≡ v′′(1−l)(−l)v′(1−l) > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and
µˆw,t = − 1
εw − 1 εˆw,t, (2.16)
is the log deviation of the wage markup, the firm’s pricing condition
0 = wˆt − zˆl,t + ζ
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ µˆp,t, (2.17)
where ζ ≡ Lyy(y,k)yLy(y,k) > 0 measures the convexity of the variable cost function (2.8) in steady
state and
µˆp,t = − 1
εp − 1
(
εˆp,t + φp
(
Πˆt − βEt
(
Πˆt+1
)))
(2.18)
is the log deviation of the price-cost markup, the firm’s investment condition
λˆt − zˆi,t = βˆt + Et
(
λˆt+1
)
+ β
wl
z−1i k
ζEt
(
yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
)
− β (r + δ)Et (µˆp,t+1)− β (1− δ)Et (zˆi,t+1) , (2.19)
where r ≡ β−1−1 > 0 is the real interest rate in steady state, the amount of labor required
for production
lˆt = −zˆl,t + ν
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ kˆt, (2.20)
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where ν ≡ Ly(y,k)yL(y,k) > 0 is the output elasticity of labor demand in steady state, the law of
motion for capital
kˆt+1 = kˆt (1− δ) + δ
(
iˆt + zˆi,t
)
, (2.21)
the aggregate resource constraint
c
y
cˆt +
i
y
iˆt = yˆt. (2.22)
the Fisher’s equation
λˆt = βˆt + Et
(
λˆt+1
)
+ Iˆt − Et
(
Πˆt+1
)
, (2.23)
and the monetary policy
Iˆt = φpiΠˆt + φyyˆt + zˆm,t. (2.24)
2.2.3 Sources of Inefficiency
Monopolistic power and price stickiness are the only sources of inefficiency. If markets
are perfectly competitive and prices are perfectly flexible, there is no resource loss due to
price adjustment costs and both the price-cost markup µp,t and the wage markup µw,t will
always be one. In this perfectly competitive case, one can verify that the real allocations
are efficient by comparing them with those implied by the corresponding social planner’s
problem:
max
{ct,yt,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
βτ−1
)(
zc,tu
(
ct
zc,t
)
+ ω¯tv
(
1− z−1l,t L (yt, kt)
))
, (2.25)
subject to ct + z
−1
i,t kt+1 = yt + z
−1
i,t kt (1− δ), where L is the effective labor required by the
social planner as a function of aggregate output and capital:
L (y, k) ≡ min
{yj ,kj}j∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
L (yj , kj) dj, (2.26)
subject to the CES aggregation (2.5) and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kjdj ≤ k. Note that
the above minimization problem is symmetric and convex. Thus, a symmetric allocation
solves the minimization problem and the required labor function of the social planner is
the same as the required labor function of firms: L (y, k) = L (y, k).
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2.2.4 Partially Efficient Capital Accumulation
Despite monopolistic power and price stickiness, the capital accumulation decisions made
by firms are not directly distorted. In this sense, capital accumulation is partially efficient.
Definition 2.1. (Partially efficient capital accumulation) Capital accumulation is said to
be partially efficient if and only if the capital stock chosen by firms in a decentralized way
minimizes the present value of aggregate costs:
min
{it,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
Qτ
)
(C (yt, kt; zl,t, wt) + it) , (2.27)
subject to the law of motion for aggregate capital kt+1 = kt (1− δ) + it, where C is the
aggregate variable cost as a function of aggregate demand and capital.
The aggregate variable cost function of the standard one-good economy is given by
C (y, k; zl, w) = min{yj ,kj}j∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
w
zl
L (yj , kj) dj, (2.28)
subject to the CES aggregation (2.5) and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kjdj ≤ k.
Since the problem is symmetric and convex, a symmetric allocation solves the minimization
problem, and the aggregate variable cost function is the same as the variable cost function
at the firm-level: C (y, k; zl, w) = C (y, k; zl, w). Therefore, the capital stock chosen by
firms in a decentralized way also minimizes the present value of aggregate costs.
The partial efficiency of capital accumulation does not mean that the aggregate capital
stock in equilibrium will be at the efficient level because monopolistic power and price
stickiness can still distort capital accumulation indirectly by affecting the stochastic dis-
count factor, the real wage rate, and the aggregate demand. However, the fact that the
capital accumulation decisions are not distorted directly has important consequences. It
will be shown later in section 2.4 that the partial efficiency of capital accumulation, to-
gether with regularity conditions 1-4, rules out chronic excess capacity and capital resource
slackness.
2.2.5 AD-AS System
The equilibrium system can be viewed from an aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AD-
AS) perspective, which is useful to clarify the concepts of demand and supply.
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Real Aggregate Demand
The household’s consumption condition (2.14) characterizes the consumption demand,
which describes a negative contemporaneous relationship between the price in utils λˆt and
consumption cˆt.
Substitute the capital law of motion (2.21) into the firm’s investment condition (2.19).
We get an equation that characterizes the investment demand, which describes a negative
contemporaneous relationship between the price in utils λˆt and investment iˆt:
λˆt = −ziβwl
k
ζ
(
δiˆt + (1− δ) kˆt
)
+ Et (Θt+1) + Ψt, (2.29)
where Θt+1 is a combination of future prices and output and Ψt is a combination of various
exogenous shocks.4
Combining the consumption demand condition (2.14), the investment demand condition
(2.29), and the aggregate resource constraint (2.22) gives us the real aggregate demand
(AD) condition
(
1 + ziβ
wl
k
ζ
δ
γ
c
i
)
λˆt = −ziβwl
k
ζ
(
δ
y
i
yˆt + (1− δ) kˆt
)
+ Et (Θt+1) + Ψt + ziβ
wl
k
ζδ
c
i
zˆc,t, (2.30)
which describes a negative contemporaneous relationship between the price in utils λˆt and
the aggregate demand yˆt.
Monetary Aggregate Demand
Combining the Fisher’s equation (2.23) and the monetary policy (2.24) gives us the mon-
etary AD condition
φpiΠˆt = −φyyˆt + λˆt + Et
(
Πˆt+1 − λˆt+1
)
− βˆt − zˆm,t, (2.31)
which describes a negative contemporaneous relationship between the monetary price Πˆt
and the aggregate demand yˆt.
4Θt+1 ≡ λˆt+1 + ziβ wlk ζyˆt+1 + β(r+δ)εp−1 φp
(
Πˆt+1 − βΠˆt+2
)
and Ψt ≡ βˆt + zˆi,t
(
1− ziβ wlk ζδ
) −
β (1− δ)Et (zˆi,t+1) + β(r+δ)εp−1 Et (εˆp,t+1) .
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Aggregate Supply
The aggregate supply (AS) condition can be obtained by combining the firm’s pricing
condition (2.17), the required labor for production (2.20), and the household’s labor supply
condition (2.15):
λˆt +
φp
εp − 1Πˆt = (ζ + ην)
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ ηkˆt + βEt
(
φp
εp − 1Πˆt+1
)
− 1
εp − 1 εˆp,t − (1 + η) zˆl,t −
1
εw − 1 εˆw,t +
ˆ¯ωt, (2.32)
which shows a positive contemporaneous relationship between the price in utils λˆt and the
aggregate supply yˆt. If prices are sticky (φp > 0), the AS condition (2.32) also shows a
positive contemporaneous relationship between the monetary price Πˆt and the aggregate
supply yˆt. Hence, the AS condition is also known as the New Keynesian Philips Curve
(NKPC) in the business cycle literature (e.g., Woodford, 2005).
Reduced Equilibrium System
The equilibrium system can now be reduced to a stable stochastic process of four variables
(yˆt, λˆt, Πˆt, and kˆt+1) that satisfies the real AD condition (2.30), the monetary AD condition
(2.31), the AS condition (2.32), and the law of motion for capital (2.21).
For a given set of state variables, the short run equilibrium is characterized by yˆt, λˆt,
and Πˆt, and is pinned down by the real AD (2.30), the monetary AD (2.31), and the AS
(2.32) conditions, which are surfaces in the output-price in utils-monetary price space.
For example, Figure 2.1 shows these three surfaces in a standard one-good economy. The
upper right panel of Figure 2.1 shows that a positive shock to the nominal interest rate
moves the monetary AD surface inward, causing a lower inflation rate. The intersection
of the real AD surface and the monetary AD surface projected on the output-price in utils
plane gives us a downward sloping real AD curve. Since the real AD surface is orthogonal
to the output-price in utils plane, a shift in the monetary AD surface has no effect on the
real AD curve. The intersection curve of the AS surface and the monetary AD surface
projected on the output-price in utils plane gives us an upward sloping real AS curve.
When there are nominal rigidities, moving the monetary AD surface inward would cause
a lower output and move the real AS curve to the left.
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AD-AS System
Figure 2.1: The solid surfaces and the solid lines represent a standard one-good economy in
steady state. The dotted surface and the dashed lines represent the same one-good economy with
a positive shock to the nominal interest rate that shifts the monetary AD surface inward. Each
line on a surface is the intersection line of the surface and the monetary AD surface.
Demand and Supply
Definition 2.2. (Demand shocks and supply shocks) A real demand shock is a shock
that disturbs the real AD condition (2.30). A monetary demand shock is a shock that
disturbs the monetary AD condition (2.31). A supply shock is a shock that disturbs the
AS condition (2.32).
I now classify the eight exogenous shocks based on the above definition.
An increase in the marginal utility of consumption zˆc,t is a positive real demand shock as
it increases the consumption demand.
An increase in the dis-utility of labor ˆ¯ωt is a negative supply shock as it reduces the labor
supply.
An increase in patience βˆt is both a positive real demand shock as it increases investment
demand and a negative monetary demand shock as it creates a deflationary pressure by
74
making money hoarding more attractive.
An increase in the labor demand elasticity εˆw,t, which is similar to a decrease in the labor
dis-utility, is a positive supply shock as it increases the supply of labor by lowering the
wage markup.
An increase in the goods demand elasticity εˆp,t is a positive supply shock as it lowers
the price-cost markup. In addition, if the increase in the goods demand elasticity εˆp,t
is persistent, the expected increase of εˆp,t+1 is also a positive real demand shock as it
increases the investment return by reducing the price-cost markup in the future.
An improvement in the investment specific technology zˆi,t could be a positive or a negative
real demand shock depending on the parameter values. On one hand, the improved in-
vestment specific technology lowers the cost of investment and boosts investment demand.
On the other hand, the improved investment specific technology makes the investment
more efficient; thus, less investment is required to achieve the desired capital level in the
future. For example, if the convexity of the variable cost function in steady state ζ is low
enough, the first effect dominates and the improved investment specific technology works
as a positive real demand shock. However, if ζ is sufficiently high, the second effect dom-
inates and the improved investment specific technology becomes a negative real demand
shock.
An increase in the labor productivity zˆl,t is clearly a positive supply shock.
Finally, an increase in the nominal interest rate zˆm,t is a negative monetary demand shock
as it creates a deflationary pressure.
2.2.6 New Keynesian Mechanism
The AD-AS framework illustrates how monetary demand shocks affect the real economy.
Consider a positive shock to the nominal interest rate, which shifts inward the monetary
AD surface and creates a deflationary pressure. The intersection curve of the monetary
AD surface and the AS surface moves inward along the AS surface. When there are
nominal rigidities (φp > 0), the intersection curve falls and corresponds to a lower level
of output (see the lower left panel of Figure 2.1). Hence, the real AS curve, which is the
projection of the intersection curve on the output-price in utils plane, moves to the left
(see the lower right panel of Figure 2.1). In this sense, a negative monetary demand shock
works like a negative shock on the real AS, causing a fall in output and a rise in price in
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utils. Intuitively, as it is costly to adjust prices, the deflationary pressure would cause an
increase in the price-cost markup, exacerbating the monopolistic distortion that depresses
the real AS.
2.2.7 Barro-King Curse
Without nominal rigidities, the standard one-good economy is subject to the Barro-King
curse. Consider, for example, a positive investment demand shock, which shifts the real
AD curve outward and moves the equilibrium along the upward sloping real AS curve.
As we can see from the AS condition (2.32), the real AS curve is upward sloping because
the variable cost function is convex (ζ > 0) and because the utility of leisure is concave
(η ≥ 0). Hence, both output and the price in utils increase. According to the household’s
consumption condition (2.14), consumption must fall when the price in utils increases.
But investment and hours must rise because output increases. Therefore, an increase in
investment demand crowds out consumption, causing consumption, investment, and hours
to move in different directions.
2.2.8 Standard RBC Model: An Example
To end this section, I use a standard RBC model as an example to illustrate the business
cycle properties of the one-good economy under different types of shocks.
Suppose that prices are perfectly flexible (φp = 0) and all markets are perfectly com-
petitive. Shocks to the price elasticity of goods demand and the wage elasticity of labor
demand are no longer considered as both converge to infinity: εp →∞ and εw →∞. The
production function for the standard RBC model is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas (CD):
yt = (zl,tlt)
α k1−αt , where α ∈ (0, 1) is the CD share of labor. The required effective labor
is given by L (y, k) = y
1
αk1−
1
α and the convexity of the variable cost function in steady
state is ζ = 1−αα > 0.
Calibration
There are seven parameters remained to be calibrated. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated
to match the average ratio of gross private domestic investment to private fixed assets
from 1947 to 2016 in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The curvature of the consumption utility
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Table 2.1: Parameters and Calibration Targets – Standard RBC
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 1.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
η 0.0000 Frisch elasticity of labor supply ∞
α 0.6200 Labor share of income 0.62
β 0.9747 Investment to output ratio 0.17
γ is calibrated to give an elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of 1, which corresponds
to a log utility of consumption. The curvature of the dis-utility of labor η is chosen to
imply an infinite Frisch elasticity of labor supply as in the indivisible labor setup (e.g.,
Hansen, 1985 and Rogerson, 1988). This choice of η helps the RBC model to generate a
sizable labor volatility under productivity shocks (e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999). The CD
share of labor α is calibrated to match the average labor share of income estimated by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from 1946 to 2016. The subjective discount factor
in steady state β is calibrated to be such that the investment to output ratio in steady
state is equal to the average of the gross private domestic investment to the gross domestic
product (GDP) ratio from 1947 to 2016 in the NIPA.
Table 2.1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and their mostly associated targets.
Quantitative Results and Discussions
Tables 2.2 compares the business cycle statistics in the calibrated RBC model under dif-
ferent shocks with those in the data. There are five stylized business-cycle facts that we
aim to match simultaneously using a single type of shock. First, there is a co-movement
between consumption, investment, and hours. Second, the volatility of investment is much
larger than the volatility of consumption. Third, the real wage rate is not too counter-
cyclical.5 Fourth, the labor productivity measured as the output to labor ratio is not too
countercyclical. Fifth, the Solow residual measured based on the average labor share of
income is strongly pro-cyclical.
The investment specific technology shock zi,t and the patience shock βt are both shocks to
5The cyclicality of the real wage rate shown in Table 2.2 is for the average real wage rate of the business
sector deflated with the GDP deflator. For robustness, Appendix 4.6 shows the cyclicality of the average
real wage rates of different sectors including the business sector, the no-farm sector, and the non-financial
corporations. The average nominal wage rates are deflated using different deflators, e.g., the GDP deflator,
the consumer price index (CPI), and the own sector deflator. The results show that the real wage rates
on average are roughly acyclical. It is also well known in the literature that cyclicality of the average real
wage rate tends to underestimate the pro-cyclicality of the real wage rate at the individual level because
of a composition bias (e.g., Bils, 1985).
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investment demand. Both are subject to the Barro-King curse and thus fail to generate
the co-movement between consumption, investment, and hours. A positive investment
demand shock, though induces more hours, inevitably crowds out consumption.
The consumption demand shock zc,t is not subject to the Barro-King curse because the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is directly affected. Hence,
consumption and hours can move in the same direction. If the shock is persistent, the
desire to invest could be strong enough so that there is a co-movement among consumption,
investment, and hours. However, the relative volatility of investment to consumption is
too small. Intuitively, capital resources are tight in the RBC model: a short run increase
in output would cause an increase in the real marginal cost of production and a decrease
in the marginal product of labor. Thus, it is not wise to concentrate investment in a single
period. The tendency to smooth investment under consumption demand shocks causes a
small volatility of investment relative to that of consumption.
The labor dis-utility shock ω¯t is able to generate a co-movement between consumption, in-
vestment, and hours and a large relative volatility of investment to consumption. However,
like all other shocks that do not affect productivity, e.g., zc,t, zi,t, βt, the labor dis-utility
shock ω¯t generates a strongly countercyclical real wage rate, a strongly countercyclical
labor productivity, and an acyclical Solow residual.
The labor productivity shock zl,t turns out to be the only type of shock that can generate all
the stylized business-cycle facts. Therefore, the business cycle literature tends to consider
productivity shocks as the primary driving forces of business cycles since RBC theory
has been introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982). This view, however, contradicts
the Keynes tradition which emphasizes on real demand shocks as the main driving forces
of business cycles. The new Keynesian (NK) literature developed based on RBC theory
tries to re-introduce the importance of demand by including nominal rigidities. However,
the standard NK literature emphasizes more on the effectiveness of monetary demand
than on the importance of real demand. For shocks that directly affect the real economy,
supply shocks, including productivity shocks and markup shocks, remain to be the most
important (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007).
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Table 2.2: Business Cycle Statistics – Standard RBC
The U.S. Data zc,t zi,t βt ω¯t zl,t
Persistence ρ 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99
ρ (c, h) 0.58 [0.42, 0.72] 0.88 0.96 -0.99 -0.91 -0.99 -0.93 0.42 0.90 0.39 0.83
ρ (c, i) 0.68 [0.57, 0.78] -1.00 0.93 -0.99 -0.90 -0.99 -0.92 0.40 0.86 0.40 0.86
σi/σc 6.49 [5.55, 7.42] 4.34 5.08 13.4 12.3 13.5 12.9 58.6 8.44 58.6 8.44
Cov(w,y)/σ2y 0.08 [−0.03, 0.18] -0.30 -0.60 -0.66 -0.54 -0.66 -0.55 -0.64 -0.59 0.05 0.43
Cov(LP,y)/σ2y 0.11 [0.00, 0.21] -0.30 -0.60 -0.66 -0.54 -0.66 -0.55 -0.64 -0.59 0.05 0.43
Cov(SR,y)/σ2y 0.39 [0.30, 0.49] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.63
Note: ρ (x1, x2) stands for the correlation coefficient between x1 and x2. σi/σc is the relative
volatility of investment to consumption. Cov(w,y)/σ2y stands for the covariance between x and
output relative to the variance of output. The brackets are the 95% confidence intervals calculated
using a parametric bootstrapping method (see Appendix 4.5 for details). The U.S. data is from
the BEA and the BLS. A path of 5,000 quarters is simulated to calculate the statistics for each
calibrated model. All variables are Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered logarithms of the original series.
2.3 Efficient Utilization Models: Special Cases of the Stan-
dard One-Good Economy
As consumption demand shocks are not subject to the Barro-King curse, they seem promis-
ing in reviving the idea of Keynes.6 However, under consumption demand shocks, the
relative volatility of investment to consumption tends to be too small because of capital
resource tightness. If there is some unused capital or capacity, we might be able to live in
an economy with capital resource slackness, and thus, the issues related to consumption
demand shocks might be resolved. This possibility will be discussed in the rest of the
chapter. From now on, I will focus on the role of consumption demand shocks and restrict
myself to a real economy with perfectly flexible prices.
In this section, I introduce four different methods in the literature that model capital or
capacity utilization explicitly. First, capital may not be fully utilized because of a convex
utilization cost (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005 and Smets and Wouters, 2007). Second, if
plants are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, plants with a low productivity
ex post may be left idle (e.g., Cooley et al., 1995). Third, if firms face idiosyncratic
demand shocks, extra capacity is held as a precaution in case demand is high and firms
that experience a low demand ex post can have their capacity underutilized (e.g., Fagnart
6There are models in the literature that can overcome the Barro-King curse (e.g., Jaimovich and
Rebelo, 2009, Khan and Tsoukalas, 2011, and Ascari et al., 2019). Three methods are often used. First,
the Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences are used to reduce the short run wealth effect on the supply of labor.
However, as long as consumption and leisure are still normal goods, the Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences
alone will not be enough to break the Barro-King curse. Second, depreciation in use is assumed so that
the investment specific technology shock can partly work as a labor productivity shock. Third, production
networks and trend growth rate are introduced to flatten the NKPC. From the perspective of the one-good
economy developed here, the second methods adds a labor productivity shock, while the third strengthens
the role of nominal rigidities that endogenously move markups. Hence, both work via a supply channel:
an increase in real aggregate demand is simultaneously accompanied with an increase in real aggregate
supply.
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et al., 1997 and Fagnart et al., 1999). Finally, if there are matching frictions in the goods
market, capacity expansion can reduce the tightness of the goods market and lower the
purchasing cost for buyers. Thus, firms have an incentive to supply extra capacity (e.g.,
Bai et al., 2012).
However, despite unused capital, plants, or capacity at the firm-level, I show that the
economy described by these methods has no fundamental difference from the standard
one-good economy developed in section 2.2, the capital accumulation decisions made by
firms are still partially efficient, and the whole economy can even be fully efficient if
markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, the efficient utilization models would have to
face the same issues as the standard one-good economy does.
2.3.1 Variable Capital Utilization
Technology and Cost Minimization
The production function of a representative firm is given by F (θtkt, lt), where θt is the
capital utilization rate. The production function F is assumed to be twice differentiable,
concave, and homogeneous of degree one. The derivatives of F satisfy: FK > 0, FL > 0,
and FKK < 0. Both the capital and the labor are assumed to be necessary such that
∀x ≥ 0, F (0, x) = F (x, 0) = 0.
The cost of utilizing capital is assumed to be paid in the firm’s own product and is given
by a (θt) kt, which is non-negative a ≥ 0, increasing a′ > 0, and convex a′′ > 0 in terms of
the capital utilization rate. The representative firm acts as a price taker and chooses its
labor and capital utilization rate to minimize its variable cost:
C (yt, kt;wt) = min
θt≥0,lt≥0
wtlt, (2.33)
subject to yt ≤ F (θtkt, lt)− a (θt) kt. Suppose that there is an upper limit for the capital
utilization rate θ¯. Because of the convex utilization cost, it could be optimal for firms to
choose a utilization rate smaller than θ¯, generating a notion of capital underutilization.
Following the convention in the literature, I assume that the upper limit θ¯ is infinite,
a′ (0) = 0, and if θ →∞, a′ (θ)→∞. These assumptions ensure the existence of an interior
solution. One can show that the labor and the capital utilization rate that solve the above
minimization problem exist uniquely. Both will be positive if yt > 0. By the envelope
theorem and the implicit function theorem, C is non-negative, twice differentiable, and
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homogeneous of degree one; and Cy > 0, Ck < 0, and Ckk > 0. Finally, the necessity of
capital can be proved by contradiction.7
Partially Efficient Capital Accumulation
The aggregate variable cost incurred to satisfy the aggregate demand yt is the same as
the variable cost function of the representative firm: C (yt, kt;wt) = C (yt, kt;wt). Hence,
the capital stock determined by firms in a decentralized way also minimizes the present
value of aggregate costs, that is, the capital accumulation is partially efficient. With a
standard household’s problem as described in section 2.2, the variable capital utilization
model developed here is a special case of the standard one-good economy.
Perfectly Competitive Markets and Efficiency
Assume further that all markets are perfectly competitive. The economy is efficient and
can be summarized as a social planner’s problem:
max
{ct,yt,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
zc,tu
(
ct
zc,t
)
+ ω¯v (1− L (yt, kt))
)
, (2.34)
subject to ct + kt+1 = yt + kt (1− δ), where the labor required by the social planner L is
given by
L (Yt, kt) = min
lt≥0,θt≥0
lt (2.35)
subject to yt ≤ F (θtkt, lt)− a (θt) kt. Hence, the efficient variable utilization model works
just like the RBC model except that the required labor function L is different.
2.3.2 Variable Plant Utilization
Technology and Cost Minimization
Consider a representative firm who owns a continuum of identical plants with measure
mt. A plant can either be operated or not. If a plant j ∈ [0,mt] is operated, it requires
k0 units of capital and h0 units of hours as inputs and the output of the plant is 1 + sj,t,
7For a given positive aggregate demand y > 0, if there is an upper bound for C as k → 0, l∗ that
solves the cost minimization problem has an upper bound: l∗ ≤ l¯. Therefore, y ≤ F (θk, l¯) − a (θ) k ≤
F
(
θ∗k, l¯
) − a (θ∗) k ≤ F (θ∗k, l¯), where θ∗ > 0 maximizes the net output: FK (θ∗k, l¯) = a′ (θ∗). By the
implicit function theorem, θ∗ decreases with k. If θ∗ has an upper bound as k → 0, then θ∗k → 0. If θ∗
increases without limit as k → 0, a′ (θ∗) increases without limit. Since FK
(
θ∗k, l¯
)
= a′ (θ∗), we have again
that θ∗k → 0. To sum up, y ≤ F (θ∗k, l¯)→ 0, a contradiction to that y > 0.
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where sj,t is a plant specific productivity shock distributed independently and identically
distributed across time and plants. Following Cooley et al. (1995), sj,t is assumed to be
uniformly distributed on the interval [−σ, σ], where σ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that captures
the volatility of the plant specific shock.
The capital stock of the plants have to be installed one period before the realizations of
the plant specific shocks. Suppose that the representative firm carries kt units of capital
stock at the beginning of the period t. The measure of plants that the firm owns is given
by mt = kt/k0.
8 The representative firm chooses the fraction of plants operated nt ∈ [0, 1]
to minimize the variable cost. High productivity plants shall be operated first. Hence, for
a given nt, there is a threshold given by s
∗ (nt) = σ − 2σnt: plants with a productivity
larger than s∗ (nt) will be operated and plants with a productivity smaller than s∗ (nt)
will be left idle. The cost minimization problem of the firm is summarized below:
C (yt, kt;wt) ≡ min
nt∈[0,1],lt≥0
wtlt, (2.36)
subject to the production constraint yt ≤ ktk−10
∫ σ
σ−2σnt (1 + s)
1
2σds and the required
labor for production ntktk
−1
0 h0 ≤ lt. Because of the heterogeneous plant productivities,
the higher the plant utilization rate is, the smaller the productivity of the marginal plant.
Therefore, the firm may find it optimal to choose a utilization rate smaller than one,
generating a notion of plant underutilization.
The labor and the plant utilization rate that solve the above minimization problem are
uniquely pinned down by the two constraints:yt = ktk
−1
0
(
(1 + σ)nt − σn2t
)
and lt =
ntktk
−1
0 h0. The former shows that the output is a strictly increasing and concave function
of the plant utilization rate nt. By the implicit function theorem, one can show that C is
non-negative, twice differentiable, and homogeneous of degree one; and Cy > 0, Ck < 0,
and Ckk > 0. In addition, there exists a constant χ = k0 > 0 that sets a production limit
on output: yt ≤ χ−1kt = k−10 kt, which can be achieved if and only if all plants are utilized
(nt = 1).
8The original fixed-plant economy set up by Cooley et al. (1995) assumes that the measure of plants
mt is fixed and the capital stock kt is used to increase the productivity of plants. However, since the
measure of plants is fixed, the aggregate production function will be of decreasing returns to scale in terms
of capital and labor. I restore constant returns to scale by assuming that the measure of plants is fixed in
the short run but the capital stock is used to expand the measure of plants in the long run.
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Partially Efficient Capital Accumulation
The aggregate variable cost incurred to satisfy the aggregate demand yt is the same as
the variable cost function of the representative firm: C (yt, kt;wt) = C (yt, kt;wt). Hence,
the capital stock chosen by firms in a decentralized way also minimizes the present value
of aggregate costs, that is, the capital accumulation is partially efficient. With a standard
household’s problem as described in section 2.2, the plant utilization model is a special
case of the standard one-good economy.
Perfectly Competitive Markets and Efficiency
If all markets are perfectly competitive, the economy is efficient and can be summarized
as a social planner’s problem:
max
{ct,yt,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
zc,tu
(
ct
zc,t
)
+ ω¯v (1− L (yt, kt))
)
, (2.37)
subject to ct + kt+1 = yt + kt (1− δ), where the labor required by the social planner L is
given by
L (yt, kt) = min
nt∈[0,1],lt≥0
lt, (2.38)
subject to the production constraint yt ≤ ktk−10
(
(1 + σ)nt − σn2t
)
and the required labor
for production ntktk
−1
0 h0 ≤ lt. Hence, the efficient plant utilization model works just like
the RBC model except that the required labor function L is different.
2.3.3 Demand Uncertainty and Precautionary Capacity
Technology and Cost Minimization
There is a continuum of firms with measure one. Each is indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and produces
a certain type of differentiated goods. The aggregated goods demanded by households and
firms is a CES aggregation of the differentiated goods:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
v
1
ε
j,ty
ε−1
ε
j,t dj
) ε−1
ε
, (2.39)
where yj,t is the amount of differentiated goods produced by firm j, vj,t is the firm specific
quality shock that affects the demand faced by firm j, yt is the amount of aggregate goods,
and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods. The demand
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faced by firm j is given by
yj,t = vj,tp
−ε
j,t yt, (2.40)
where pj,t = Pj,t/Pt is the real price charged by firm j and Pt =
(∫ 1
0 vj,tP
1−ε
j,t dj
) 1
1−ε
is
the aggregate price. Equation (2.40) shows that vj,t can also be interpreted as a demand
shock for the firm. Following Fagnart et al. (1997), vj,t is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time and firms, and is drawn from a log-normal
distribution with mean of one and standard deviation of σ > 0.
Each firm operates with a Leontief production technology. The cost minimization problem
of an individual firm is given by:
C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) = min
lj,t≥0
wtlj,t, (2.41)
subject to the Leontief production function yj,t ≤ min {lj,t/αv, Akj,t}, where αv > 0 is
the required labor per output and A > 0 is the productivity of capital. The labor that
solves the above minimization problem is uniquely pinned down by the required labor for
production: lj,t = αvyj,t. Since capacity is installed one period before the realization of
the firm specific quality shocks, if the realized shock to demand vj,t is low enough, some
capacity will be left idle, generating a notion of capacity underutilization.
Aggregate Variable Cost
The aggregate variable cost incurred to satisfy the aggregate demand is not as simple as
the variable cost function for an individual firm. For a given aggregate demand yt and
an aggregate capital stock kt, the aggregate variable cost function takes all firms and all
possible realizations of the quality shocks into account:
C (yt, kt;wt) = min{yj,t(v)≥0,kj,t≥0}j∈[0,1],v≥0
wt
∫
v
∫ 1
0
αvyj,t (v) djdF (v) , (2.42)
subject to a CES aggregation constraint
yt ≤
∫
v
(∫ 1
0
v (j)
1
 yj,t (v)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
dF (v) , (2.43)
the capacity constraint yj,t (v) ≤ Akj,t, and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt,
where v is a possible realization of the quality shocks, v (j) gives the realized quality of
firm j, yj,t (v) denotes the output allocated to firm j if the realized quality shocks are
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v, and F is the distribution of the quality shocks. Note that the capital allocation has
to be made before the realization of the firm specific quality shocks. Hence, kj,t is not
contingent on v.
Because the above minimization problem is strictly convex and symmetric in j, an allo-
cation that minimizes the aggregate variable cost must be symmetric in j such that ∀j,
yj,t (v) = yt (v (j)), and kj,t = kt. Hence, by the law of large numbers, the expected labor
cost (2.42) is reduced to wt
∫
v
∫ 1
0 αvyt (v (j)) djdF (v) = wt
∫∞
0 αvyt (v) f (v) dv, where v
is a possible realization of the quality shock of a firm and f is the probability density
function of the quality shock. By the same argument, the CES aggregation constraint
(2.43) is reduced to
yt ≤
(∫ ∞
0
v
1
 yt (v)
−1
 f (v) dv
) 
−1
. (2.44)
The cost minimization problem can be rewritten as
C (yt, kt;wt) = min{yt(v)≥0}v≥0
wt
∫ ∞
0
αvyt (v) f (v) dv, (2.45)
subject to the simplified CES aggregation constraint (2.44) and the capacity constraint
yt (v) ≤ Akt.
To solve the simplified minimization problem (2.45), note that there is a threshold v∗t ≥ 0
that determines whether the capacity constraint is binding or not. If a firm experiences
a quality shock v that is larger than v∗t , the output allocated to the firm will be equal
to its capacity. If the firm experiences a quality shock v that is smaller than v∗t , the
output allocated to the firm will be smaller than its capacity and fall proportionally with
v because it is now less attractive to use the goods from the firm to satisfy the aggregate
demand. To sum up, we have
yt (v) =

v
v∗t
Akt, v ≤ v∗t ,
Akt, v > v
∗
t .
(2.46)
A smaller v∗t corresponds to a larger fraction of firms having their capacity fully utilized,
and thus, a higher labor cost:
C (yt, kt;wt) = wtαv
(
1
v∗t
∫ v∗t
0
vf (v) dv +
∫ ∞
v∗t
f (v) dv
)
Akt. (2.47)
Therefore, v∗t in optimum should be as large as possible, making the CES aggregation
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constraint (2.44) binding:
yt = Akt
(
(v∗t )
− −1

∫ v∗t
0
vf (v) dv +
∫ ∞
v∗t
v
1
 f (v) dv
) 
−1
. (2.48)
By the implicit function theorem, one can show that C is non-negative, twice differentiable,
and homogeneous of degree one; and Cy > 0, Ck < 0, and Ckk > 0. In addition, there exists
a constant χ > 0 that sets a production limit: yt ≤ χ−1kt =
(∫∞
0 v
1
 f (v) dv
) 
−1
Akt,
which can be achieved if and only if all capacity is fully utilized (v∗t →∞).
Partially Efficient Capital Accumulation
When each firm makes its own investment decision, it has to face some demand uncertainty
as the firm specific quality shocks have not yet been realized. Hence, it is the gross profit in
expectation that matters for capital accumulation. The gross profit of firm j is a function
the firm’s capital stock and the firm’s realized quality shock:
pi (kj,t, vj,t;wt, yt) = max
pj,t≥0,yj,t≥0
pj,tyj,t − C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) , (2.49)
subject to the demand function (2.40) and the capacity constraint yj,t ≤ Akj,t. The
expected gross profit is given by
∫ ∞
0
pi (kj,t, v;wt, yt) f (v) dv, (2.50)
which is strictly concave in capital. Although capacity may be underutilized in low demand
cases, capacity expansion can still relax the capacity constraint if demand turns out to
be high, justifying the value of extra capacity as a precaution. The same logic justifies
the value of extra capacity in the aggregate variable cost minimization problem (2.42).
Since all firms are identical ex ante, one can verify that in equilibrium, the return of
capital viewed from a representative firm’s perspective is the same as that viewed from an
aggregate perspective:
∫ ∞
0
pik (kt, v;wt, yt) f (v) dv = −Ck (yt, kt;wt) . (2.51)
Thus, the capital stock chosen by firms in a decentralized way also minimizes the present
value of aggregate costs, that is, the capital accumulation is partially efficient. With a
standard household’s problem as described in section 2.2, the precautionary capacity model
developed by Fagnart et al. (1997) is a special case of the standard one-good economy.
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Perfectly Competitive Markets and Efficiency
If there are infinitely many firms that can produce the same differentiated goods j, the
goods markets become perfectly competitive. If the labor market is also perfectly com-
petitive, the economy is efficient and can be summarized as a social planner’s problem:
max
{ct,yt,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
zc,tu
(
ct
zc,t
)
+ ω¯v (1− L (yt, kt))
)
, (2.52)
subject to ct + kt+1 = yt + kt (1− δ), where the labor required by the social planner L is
given by
L (yt, kt) = min{yj,t(v)≥0,kj,t≥0}j∈[0,1],v≥0
∫
v
∫ 1
0
αvyj,t (v) djdF (v) , (2.53)
subject to the CES aggregation constraint (2.43), the capacity constraint yj,t (v) ≤ Akj,t,
and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt. Hence, the efficient precautionary capacity
model works just like the RBC model except that the required labor function L is different.
2.3.4 Competitive Search in the Goods Market
Technology and Cost Minimization
Suppose that demand has to be matched with supply before a unit of goods can be pro-
duced and sold. Let Dt denote the total amount of goods requested by buyers, or simply,
the demand from buyers. Let St denote the total amount of goods that could potentially
be produced by firms, or the total capacity supplied. The matching technology, which
determines the amount of goods sold and produced, is given by the following matching
function
yt = M (Dt, St) ≡
(
D
−1

t + S
−1

t
) 
−1
, (2.54)
where  < 1 is a parameter that controls the matching efficiency. For  ∈ (0, 1), we have
yt < min {Dt, St} for any Dt, St > 0. Hence, in general, there will be some matching
frictions that prevent the demand requested by buyers from being fully fulfilled and the
capacity supplied by firms from being fully utilized.
The buyer, who could be a household that needs consumption or a firm that needs invest-
ment, has to hire some labor for purchasing. For each unit of demand requested, φ > 0
units of labor are required.
The firm, who wants to supply some capacity, also has to hire some labor and install
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some capital. Suppose that there is a continuum of identical firms with measure one.
Each is indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The capacity that could be supplied by firm j is given
by a production function, Sj,t ≤ F (kj,t, lj,t), which is assumed to be twice differentiable,
concave, and homogeneous of degree one. In addition, FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, and
∀x ≥ 0, F (0, x) = F (x, 0) = 0, which means that capital and labor are both necessary
for production.9
The capital stock kj,t is inherited from the previous period. The labor lj,t is hired and paid
at the beginning of this period but before the matching takes place. Once the matching
has taken place, the labor payment is sunk and the firm can produce with no additional
cost until the output reaches the capacity Sj,t. Hence, the variable cost of the firm is not
affected by the actual output level but is simply an increasing function of the capacity
supplied:
C (Sj,t, kj,t;wt) = min
lj,t≥0
wtlj,t, (2.55)
subject to the production technology Sj,t ≤ F (kj,t, lj,t).
Competitive Search Protocol
Following Moen (1997) and Bai et al. (2012), a competitive search protocol is assumed.
Each firm sets up its own market characterized by both the price and the market tightness.
The latter is defined as the ratio of demand to supply: xj,t ≡ Dj,t/Sj,t, where Dj,t is the
demand that goes to firm j. Each buyer is infinitely small and takes both the price and
the market tightness as given. If a buyer purchases from firm j, the unit cost of acquiring
goods is given by
ς (pj,t, xj,t;wt) ≡ pj,t + xj,t
M (xj,t, 1)
φwt, (2.56)
where pj,t is the real price charged by firm j and xj,t/M(xj,t,1) is the amount of demand
that has to be requested to yield a successful matching. The buyer chooses the best trade
off between the price and the market tightness to minimize the unit cost of purchasing.
The firm chooses the supply of capacity and a combination of the price and the market
9In Bai et al. (2012), capital and labor can increase the amount of goods purchased after a matching
has taken place, and what is searched by buyers is a fixed measure of firms T = 1. Thus, the sales or
output is given by y = M (D,T )S = M (D, 1)F (k, l), which is of increasing returns to scale (IRS). To
remove the effects that IRS brings, I restore constant returns to scale by assuming that the matching is
between the goods demanded and the capacity supplied and that capital and labor can increase the supply
of capacity: y = M (D,S) = M (D,F (k, l)).
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tightness to maximize its gross profit:
max
pj,t,xj,t,Sj,t≥0
pj,tM (xj,t, 1)Sj,t − C (Sj,t, kj,t;wt) (2.57)
subject to the participation constraint ς (pj,t, xj,t;wt) ≤ ς∗t , where M (xj,t, 1) < 1 gives the
probability of selling or the capacity utilization rate and ς∗t is the lowest unit cost offered
by other firms or the outside option of the buyers. In equilibrium, all firms would offer the
same price and the same market tightness, and the supply of capacity is proportional to
the firm’s capital: ∀j, pj,t = 1, xj,t = xt, and Sj,t ∝ kj,t. Although the capacity supplied
is not fully utilized because of the matching frictions, capacity expansion is still profitable
as it attracts demand. Consequently, a marginal increase in capital is valuable because it
saves the cost of supplying a given level of capacity, or equivalently, because it expands
capacity that attracts profitable demand:
−Ck (Sj,t, kj,t;wt) = M (xj,t, 1) Sj,t
kj,t
− C
(
Sj,t
kj,t
, 1;wt
)
. (2.58)
Partially Efficient Capital Accumulation
The aggregate variable cost incurred to satisfy the aggregate demand yt takes into account
all the variable costs paid by firms and buyers:
C (yt, kt;wt) = min{Dj,t,Sj,t,lj,t,kj,t≥0}j∈[0,1]
wt
∫ 1
0
(φDj,t + lj,t) dj, (2.59)
subject to the matching technology yt ≤
∫ 1
0 M (Dj,t, Sj,t) dj, the production technology
Sj,t ≤ F (kj,t, lj,t), and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt. Because the above
minimization problem is convex and symmetric, there exists a symmetric allocation that
minimizes the aggregate variable cost. By the envelope theorem and the implicit function
theorem, C is non-negative, twice differentiable, and homogeneous of degree one; and
Cy > 0, Ck < 0, and Ckk > 0. In addition, one can prove by contradiction that capital is
necessary for production.10
Thanks to the competitive search protocol, the extra capacity supplied by firms to compete
for demand is justified by the variable cost saved for buyers. One can verify that, in a
symmetric equilibrium, the marginal value of capital viewed from a representative firm’s
perspective (see equation (2.58)) is the same as the marginal cost saved by capital in
10If for a given positive aggregate demand y > 0, C is upper bounded as the aggregate capital converges
to zero (k → 0), the total labor hired to solve the cost minimization problem must also be upper bounded:∫ 1
0
ljdj ≤ l¯. Hence, y ≤
∫ 1
0
Sjdj ≤ F
(
k, l¯
)→ 0, as k → 0; a contradiction to that y > 0.
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aggregate:
−Ck (St, kt;wt) = M (xt, 1) St
kt
− C
(
St
kt
, 1;wt
)
= −Ck (yt, kt;wt) . (2.60)
Thus, the capital accumulation decisions made by firms in a decentralized way also min-
imizes the present value of aggregate costs, that is, the capital accumulation is partially
efficient. The rest of the household’s problem is standard as described in section 2.2.
Thus, the competitive goods market search model is a special case of the standard one-
good economy.
Perfectly Competitive Markets and Efficiency
Suppose that the labor market is perfectly competitive. Because of the competitive search
protocol in the goods market, the economy is efficient and can be summarized as a social
planner’s problem:
max
{ct,yt,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
zc,tu
(
ct
zc,t
)
+ ω¯v (1− L (yt, kt))
)
, (2.61)
subject to ct + kt+1 = yt + kt (1− δ), where the labor required by the social planner L is
given by
L (yt, kt;wt) ≡ min{Dj,t,Sj,t,lj,t,kj,t≥0}j∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
(φDj,t + lj,t) dj, (2.62)
subject to the matching technology yt ≤
∫ 1
0 M (Dj,t, Sj,t) dj, the production technology
Sj,t ≤ F (kj,t, lj,t), and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt. Hence, the competitive
goods market search model works just like the RBC model except that the required labor
function L is different.
2.4 Properties of the Standard One-Good Economy
In this section, I study the properties of the standard one-good economy to evaluate the
efficient utilization models described in section 2.3. I show that when capital accumulation
is partially efficient, aggregate capacity must be fully utilized in steady state. Hence, none
of these models could feature chronic excess capacity. Furthermore, I show that when
aggregate capacity is fully utilized in steady state, capital resources must be tight locally
around the steady state. Hence, none of these models describe an economy with capital
resource slackness. As in the standard RBC model, capital resource tightness implies an
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upward sloping real marginal cost curve and a countercyclical marginal product of labor.
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the efficient utilization models, or other models
that could be encompassed by the standard one-good economy, tend to face the same
issues as the standard RBC model. Particularly, I show that either the relative volatility
of investment to consumption is too small or the real wage rate is too countercyclical under
consumption demand shocks. In addition, the labor productivity is too countercyclical and
the Solow residual is not pro-cyclical enough.
2.4.1 No Chronic Excess Capacity
In section 2.3, capacity refers to the production limit within which goods can be produced
with a constant marginal cost. The notion of capacity can be extended to the case where
there is no production limit or the marginal cost of production is increasing in output.
Following Morrison (1985), theoretical capacity is defined as the output level at which the
short run average total cost (SRAC) curve is tangent to the long run average total cost
(LRAC) curve. Along the SRAC curve, one minimizes the average total cost of production
by adjusting only the variable inputs, such as labor. Along the LRAC curve, one minimizes
the same average total cost by adjusting both the variable inputs and the short run fixed
capital. Hence, at the point of tangency, one has no incentive to adjust the capital stock.
Definition 2.3. (Capacity) Capacity is the unique output level y¯ at which the short run
average total cost (SRAC) curve is tangent to the long run average total cost (LRAC)
curve if the capital level is positive (k > 0). If the capital level is zero (k = 0), capacity is
zero.
Definition 2.4. (Excess capacity) Capacity is in excess if and only if aggregate capacity
is underutilized.
For a positive aggregate capital level kt > 0, the aggregate capacity is the output level at
which the aggregate SRAC curve is tangent to the aggregate LRAC curve. The aggregate
SRAC is given by
SRAC (yt, kt;wt) ≡ C (yt, kt;wt) + (r + δ) kt
yt
, (2.63)
where r ≡ β−1 − 1 > 0 is the real interest rate in steady state; and the aggregate LRAC
is the minimum of the aggregate SRAC when aggregate capital stock can be adjusted:
LRAC (yt;wt) ≡ min
k∈{x|(yt,x)∈dom(C)}
SRAC (yt, k;wt) . (2.64)
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We now show that under regularity conditions 1-4, the aggregate LRAC exists and there
exists a unique point at which the aggregate SRAC curve is tangent to the aggregate
LRAC. Thus, aggregate capacity is properly defined.
Claim 2.5. For a given positive aggregate output level yt > 0, there exists a unique positive
aggregate capital level that minimizes the aggregate SRAC:
k∗ (yt, wt) ≡ arg min
k∈{x|(yt,x)∈dom(C)}
SRAC (yt, k;wt) . (2.65)
Proof. If there exists a feasible production limit, the SRAC (yt, k;wt) is continuous and
convex in k on the interval [χyt,∞); and if k → ∞, we have that SRAC (yt, k;wt) ≥
(r+δ)k
yt
→ ∞. Hence, there exists k∗ > 0 that minimizes the aggregate SRAC. If there
is no production limit or the production limit is infeasible, the SRAC (yt, k;wt) is con-
tinuous and convex in k on the interval (χyt,∞); and if k → ∞ or k → χyt, we have
that SRAC (yt, k;wt) ≥ min
{C(yt,k;wt)
yt
, (r+δ)kyt
}
→ ∞. Hence, there exists k∗ > 0 that
minimizes the aggregate SRAC.
If there exists k′ 6= k∗ that also minimizes the aggregate SRAC, then any k ∈ [a, b] can
minimize the aggregate SRAC, where a = min {k′, k∗} < b = max {k′, k∗}. For any
k1, k2 ∈ [a, b] and k1 > k2, we have C (yt, k1;wt) = C (yt, k2;wt) + (r + δ) (k2 − k1) <
C (yt, k2;wt). Hence, C is strictly decreasing in k on [a, b]. By the assumed regularity
condition 4, C is twice differentiable in terms of capital on the interval (a, b) such that
Ckk (yt, k;wt) > 0. As a result, SRAC (y, k;wt) is strictly convex in capital on (a, b), a
contradiction to the previous conclusion that any k ∈ [a, b] minimizes the SRAC. Hence,
k∗ must be unique.
Claim 2.6. The aggregate LRAC curve exists and is flat.
Proof. By definition, the long run average total cost curve can be expressed as:
LRAC (yt;wt) = min
k∈{x|(yt,x)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1,
k
yt
;wt
)
+ (r + δ)
k
yt
}
= min
k˜∈{x|(1,x)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1, k˜;wt
)
+ (r + δ) k˜
}
= C (1, k∗ (1, wt) ;wt) + (r + δ) k∗ (1, wt) ,
where k∗ (1, wt) exists according to Claim 2.5. It is clear that the aggregate LRAC is
independent of the aggregate output level yt > 0. Hence, the aggregate LRAC curve is
flat.
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Claim 2.7. Aggregate capacity is properly defined by Definition 2.3. Particularly, for a
given aggregate capital level kt ≥ 0 and a real wage rate wt > 0, the aggregate capacity is
given by
y¯t =
kt
k∗ (1, wt)
, (2.66)
where k∗ is the function that gives the capital level that minimizes the corresponding
aggregate SRAC (see equation (2.65)).
Proof. Consider the case where the aggregate capital stock is positive (kt > 0). Since
the aggregate LRAC curve is flat, the tangent point (y¯t, kt), if there is any, must be a
minimum point on the aggregate SRAC:
min
y∈{x>0|(x,kt)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1,
kt
y
;wt
)
+ (r + δ)
kt
y
}
.
This is equivalent to finding the capital to output ratio that minimizes the aggregate
SRAC:
min
k˜∈{x|(1,x)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1, k˜;wt
)
+ (r + δ) k˜
}
.
According to Claim 2.5, k∗ (1, wt) is the unique capital to output ratio that minimizes the
aggregate SRAC. Therefore, the tangent point exists uniquely and is given by (kt/k∗(1,wt), kt).
It is proper to define aggregate capacity as the output level at the unique tangent point:
y¯t = kt/k∗(1,wt). If kt = 0, aggregate capacity is also properly defined as zero.
Proposition 2.8. If capital accumulation is partially efficient, under regularity conditions
1-4, aggregate capacity must be fully utilized in steady state.
Proof. Since capital accumulation is partially efficient, the capital accumulation decisions
made by firms in equilibrium minimize the present value of aggregate costs:
min
{kt+1≥0}t≥0
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
Qτ
)
(C (yt, kt;wt) + (kt+1 − kt (1− δ)))
)
.
In a steady state where Qt = β, wt = w > 0, and yt = y > 0, the above minimization
problem implies that the aggregate capital level k must minimize the aggregate total cost:
C (y, k;w) + (r + δ) k. Hence, (y, k) is the point at which the aggregate SRAC curve is
tangent to the aggregate LRAC curve: SRAC (y, k;w) = LRAC (y;w). By Claim 2.7,
the point of tangency that gives the aggregate capacity y¯ is unique for each aggregate
capital level. Thus, y = y¯, which means that aggregate capacity is fully utilized in steady
state.
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Intuitively, if capital accumulation is partially efficient, the only reason for firms to expand
capital is to lower the aggregate total cost. However, if the aggregate capacity level is
larger than the aggregate output level in steady state, it is capital reduction rather than
expansion that lowers the cost. Hence, firms will reduce their capital until aggregate
capacity becomes fully utilized in steady state. By Definition 2.4, the economy does not
exhibit chronic excess capacity.11
Proposition 2.8 shows that partial efficiency of capital accumulation rules out the existence
of chronic excess capacity in the standard one-good economy.
Despite the existence of capital, plant, or capacity underutilization in those efficient uti-
lization models, aggregate capacity is fully utilized. The capital, plant, or capacity is not
utilized for a cost-saving reason. In the variable capital utilization model, some capital
is left unused because of an increasing marginal cost of utilization. In the variable plant
utilization model, some plants are left idle because the productivities of those plants are
too low to compensate for the labor cost. In the precautionary capacity model, some firms
have their capacity underutilized because the extra capacity is a necessary precaution that
saves the expected cost incurred to satisfy a unit of aggregate demand. In the competi-
tive goods market search model, firms have their capacity underutilized because the extra
capacity reduces market tightness and thus lowers the search cost for buyers. Hence, none
of these underutilization phenomena would mean that too much capital is accumulated or
too little capacity is utilized in aggregate.
2.4.2 Capital Resource Tightness
Capital resources are said to be tight if a marginal decrease in capital makes the current
output level infeasible or leads to an increase in the real marginal cost (MC), and capital
resources are said to be slack if a marginal decrease in capital has no effect on the real
MC.
Definition 2.9. (Capital resource tightness) Let ∂yC (y, k;w) denote the sub-differential of
the aggregate variable cost function with respect to aggregate output.12 Consider a point
(y, k) ∈ dom (C) and y > 0. If there exists ε > 0 such that for all ∆ ∈ (0, ε), (y, k −∆) is
either not feasible or inf ∂yC (y, k −∆;w) > inf ∂yC (y, k;w), we say that capital resources
11The idea of Proposition 2.8 is not new. For instance, Hall (1986) concludes that there is chronic excess
capacity in the U.S. based on his finding that the estimated marginal cost saved by capital, −Ck (y, k;w),
is smaller than the rental cost of capital, r + δ, in various U.S. industries.
12The sub-differential of a convex function f : D → R at an interior point x0 is the set of all c ∈ R such
that f (x)− f (x0) ≥ c (x− x0) for all x ∈ D. One can show that the sub-differential of a convex function
always exists and is a non-empty closed interval.
94
are tight locally around (y, k). If there exists ε > 0 such that for all ∆ ∈ (0, ε), (y, k −∆)
is feasible and inf ∂yC (y, k −∆;w) = inf ∂yC (y, k;w), we say that capital resources are
slack locally around (y, k).
By Definition 2.9, the shape of the aggregate variable cost function C determines when
capital resources must be tight and when they could be slack. We know that C (1, k;w) is
convex and decreasing in terms of capital to output ratio. Hence, if there exists k1 < k2
such that C (1, k2;w) = C (1, k1;w), then for all k ≥ k1, we have C (1, k;w) = C (1, k1;w).
Let S (w) be the set of all such k1 from which the aggregate variable cost function no
longer decreases with the capital to output ratio:
S (w) ≡
{
k˜ |
(
1, k˜
)
∈ dom (C) , ∀k ≥ k˜, C (1, k;w) = C
(
1, k˜;w
)}
. (2.67)
S (w) could be interpreted as a set of satiation in which the capital to output ratio is so
large that additional capital no longer saves the aggregate variable cost. If S (w) 6= ∅, let
κ (w) ≡ inf S (w) be the minimum capital to output ratio that satiates the appetite for
capital as a production factor.
The shape of the aggregate variable cost function C is described by one of the following
cases:
1. If S (w) = ∅, C is strictly decreasing in capital on its entire domain.
2. If S (w) 6= ∅ and κ (w) > χ, C is strictly decreasing in capital on (χy, κ (w) y) and
flattens out when k ∈ [κ (w) y,∞).
3. If S (w) 6= ∅ and κ (w) = χ, C is flat in capital on its entire domain and the production
technology is Leontief.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the shape of an aggregate variable cost function described by the
second case.13 The thick solid line highlights the part where capital resources are slack.
Intuitively, capital resources are slack if and only if the capital stock is so large that the
aggregate variable cost function flattens out.
Lemma 2.10. Under regularity conditions 1-4, for a given positive output level y > 0,
capital resources are slack if and only if the set of satiation is non empty S (w) 6= ∅ and the
capital to output ratio is large enough such that it belongs to the interior of the satiation
set: k/y > κ (w) ≡ inf S (w).
13The variable cost function is drawn based on a production technology given by
y = min
{(
0.38k−1 + 0.62l−1
)−1
, l
}
.
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Shape of the Aggregate Variable Cost Function
Figure 2.2: The thick solid line highlights the part where capital resources are slack. The
vertical dashed line indicates a non-feasible production limit. The circle marker is the
minimum of the average total cost and is also the point where capacity is fully utilized.
Proof. First note that capital resources are tight locally around the production limit k =
χy because a marginal decrease in capital makes the current output level infeasible. Sec-
ond, if S (w) = ∅, C is strictly decreasing in capital on its entire domain. Since the marginal
returns to capital diminishes smoothly (see regularity condition 4), C is twice differentiable
for all k > χy and Cyk (y, k;w) = −Ckk (y, k;w) ky < 0. Hence, capital resources are tight
for all k ∈ (χy,∞). Third, if S (w) 6= ∅ and κ (w) > χ, C is strictly decreasing in capital
on (χy, κ (w) y). By the same argument, capital resources are tight for k ∈ (χy, κ (w) y).
In addition, if k = κ (w) y, there exists ε = (κ (w)− χ) y > 0 such that for all ∆ ∈ (0, ε),
C (y, k −∆;w) is twice differentiable and Cy (y, k −∆;w) is strictly increasing in ∆. Thus,
Cy (y, k −∆;w) > lim∆↓0 Cy (y, k −∆;w) ≥ inf ∂yC (y, k;w), meaning that capital re-
sources are tight for all k ∈ (χy, κ (w) y]. Fourth, if S (w) 6= ∅ and κ (w) = χ, capital
resources are tight locally around the production limit (k = χy = κ (w) y). Finally, if and
only if S (w) 6= ∅ and k > κ (w) y, we have that capital resources are slack because C is
flat and twice differentiable on (κ (w) y,∞) and Cyk (y, k;w) = −Ckk (y, k;w) ky = 0.
We are now ready to show that if aggregate capacity is fully or overly utilized, capital
resources must be tight. Intuitively, if capital resources are slack, the level of capital must
be so high that a small reduction in capital would have no negative effect on production;
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but holding capital is costly. Hence, a small reduction in capital can lower the aggregate
SRAC. However, if aggregate capacity is fully or overly utilized, any reduction in capital
should cause an increase in the aggregate SRAC. This contradiction implies that capital
resources must be tight.
Proposition 2.11. If aggregate capacity is fully or overly utilized, under regularity con-
ditions 1-4, capital resources must be tight.14
Proof. Let y > 0 be the aggregate output, w > 0 be the real wage rate, and y¯ be the
aggregate capacity. By Definition 2.3, the aggregate SRAC curve is tangent to the aggre-
gate LRAC curve at (y¯, k). By Claims 2.5-2.6, the point of tangency (y¯, k) is the unique
minimum of the aggregate SRAC curve. Since the aggregate SRAC curve is convex, for
any y′ > y ≥ y¯, we have SRAC (y′, k;w) > SRAC (y, k;w). Note that SRAC (·, ·;w) is
homogeneous of degree zero in output and capital. Thus, the above inequality also implies
that for any k′ < k, SRAC (y, k′;w) > SRAC (y, k;w). If the capital resources are slack,
by Lemma 2.10, we know that the set of satiation S (w) is non-empty and the capital stock
k is larger than κ (w) y. Thus, there exists a small decrease in capital, ∆ ∈ (0, k − κ (w) y),
that can reduce the aggregate SRAC further:
C (y, k −∆;w) + (r + δ) (k −∆)
y
<
C (y, k;w) + (r + δ) k
y
.
contradicting the statement that any reduction in capital must increase the aggregate
SRAC.
Corollary 2.12. If capital accumulation is partially efficient, under regularity conditions
1-4, capital resources must be tight locally around the steady state.
Proof. The corollary can be inferred from Proposition 2.8 and Proposition 2.11.
Hence, the partial efficiency of capital accumulation not only rules out chronic excess
capacity but also rules out capital resource slackness. Suppose that the aggregate variable
cost function C is twice differentiable locally around the steady state.15 Capital resource
tightness can be measured by the negative capital elasticity of the real MC. Since the
14Smoothly diminishing marginal return to capital (regularity condition 4) is not necessary for Propo-
sitions 2.8 and 2.11 to hold. One can assume instead that the capital level that minimizes the aggregate
SRAC is unique. If one wants to ensure the uniqueness of the steady state, this alternative assumption is
necessary. The smoothly diminishing marginal return to capital is simply a stronger property to imply the
uniqueness (see Claim 2.5).
15C is twice differentiable almost everywhere. The only interior points where C may not be twice
differentiable are those where the capital to output ratio is just large enough to satiate the appetite for
capital as a production factor: k = κ (w) y. Locally around this point, capital resources are infinitely tight.
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production technology is of constant returns to scale, the measure of capital resource
tightness is also equal to the steepness of the real MC curve or the convexity of the
aggregate variable cost curve:
ζ = −∂ ln Cy (y, k;w)
∂ ln k
=
∂ ln Cy (y, k;w)
∂ ln y
=
Cyy (y, k;w) y
Cy > 0, (2.68)
which must be positive according to Corollary 2.12.
The rest of this section shows that capital resource tightness has important consequences
on the dynamic properties of the model.
2.4.3 Countercyclical Real Wage Rate
Since capital resources are tight, an increase in output would cause a decrease in the
marginal product of labor, creating a pressure for the real MC to increase. With a constant
markup, this pressure will be transmitted to a decrease in the real wage rate according to
the firm’s pricing condition (2.17). With perfectly flexible prices and consumption demand
shocks only, equation (2.17) is reduced to
wˆt = −ζ
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
, (2.69)
which links the cyclicality of the real wage rate directly to the magnitude of capital resource
tightness.
One could use the covariance between the real wage rate and the aggregate output nor-
malized by the variance of the aggregate output to measure the cyclicality of the real wage
rate. The business cycle fluctuations of the capital stock kˆt can largely be ignored as they
are typically very small compared to others. Thus, we have in approximation
βwy ≡
Cov (wˆt, yˆt)
Var (yˆy)
≈ −ζ < 0, (2.70)
which says that the tighter the capital resources are, the more countercyclical the real
wage rate.
2.4.4 Upward Sloping AS Curve and its Dampening Effect on Output
With perfectly flexible prices, the AS surface (2.32) is orthogonal to the output-price in
utils plane. The projection of the AS surface on the output-price in utils plane gives us
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the real AS curve.
There are two forces that cause the real AS curve to be upward sloping. First, the real
MC curve is upward sloping and marginal product of labor is decreasing with output
because of capital resource tightness. Second, the marginal dis-utility of supplying labor
increases with hours. The second effect can be understood as a result of labor resource
tightness measured by the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η ≥ 0. The
following equation illustrates how the capital resource tightness measured by ζ and the
labor resource tightness measured by η affect the cyclicality of the price in utils λˆt:
λˆt = ζ
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ ηlˆt. (2.71)
Equation (2.71) is obtained by combining the household’s labor supply condition (2.15)
and the firm’s pricing condition (2.17).
Substituting the log-linearied required labor function (2.20) for lˆt in equation (2.71) gives
us the real AS curve:
λˆt = (ζ + ην)
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ ηkˆt. (2.72)
Equation (2.72) shows that the price in utils must be pro-cyclical as real demand shocks
move the equilibrium output along the upward sloping real AS curve. A pro-cyclical price
in utils due to the steep real AS curve, however, will reduce the response of output to
demand shocks by making goods more expensive in boom and less expensive in recession.
2.4.5 Lack of Investment Volatility
If labor resources are slack η = 0 and if the magnitude of capital resource tightness
converges to zero (ζ → 0), the real AS curve (2.72) becomes almost flat. One can see from
the household’s optimal consumption condition
ζ
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
= λˆt = γ (zc,t − cˆt) , (2.73)
that the price in utils is almost acylical and the response of consumption to demand is
almost not dampened.
However, even if the real AS curve is almost flat, the response of investment to consumption
demand shocks is still much limited. To see this, combine the real AS curve (2.72) and the
firm’s investment condition (2.19) and set η = 0 to ensure the slackness of labor resources.
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We have:
ζ
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
= ζ
(
1 + β
wl
k
)
Et
(
yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
)
. (2.74)
It is clear that the measure of capital resource tightness ζ appears on both sides and is
canceled out. Hence, even if ζ → 0, the response of investment to consumption demand
shocks is still much limited.
Intuitively, when capital resources become less tight, two forces work in opposite directions.
On one hand, the price in utils λˆt is less pro-cyclical; thus, the dampening effect on
investment is weaker (see the left hand side of equation (2.74)). On the other hand, the
return of capital also becomes less pro-cyclical; thus, firms would have less incentive to
adjust capital (see the right hand side of equation (2.74)). In fact, precisely because capital
resources are tight, there is a pro-cyclical upward pressure on the real MC that firms can
adjust their capital stock to mitigate. Thus, removing the curb on capital adjustment
would also remove the impetus for capital adjustment.
In the quantitative exercises below, I show that as capital resources become less tight,
the volatility of investment does not increase, but the volatility of consumption does.
The relative volatility of investment to consumption declines. To achieve a large relative
volatility of investment to consumption, capital resources must be so tight that the real
wage rate becomes too countercyclical.
Calibration
I start with the case where labor resources are slack (η = 0) and the households are the
most patient (β → 1) to maximize the volatility of investment. Intuitively, the real AS
curve becomes flatter when the labor resources are less tight; thus, it is easier for firms
to adjust capital. In addition, if the future becomes more important, firms also have a
stronger incentive to adjust capital.
Prices are assumed to be perfectly flexible: φp = 0. The depreciation rate δ, the curvature
of the consumption utility γ, the goods demand elasticity εp, and the output elasticity
of labor demand ν in steady state are calibrated to match the same targets as described
in section 2.2.8. Finally, the measure of capital resource tightness ζ and the persistence
parameter of consumption demand shocks ρc would be set to different values to explore
how the relative volatility of investment to consumption is affected.
Table 2.3 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and their mostly associated targets.
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Table 2.3: Parameters and Calibration Targets – Standard One-Good Economy
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 1.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
ν 1.2742 Labor share of income 0.62
εp 4.7623 Investment to output ratio 0.17
Quantitative Results
Before we look at the relative volatility of investment to consumption, we should first en-
sure that the model generates a positive correlation between consumption and investment.
If an increase in consumption demand is too transitory, households would rather reduce
investment to save resources for current consumption. Furthermore, if capital resources
are too tight, the real AS curve would be so steep that any desired investment would
have to be achieved by sacrificing current consumption. Figure 2.3 shows the results of a
numerical experiment: if consumption demand shocks are persistent enough (ρc ≥ 0.935)
and capital resources are not too tight (ζ ≤ 1.34), a positive correlation can be achieved.
Co-movement Range
Figure 2.3: The light shaded area indicates the range for parameters values where consumption,
investment, and hours co-move under consumption demand shocks in a standard one-good economy.
Different values of ζ ∈ (0, 1.34] and ρc ∈ [0.935, 1) are then explored to exam their effects
on the relative volatility of investment to consumption. Each contour line drawn in the
left panel of Figure 2.4 shows the values of ζ and ρc that lead to the same level of relative
volatility of investment to consumption. The results show that the relative volatility of
investment to consumption falls as capital resources become less tight.
We also see that the relative volatility of investment to consumption falls as the consump-
tion demand shocks becomes less persistent. Consider a positive consumption demand
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shock for example. If the increase in consumption demand is concentrated in a short pe-
riod of time, it is not wise to make a large investment. By contrast, if the increase is quite
persistent, households prefer a smooth increase in consumption for a long period of time;
thus, a large investment is justified.
Lack of Investment Volatility or Countercyclical Real Wage Rate
Figure 2.4: Each solid line is a contour line. The dotted lines are the contour lines corresponding to
the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals. The 95% confidence interval of the relative volatility
is [5.55, 7.42]. The 95% confidence interval of the cyclicality of the real wage is [−0.03, 0.18].
The data is from the BEA and the 95% confidence intervals are calculated using a parametric
bootstrapping method.
The dashed line in the left panel of Figure 2.4 shows the minimum value of ζ needed to
obtain the observed relative volatility of investment to consumption. The value is about
0.4, which implies a real wage rate that is too countercyclical as shown in the right panel
of Figure 2.4. Therefore, either the relative volatility of investment to consumption is too
small or the real wage rate is too countercyclical under consumption demand shocks.
Robustness of the Quantitative Results
The above results are robust to different values of η. If labor resources become tighter
η > 0, the real AS curve becomes steeper. However, unlike capital resource tightness,
labor resource tightness does not affect the return of capital and thus the incentive of
firms to adjust capital stock. Therefore, as the real AS curve becomes steeper, it simply
becomes more costly for firms to move resources across time. In order to have less resource
movement across time, the response of investment is reduced more than the response of
consumption. Hence, the relative volatility of investment to consumption declines. The
upper left panel of Figure 2.5 confirms this analysis.
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Relative Volatility of Investment to Consumption
Figure 2.5: The circle marker indicates the case where ζ = 0.6, ρc → 1, β → 1, and φi = φk = η =
0. The diamond marker indicates the case where ζ = 0.4, ρc = 0.995, β = 0.99, φi = 0.1, φk = 1,
and η = 0.25. The square marker indicates the case where ζ = 0.2, ρc = 0.99, β = 0.98, φi = 0.2,
φk = 2, and η = 0.5. Each line shows how the relative volatility of investment to consumption
changes with the value of the parameter specified on the x-axis while the values of other parameters
are the same as in the case indicated by the marker on the line.
The results are also robust to different values of β. If households are less patient β < 1,
the future becomes less important. The firms would have less incentive to change capital
but the incentive to consume will not be negatively affected. Hence, the relative volatility
of investment to consumption declines. The upper right panel of Figure 2.5 confirms this
analysis.
We could also extend the model to include capital and investment adjustment costs. Both
tend to reduce the relative volatility of investment to consumption. Suppose that the
capital stock of firm j is accumulated according to
kj,t+1 = kj,t (1− δ) + ij,t (1− S (ij,t, ij,t−1, kj,t)) , (2.75)
where S is the adjustment cost function. Following Hayashi (1982) and Christiano et al.
(2005), I assume that
S (ij,t, ij,t−1, kj,t) =
φi
2
(
ij,t
ij,t−1
− 1
)2
+
φk
2
(
ij,t
kj,t
− δ
)2 kj,t
ij,t
, (2.76)
where φk ≥ 0 and φi ≥ 0 are parameters that capture the curvature of the capital and
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investment adjustment costs respectively. The existence of adjustment costs reduces the
incentive to change capital but does not affect the incentive to consume. Hence, the relative
volatility of investment to consumption falls. The lower panels of Figure 2.5 confirm this
analysis.
So far we have chosen γ = 1 to yield a log utility. In the literature, the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution is typically estimated to be smaller than one; thus, the value
of γ is typically larger than one (see Havra´nek, 2015 for a meta-analysis). Our results
are also robust to γ > 1. One can show that if γ, ζ, η, φi, and φk are all scaled up by
the same proportion, the local dynamics of consumption, investment, and hours remains
unchanged. Hence, if γ becomes larger, a larger value of ζ would be needed to match
the relative volatility of investment to consumption observed in the data, making the real
wage rate more countercyclical.
2.4.6 Countercyclical Labor Productivity and Acyclical Solow Residual
Without labor productivity shocks, the standard one-good economy tends to generate a
labor productivity that is too countercyclical and a Solow residual that is not pro-cyclical
enough. The labor productivity is measured as the output to labor ratio and the Solow
residual is measured based on the average labor share of income.
Recall that the log-linearized labor cost function is given by
lˆt = ν
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ kˆt, (2.77)
where ν =
εp−1
εp
y
wl =
wl+(r+δ)k
wl > 1 is the output elasticity of labor demand in steady
state. Ignore the business-cycle fluctuations of the capital stock kˆt that are typically very
small compared to others. In approximation, we have that the cyclicality of the labor
productivity is given by
βLPy ≡
Cov
(
yˆt − lˆt, yˆt
)
Var (yˆy)
≈ 1− ν = −(r + δ) k
wl
< 0, (2.78)
and that the cyclicality of the Solow residual is given by
βSRy ≡
Cov
(
yˆt − wly lˆt −
(
1− wly
)
kˆt, yˆt
)
Var (yˆy)
≈ 1
εp
= 1− wl + (r + δ) k
y
< 1− wl + δk
y
. (2.79)
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Table 2.4: Cyclicality of Labor Productivity and Solow Residual
βLPy β
SR
y
ρc = 0.93 ρc → 1 The U.S. Data ρc = 0.93 ρc → 1 The U.S. Data
β = 0.97 -0.62 -0.60
[0.00, 0.21]
0.00 0.00
[0.30, 0.49]β = 0.99 -0.41 -0.39 0.13 0.12
β → 1 -0.28 -0.27 0.21 0.20
Note: The U.S. data is from the BEA and the BLS and the brackets are the 95% confidence intervals
calculated using a parametric bootstrapping method. A path of 5,000 quarters is simulated to
calculate the statistics for each calibrated model. All variables are Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered
logarithms of the original series.
Hence, the labor productivity is always countercyclical but the Solow residual is slightly
pro-cyclical when firms have some market power: εp <∞. When there exists a price-cost
markup µp = εp/(εp−1) > 1, the Solow residual is a biased estimation of the acyclical total
factor productivity (TFP) because the labor share of income underestimates the share of
labor in total cost of production. Equation (2.79) shows that the larger the price-cost
markup, the more pro-cyclical the Solow residual.
However, the price-cost markup in steady state cannot be indefinitely large. The larger
the price-cost markup is, the smaller the total cost of production relative to output. The
latter is lower bounded by the sum of the observed labor share of income and the share of
depreciation cost in output as shown by the last inequality in expression (2.79). Therefore,
the highest price-cost markup and the most pro-cyclical Solow residual can be achieved
when the real interest rate in steady state converges to zero: r → 0 or β → 1.
Table 2.4 shows that even when β → 1, the Solow residual is still not pro-cyclical enough
compared to what is observed in the data.
Perhaps surprisingly, when the model is extended to incorporate some hoarded labor,
the above results do not change. Consider an aggregate production function that is of
constant returns to scale: y = F (lv, lf , k), where lv is the variable labor and lf is the
quasi-fixed labor that does not fluctuate much at the business cycle frequency. Hence, the
business cycle fluctuations of labor is mainly given by the fluctuations of the variable labor:
lˆt ≈ (lv/l) νyˆt, where ν = (wlv)−1 (wl + (r + δ) k) is the inverse of the share of variable labor
in the total production cost. A simple calculation reveals that the cyclicality of the labor
productivity and the cyclicality of the Solow residual are still upper bounded by the same
ratios as in expressions (2.78) and (2.79) respectively.
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2.5 A Possible Solution: Capacity Competition Externality
This section shows that the capacity underutilization (CU) model developed in Chapter
1 provides a possible solution to the issues discussed above. In the CU model, there is
a capacity competition externality. If a firm expands its capacity while others do not, it
steals profitable demand from others. Hence, capacity is underutilized at the firm-level.
However, from an aggregate perspective, the extra capacity invested due to the capacity
competition externality has no extra value. Hence, capital accumulation is not partially
efficient in the CU model. I show that when the capacity competition externality is strong
enough, the economy will exhibit chronic excess capacity. With a Leontief production
technology, capital resources are slack locally around the steady state where capacity is
in excess. The CU model is then calibrated to match the statistics observed in the U.S.
data. The quantitative results show that the model can generate a positive co-movement
between consumption, investment, and hours, a large relative volatility of investment to
consumption, an acyclical real wage rate, a slightly pro-cyclical labor productivity, and a
strongly pro-cyclical Solow residual under consumption demand shocks.
2.5.1 Setup of the CU Model
Households
There is a continuum of identical households as described in section 2.2. The labor market
is assumed to be perfectly competitive (εw,t →∞ for all t ≥ 0). The one-period utility of
a representative household is assumed to be of the following functional form:
zc,tu
(
ct
zc,t
)
+ ω¯v (1− lt) =

φzc,t
(ct/(φzc,t))
1−γ−1
1−γ + ω¯ − ω¯lt, γ 6= 1
φzc,t ln (ct/zc,t) + ω¯ − ω¯lt, γ = 1
(2.80)
where the utility of consumption is of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and the
utility of leisure is linear as in the indivisible labor theory.
Technology and Capacity
There is a continuum of identical firms with measure one. Each is indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]
and operates with a Leontief production technology given by the following production
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function:
yj,t = min
{
Akj,t,
lf,j,t
αf
,
lv,j,t
αv
}
, (2.81)
where lv,j,t is the direct labor hired by firm j, lf,j,t is the indirect labor, and α
−1
f > 0 gives
the productivity of the indirect labor. Direct labor is variable. Indirect labor, however, is
predetermined like capital stock. By Definition 2.3, the capacity of firm j is given by the
output level at which the SRAC curve is tangent to the LRAC curve:
y¯j,t = min
{
Akj,t,
lf,j,t
αf
}
. (2.82)
The SRAC of firm j is given by
SRAC (yj,t, kj,t, lf,j,t;wt) =
C (yj,t, kj,t, lf,j,t;wt) + (r + δ) kj,t + wtlf,j,t
yj,t
, (2.83)
where the indirect labor and the capital stock are both short run fixed factors and the
variable cost function C is given by C (y, k, lf ;wt) = wtαvy, for all y ≤ min {Ak, lf/αf}.
The LRAC is the minimum of the SRAC when both the indirect labor and the capital
stock are allowed to be adjusted. Equation (2.82) shows that the parameter αf can be
interpreted as the indirect labor required per unit of capacity supplied.
The goods produced by firms are perfect substitutes and can be used either as consumption
or as investment.
Buyers and the Goods Market
Households or firms decide how many goods shall be purchased based on the aggregate
price Pt and send out their buyers to purchase the goods for them. All buyers are the
same. If a buyer chooses to purchase the goods from firm j the payoff is given by vt (j) =
− ln (Pj,t/Pt), which is strictly decreasing in the real price charged by the firm.
A buyer has to process some price information in order to direct her actions towards the
desired.
If no price information is processed, the matching between the demand from buyers and
the capacity supplied by firms is assumed to be completely random. In this case, the
likelihood of purchasing from firm j is given by n∗t (j) = y¯j,t/y¯t, where y¯t ≡
∫ 1
0 y¯j,tdj is
the total capacity supplied by firms. n∗t is the most inattentive behavior of buyers and is
called the default purchasing behavior.
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To deviate from the default, buyers have to process some price information and incur some
information processing cost. Let nt be the purchasing behavior eventually obtained by a
buyer. nt (j) gives the likelihood that the buyer purchases from firm j. The amount of
information that needs to be processed is given by the relative entropy of the behavior
chosen by the buyer nt with respect to the default n
∗
t :
DKL (nt||n∗t ) =
∫ 1
0
nt (j) ln
(
nt (j)
n∗t (j)
)
dj. (2.84)
A representative buyer’s problem can now be characterized as:
max
nt≥0
−
∫ 1
0
ln
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
nt (j) dj − ΛDKL (nt||n∗t ) , (2.85)
subject to
∫ 1
0 nt (j) dj = 1, where Λ ∈ (0, 1) is the unit cost of processing information.
As demonstrated in section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1, the behavior of the buyers yields the
following demand system:
∀j : yj,t = nt (j) yt =
y¯j,tP
− 1
Λ
j,t∫ 1
0 y¯j,tP
− 1
Λ
j,t dj
yt, (2.86)
where yt is the total amount goods demanded. The aggregate price Pt is simply the average
price of the goods purchased by buyers: Pt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,tnt (j) dj.
Equation 2.86 shows that the demand for the goods produced by firm j is proportional to
the capacity held by the firm and is negatively related to the price charged by the firm.
The higher the unit cost of processing information Λ is, the more inattentive to prices
buyers are, and the lower the price elasticity of demand Λ−1.
In addition to the usual price competition, there is a capacity competition among firms.
To avoid thinking about prices, buyers tend to behave in an undirected way. Thus, firms
with a larger capacity are more likely to be visited by buyers. For a given amount of total
demand from buyers, the demand gained due to capacity expansion in one firm must be
“stolen” from others.
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Firms
Each firm maximizes the present value of dividend flows dj,t:
max
{Pj,t,dj,t,yj,t,y¯j,t,ij,t,kj,t+1,lf,j,t+1}∞t=0
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
dj,t
)
, (2.87)
subject to the demand curve (2.86), the resource constraint
dj,t + ij,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
− wtαv
)
yj,t − wtlf,j,t, (2.88)
the capacity supplied y¯j,t = min {Akj,t, lf,j,t/αf}, the capacity constraint yj,t ≤ y¯j,t, and
the law of motion for capital
kj,t+1 = kj,t (1− δ) + ij,t (1− S (ij,t, ij,t−1, kj,t)) , (2.89)
where S is the adjustment cost function specified as in equation (2.76).
2.5.2 Properties of the CU Model
Capacity Competition Externality and Inefficient Capital Accumulation
Consider a symmetric equilibrium. Let qt denotes the value of capital. A representative
firm’s investment condition is given by
qt = Et
(
β
λt+1
λt
(
A (Λut+1 + µt+1 − wt+1αf ) + qt+1
(
1− δ − it+1∂St+1
∂kt+1
)))
, (2.90)
where ut+1 ≡ yt+1/y¯t+1 is the capacity utilization rate and µt+1 ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian mul-
tiplier of the capacity constraint. Equation (2.90) shows that the return of capital comes
from two sources. First, the capacity constraint can be relaxed by capacity expansion:
µt+1. Second, profitable demand can be stolen by capacity expansion: Λut+1.
Note that firms are able to charge a positive net markup because buyers are not fully
attentive to prices. Hence, if a firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, it steals
profits from others by stealing demand. Because of this capacity competition externality,
capital has an extra value in addition to the value of relaxing the capacity constraint.
If the capital accumulation decisions made by firms are partially efficient, the present value
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of aggregate costs should be minimized:
min
{it,lf,t+1,kt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
(C (yt, kt, lf,t;wt) + wtlf,t + it) , (2.91)
subject to the law of motion for capital (2.89), where the aggregate variable cost function
C is the same as the variable cost function at the firm-level: C (y, k, lf ;wt) = wtαvy, for
all y ≤ min {Ak, lf/αf}.
However, the optimal investment condition obtained from the minimization problem above
is given by
qt = Et
(
β
λt+1
λt
(
A (µt+1 − wt+1αf ) + qt+1
(
1− δ − it+1∂St+1
∂kt+1
)))
, (2.92)
which shows that the only value of capital in aggregate is to relax the capacity constraint.
Hence, the capital accumulation decisions made by firms are not partially efficient.
Chronic Excess Capacity and Capital Resource Slackness
If the unit cost of processing information is sufficiently large, the capacity competition
externality will be strong enough to cause chronic excess capacity.
Particularly, if and only if Λ ∈ ( r+δA + wαf , 1), capacity at the firm-level will be under-
utilized in steady state. Since the aggregate variable cost function C is the same as the
variable cost function C at the firm-level, aggregate capacity is also underutilized. Thus,
the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity.
Finally, in the steady state where capacity is in excess, a marginal decrease in capital will
not cause an increase in the real MC as the real MC curve is flat: Cyk = Cyy yk = 0. Thus,
capital resources are slack locally around the steady state.
2.5.3 Calibration
To exam the model dynamics quantitatively, the model parameters are calibrated to match
the statistics observed in the U.S. data. An advantage of the calibration exercise conducted
here over the Bayesian estimation conducted in section 1.5 of Chapter 1 is that the pa-
rameters values are determined more transparently.
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We have twelve parameters to calibrate. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to match
the average ratio of gross private domestic investment to private fixed assets from 1947 to
2016 in the NIPA published by the BEA.
The curvature of the consumption utility function γ is chosen to give an elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution of 0.5. In fact, because of a locally flat real AS curve, the value of
γ does not matter for the local dynamics of the CU model and consumption is directly
determined by consumption demand: cˆt = zˆc,t.
The persistence of consumption demand shocks ρc can be calibrated to match the auto-
regressive coefficient of the consumption series published by the BEA from the first quarter
of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017.
The rest of the nine parameters are jointly calibrated to achieve the following targets.
The price in utils in steady state λ is normalized to 1. This target is mostly associated
with the scaling parameter φ in the representative household’s utility function.
The size of output in steady state y is normalized to 1. This target is mostly associated
with the dis-utility of labor ω¯, which affects the size of the economy through the supply
of labor.
The capacity utilization rate in steady state u is matched to the average of the total
industry capacity utilization rate from 1967 to 2016 reported by the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB). This target is mostly associated with the subjective discount factor β, which affects
the opportunity cost of holding capacity.
The investment to output ratio in steady state i/y is matched to the average ratio of gross
private domestic investment to GDP from 1947 to 2016 in the NIPA. This target is mostly
associated with the productivity of capital A, which affects the capital to output ratio.
The labor underutilization rate in steady state is defined as one minus the ratio of the
labor hours actually utilized to the total labor hours that the representative household
can potentially supply: 1 − l, where the total hours that the representative household
could supply is normalized to one. I choose the average of U-5 and U-6 from 1994 to 2016
published by the BLS as a target for the labor underutilization rate.This target is mostly
associated with the direct labor required per unit of output αv, which affects the demand
for labor.
The labor share of income in steady state wl/y is matched to the average labor share of
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income estimated by the BLS from 1946 to 2016. This target is mostly associated with
the unit cost of processing information Λ, which affects the size of the monopolistic profit
and thus the labor share of income.
The cyclicality of the labor productivity generated by the model is matched to the same
statistics calculated based on the output and hours data published by the BEA and the
BLS from the first quarter of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017. This target is mostly
associated with the indirect labor required per unit of capacity αf . Note that locally
around the steady state, the fluctuation of hours is given by
lˆt =
(
1− αfAk
l
)
yˆt +
αfAk
l
kˆt. (2.93)
Ignoring the cyclical fluctuations of capital, we have that the cyclicality of the labor
productivity is closely linked to the share of indirect labor hours in total hours worked:
βLPy ≡
Cov
(
yˆt − lˆt, yˆt
)
Var (yˆy)
≈ αfAk
l
≥ 0. (2.94)
The relative volatility of investment to consumption generated by the model is matched to
the same statistics calculated based on the consumption and investment series published
by the BEA from the first quarter of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017. This target is
mostly associated with the curvature of the capital adjustment cost φk, which dampens
the response of investment to consumption demand shocks.
The auto-correlation of investment generated by the model is matched to the same statis-
tics calculated based on the investment series published by the BEA from the first quarter
of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017. This target is mostly associated with the curvature
of the investment adjustment cost φi, which helps generate a hump-shaped response of
investment to consumption demand shocks.
Table 2.5 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and their mostly associated targets.
2.5.4 Quantitative Results
Table 2.6 compares the business cycle statistics of the model generated series with those in
the data. The results show that the CU model is able to match all the five stylized business-
cycle facts using consumption demand shocks. Particularly, the model generates a positive
correlation between consumption, investment, and hours, a highly volatile investment, an
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Table 2.5: Parameters and Calibration Targets – The CU Model
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 2.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 0.5
φ 0.8300 Price in utils normalized to 1
ω¯ 0.6798 Output normalized to 1
β 0.9747 Capacity utilization rate 0.8
A 0.1544 Investment to output ratio 0.17
αv 0.8117 Labor underutilization rate 0.088
αf 0.0803 Cyclicality of the labor productivity 0.11
Λ 0.4482 Labor share of income 0.62
φk 2.6870 Relative volatility of investment to consumption 6.49
φi 0.0460 Auto-correlation of investment 0.80
ρc 0.9918 Auto-regressive coefficient of consumption 0.9918
Table 2.6: Business Cycle Statistics – The CU Model
ρ (c, h) ρ (c, i) σi/σc βwy β
LP
y β
SR
y
zc,t 0.98 0.92 6.49 0.00 0.11 0.44
The U.S. Data
0.58 0.68 6.49 0.08 0.11 0.39
[0.42, 0.72] [0.57, 0.78] [5.55, 7.42] [−0.03, 0.18] [0.00, 0.21] [0.30, 0.49]
Note: ρ (x1, x2) stands for the correlation coefficient between x1 and x2. σi/σc is the relative
volatility of investment to consumption. The brackets are the 95% confidence intervals calculated
using a parametric bootstrapping method. The U.S. data is from the BEA and the BLS. A path
of 5,000 quarters is simulated to calculate the statistics for the calibrated CU model. All variables
are Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered logarithms of the original series.
acyclical real wage rate, a slightly pro-cyclical labor productivity, and a strongly pro-
cyclical Solow residual.
Figure 2.6 shows the fitted values investment and hours when consumption demand shocks
are chosen to match the consumption data. The results are quite close to the investment
and hours series observed in the data and shows that the CU model is able to capture
most of the business cycle co-movement among consumption, investment, and hours under
consumption demand shocks.
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Consumption, Investment, and Hours Fitted by the CU Model
Figure 2.6: The solid lines are the values generated by the CU model under consumption demand
shocks. The dotted lines are the U.S. data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated recessions.
The data is from the BEA and the BLS. All variables are logarithms of the original series.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies a standard one-good economy to illustrate the difficulties of demand
driving business cycles in a wide class of models in the existing literature. The variable
capital utilization model (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005 and Smets and Wouters, 2007), the
variable plant utilization model (e.g., Cooley et al., 1995), the precautionary capacity
model (e.g., Fagnart et al., 1997 and Fagnart et al., 1999), and the competitive search in
the goods market model (e.g., Bai et al., 2012) can all be regarded as special cases of the
standard one-good economy. The following properties of the standard one-good economy
are obtained.
First, the standard new Keynesian mechanism relies on countercyclical markups to move
real aggregate supply pro-cyclically. Second, when prices are perfectly flexible, the stan-
dard one-good economy is subject to the Barro-King curse under investment demand
shocks. Third, capital accumulation is partially efficient. Hence, aggregate capacity must
be fully utilized in steady state and capital resources must be tight locally around the
steady state. Fourth, when prices are perfectly flexible and capital resources are tight,
either the relative volatility of investment to consumption is too small or the real wage
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rate is too countercyclical under consumption demand shocks. Fifth, under both types of
real demand shocks, the labor productivity is too countercyclical and the Solow residual
is not pro-cyclical enough.
The capacity underutilization (CU) model developed in Chapter 1 provides a possible solu-
tion to the issues discussed above. Firms are encouraged to over-invest in capital because
capacity expansion can steal profitable demand from other firms but the extra capacity
invested has no extra benefit in aggregate. Because of this capacity competition exter-
nality, capital accumulation is not partially efficient, the economy exhibits chronic excess
capacity, and capital resources can be slack locally around the steady state. Quantitative
results indicate that consumption demand shocks alone can generate realistic business
cycle fluctuations in the CU model. The results suggest that the capacity competition
externality is a powerful mechanism that can alleviate the dependence on supply channels
to drive business cycles, reviving the original idea proposed by Keynes.
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Chapter 3
Capacity Competition Externality
and Chronic Excess Capacity
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 shows that if capital accumulation is too efficient, aggregate capacity will be
fully utilized in steady state and capital resources must be tight locally around the steady
state. By contrast, if there is a capacity competition externality, the return of capital at
the firm-level can be larger than the return of capital in aggregate. In this case, too much
capital will be inefficiently accumulated and capacity will be chronically in excess.
As illustrated in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the existence of chronic excess capacity
can have important consequences on the model dynamics. Real demand shocks have
difficulties driving business cycles in models with efficient capital or capacity utilization
but can drive business cycles quite easily in an economy with excess capacity.
In general, what kind of goods market structure could feature the capacity competition
externality that causes chronic excess capacity? To answer this question, I start with a
basic setup in which the goods market is populated with infinitely many small firms. The
setup incorporates the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework as a
special case. I then proceed to narrow down the class of market structures by imposing
three intuitive assumptions.
First, each firm is able to scale up (or down) its market share proportionally by scaling up
(or down) its relative capacity. Therefore, in addition to the usual price competition, there
is a capacity competition among firms. For a given amount of total demand requested, if a
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firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, the firm can “steal” demand from others.
With a production technology of constant returns to scale, the scalability assumption
implies that the gross profit earned by a firm is proportional to the firm’s capital stock.
Hence, a firm can replicate its success in the market by expanding its capital or capacity,
an implication that is quite reasonable for small firms. In this case, firms have no incentive
to merge nor to split up. In fact, I show that when output is demand determined, firms
have no incentive to merge nor to split up if and only if the demand allocated to each firm
varies proportionally with the firm’s capital stock. Hence, like constant returns to scale,
the scalability assumption can be regarded as a good benchmark.
Second, each firm is able to charge a sufficiently high price, so if all goods produced at full
capacity can be sold, the firm can make a positive net profit. The profitability assumption
ensures that firms have an incentive to participate in the capacity competition described
above because the demand stolen due to the capacity expanded is profitable enough. The
scalability assumption and the profitability assumption imply that there is a negative
capacity competition externality: if a firm expands its capacity while other firms do not,
it steals profits from others by stealing demand. Because of this negative externality, firms
tends to hold too much capacity. I show that adding this profitability assumption to the
scalability assumption is necessary and sufficient to see long-term capacity underutilization
at the firm-level.
Third, the invested capital has no positive externality that could potentially offset the
capacity competition externality. In general, the invested capital may have a positive
externality, such as increasing the efficiency of how goods produced by firms are aggregated
into a final good or reducing the cost that has to be incurred by buyers to purchase
the goods from firms. The no positive externality assumption ensures that the negative
capacity competition externality dominates. In this case, any extra capacity held by firms
is in excess.
I prove that the economy will exhibit chronic excess capacity as long as the three assump-
tions above are true.
There are several different ways that could micro-found this kind of goods market struc-
ture. Three examples are provided in this chapter.
First, the basic capacity underutilization (CU) developed in Chapter 1 is a possible micro-
foundation. Buyers are inattentive to prices and tend to search for capacity blindly and
randomly. As a result, firms with a larger capacity are more likely to be visited and the
117
scalability assumption is satisfied. Since buyers are not fully attentive to prices, firms are
able to charge a positive net markup. Hence, the profitability assumption can be satisfied.
Though buyers in aggregate act as if goods are imperfect substitutes, all goods are perfect
substitutes. Hence, the capital invested has no positive externality. As expected, the
economy exhibits chronic excess capacity.
Second, following Michaillat and Saez (2015), I incorporate the standard labor market
matching framework into the goods market. The random matching takes place between
the demand from buyers and the capacity supplied by firms. Prices are determined via a
Nash bargaining process after matching takes place. I show that if the bargaining power
of firms is sufficiently strong, the profitability assumption is satisfied. Furthermore, the
scalability assumption holds because the random matching process allows firms with a
larger capacity to sell more. Finally, since all goods are perfect substitutes as in the basic
CU model, the no positive externality assumption is satisfied. With the same Leontief
production technology and the same household’s problem, I show that the main properties
of the random matching model are the same as those of the basic CU model.
Third, I present a model in which investment in capital not only expands the production
potential but also expands the variety of the goods supplied in the market. With a standard
Dixit-Stiglitz setup, an increase in variety allows firms to steal demand from others. Hence,
the scalability assumption holds. Since the goods produced by different firms are imperfect
substitutes, firms can charge a positive net markup and the profitability assumption can
be satisfied. Finally, I show that the value of expanding variety can be internalized by
firms so that the capital invested has no positive externality in equilibrium. Again, with
the same Leontief production technology and the same household’s problem, I find that
the properties of this variety expansion model are exactly the same as those of the basic
CU model.
To sum up, the scalability, the profitability, and the no positive externality assumptions
together describe a goods market structure in which the capacity competition externality
dominates, and ensure that the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity. These three
assumptions capture the key mechanism that drives the results of the capacity underuti-
lization models studied in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In addition, there are several different
ways to micro-found this goods market structure. Different models correspond to different
interpretations but the main properties of the models remain unchanged.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the three key
assumptions. Sections 3.3-3.5 provide three examples. Particularly, section 3.3 reviews
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and generalizes the basic capacity underutilization (CU) model developed in Chapter 1.
Section 3.4 incorporates the standard random matching and Nash bargaining framework
into the goods market. Section 3.5 presents a model in which invested capital expands
variety. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Capacity Competition Externality and Chronic Excess
Capacity
This section presents a partial equilibrium model in which prices and demand are deter-
mined exogenously. I start with a basic setup, which incorporates the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz (DS) monopolistic competition framework as a special case. Three key assump-
tions are then introduced to describe the goods market structure that features a capacity
competition externality and chronic excess capacity. First, each firm is able to expand its
market share by expanding its relative capacity in the market. Hence, in addition to the
usual price competition, there is a capacity competition among firms. Second, each firm
is able to charge a sufficiently high price to make a positive net profit. Hence, there is a
negative capacity competition externality: if a firm expands its capacity while other firms
do not, it steals profits from others by stealing demand. Third, the invested capital has
no positive externality. Hence, any capacity underutilized at the firm-level is in excess. I
show that these three assumptions can cause chronic excess capacity in the economy.
3.2.1 Basic Setup
Production Technology
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Firms use capital and hire labor to
produce goods. They are price takers in the labor market. The production technology of
firm j at time t ≥ 0 can be represented by a variable cost function C (yj,t, kj,t;wt), where
yj,t is the output of the firm, kj,t is the capital stock, and wt > 0 is the real wage rate.
The variable cost function is assumed to satisfy the following regularity conditions:
1. (Standard properties) The variable cost function C is non-negative, continuous, con-
vex, increasing in terms of output, and decreasing in terms of capital.
2. (Necessity of capital) The domain of the variable cost function dom (C) is either
given by {(y, k) | y ≥ 0, k ≥ χy}, where χ > 0, or given by {(y, k) | y ≥ 0, k > χy} ∪
119
{(0, 0)}, where χ ≥ 0. In the latter case, if y > 0 and k → χy, the variable cost
function converges to infinity: C (y, k;w)→∞.
3. (Constant returns to scale) The variable cost function C is homogeneous of degree
one.
4. (Smoothly diminishing marginal returns to capital) If for a given y, there exists an
interval [a, b] on which the variable cost function is strictly decreasing in capital, then
C is twice differentiable in capital on the interval (a, b) such that Ck (y, k;w) < 0
and Ckk (y, k;w) > 0.
Note that if χ > 0, there is a production limit which is the smallest upper bound on output:
y ≤ χ−1k. The Leontief production technology, the Cobb-Douglas production technology,
and the production technology with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between
capital and labor smaller than one, are all special cases of the technology described above.
Definition 3.1. (SRAC ) The short run average total cost (SRAC) is defined as
SRAC (y, k;wt) ≡ C (y, k;wt) + (r + δ) k
y
, (3.1)
where the output level y > 0 is positive, δ > 0 is the capital depreciation rate, r =
Q−1 − 1 > 0 is the real interest rate in steady state, and Q ∈ (0, 1) is the stochastic
discount factor in steady state.
Claim 3.2. There exists a unique capital level that minimizes the short run average total
cost (SRAC):
k∗ (y, wt) ≡ arg min
k∈{x|(y,x)∈dom(C)}
SRAC (y, k;wt) ; (3.2)
and that capital level must be positive: k∗ (y, wt) > 0.
Proof. If there is a feasible production limit, the SRAC is continuous and convex in terms
of capital on the interval [χy,∞). When k →∞, we have SRAC (y, k;wt) ≥ (r+δ)ky →∞.
Hence, there exists k∗ > 0 that minimizes the SRAC. If there is no feasible production
limit, the SRAC is continuous and convex in terms of capital on the interval (χy,∞).
When k → χy or k → ∞, we have SRAC (y, k;wt) ≥ max
{
C(y,k;wt)
y ,
(r+δ)k
y
}
→ ∞.
Hence, there exists k∗ > 0 that minimizes the SRAC.
If there exists k′ 6= k∗ that also minimizes the SRAC, any k ∈ [a, b] minimizes the SRAC,
where a = min {k′, k∗} < b = max {k′, k∗}. For any k1, k2 ∈ [a, b] and k1 > k2, we have
C (y, k1;wt) = C (y, k2;wt) + (rt + δ) (k2 − k1) < C (y, k2;wt). Hence, by the assumed
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smoothly diminishing marginal returns to capital, C is twice differentiable in terms of
capital on the interval (a, b) such that Ckk (y, k;wt) > 0, a contradiction to the previous
conclusion that any k ∈ [a, b] minimizes the SRAC. Hence, k∗ must be unique.
Definition 3.3. (LRAC ) The long run average total cost (LRAC) is the minimum of the
SRAC when capital stock can be adjusted:
LRAC (y;wt) ≡ min
k∈{x|(y,x)∈dom(C)}
SRAC (y, k;wt) . (3.3)
Claim 3.4. The LRAC curve exists and is flat.
Proof. By definition, the long run average total cost curve can be expressed as:
LRAC (y;wt) = min
k∈{x|(y,x)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1,
k
y
;wt
)
+ (r + δ)
k
y
}
= min
k˜∈{x|(1,x)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1, k˜;wt
)
+ (r + δ) k˜
}
= C (1, k∗ (1, wt) ;wt) + (r + δ) k∗ (1, wt) ,
where k∗ (1, wt) exists according to Claim 3.2. It is clear that the LRAC is independent
of the output level y > 0. Hence, the LRAC curve is flat.
Definition 3.5. (Capacity) Capacity is the unique output level y¯ at which the SRAC
curve is tangent to the LRAC curve as long as the capital level is positive (k > 0). If the
capital level is zero (k = 0), capacity is zero.
Claim 3.6. The capacity of firm j is properly defined and varies proportionally with the
firm’s capital stock kj,t ≥ 0. Particularly, for a given aggregate capital level kj,t ≥ 0 and
a real wage rate wt > 0, the capacity of firm j is given by
y¯j,t =
kj,t
k∗ (1, wt)
, (3.4)
where k∗ is a function that gives the capital level that minimizes the corresponding aggre-
gate SRAC (see Claim 3.2).
Proof. Consider the case where the capital stock is positive (kj,t > 0). Since the LRAC
curve is flat, the tangent point (y¯j,t, kj,t), if there is any, must minimize the SRAC curve:
min
y∈{x>0|(x,kj,t)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1,
kj,t
y
;wt
)
+ (r + δ)
kj,t
y
}
.
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The above minimization problem is equivalent to finding the capital to output ratio that
minimizes the SRAC:
min
k˜∈{x|(1,x)∈dom(C)}
{
C
(
1, k˜;wt
)
+ (r + δ) k˜
}
.
According to Claim 3.2, k∗ (1, wt) is the unique capital to output ratio that minimizes the
SRAC. Therefore, the tangent point exists uniquely and it is proper to define the capacity
as the output level at the unique tangent point: y¯j,t = kj,t/k∗(1,wt). If kj,t = 0, capacity is
also properly defined as zero.
Demand System
Let us now move to the demand side. Suppose that the demand faced by firm j at time t
is a function of nominal prices, capital levels, and the total demand requested Dt > 0:
Dj,t = D (Pj,t, kj,t,Pt,kt,Dt) , (3.5)
where Pj,t > 0 is the nominal price charged by firm j, Pt ≡ (Pj,t)j∈[0,1] > 0 collects all
the nominal prices charged by firms, and kt ≡ (kj,t)j∈[0,1] ≥ 0 collects all the capital stock
held by firms. D is assumed to have the following properties:
1. (Non-negativity) The demand function is non-negative.
2. (Aggregation) The sum of all demand requested is the total demand requested:
∫ 1
0
D (Pj,t, kj,t,Pt,kt,Dt) dj ≡ Dt.
3. (Neutral to absolute price-level) The demand function is homogeneous of degree zero
in terms of nominal prices:
∀α > 0 : D (αPj,t, kj,t, αPt,kt,Dt) = D (Pj,t, kj,t,Pt,kt,Dt) .
4. (Symmetric) For any P′t =
(
PI(j),t
)
j∈[0,1] and k
′
t =
(
kI(j),t
)
j∈[0,1], where I : [0, 1]→
[0, 1] is a one-to-one mapping, we have
D
(
Pj,t, kj,t,P
′
t,k
′
t,Dt
)
= D (Pj,t, kj,t,Pt,kt,Dt) .
The real price charged by firm j at time t is the ratio of the nominal price to the aggregate
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price: pj,t ≡ Pj,t/Pt, where Pt > 0 is the aggregate price. Because the demand function is
homogeneous of degree zero in terms of nominal prices, the demand function could also
be expressed in terms of real prices.
Profit Maximization
To focus on capital accumulation decisions, throughout this section, all prices will be
treated as exogenous. I assume that firms are unable to hold any inventory. Hence, each
unit of goods sold at time t must also be produced at time t. The gross profit of firm j
who produces and sells y units of goods at time t is given by:
pi (y; pj,t, kj,t, wt) ≡ pj,ty − C (y, kj,t;wt) , (3.6)
where the gross profit function pi is concave in output y because C is convex. If there
exists y1 > y2 such that pi (y1; pj,t, kj,t, wt) > pi (y2; pj,t, kj,t, wt), we have that pi is strictly
increasing in y for all y ≤ y1. Let V (pj,t, kj,t, wt) be the set of all such y1 below which the
gross profit is strictly increasing in output:
V (pj,t, kj,t, wt) ≡
{(y1, kj,t) ∈ dom (C) | ∀y2 ∈ [0, y1) , pi (y1; pj,t, kj,t, wt) > pi (y2; pj,t, kj,t, wt)} . (3.7)
If V is empty, the firm would not want to sell at all. If V 6= ∅, the firm would not want
to sell any more when its output has reached the supremum of V. The output level above
which the firm has no incentive to sell can be expressed as a function of the real price
charged, the capital stock held, and the real wage rate:
S (pj,t, kj,t;wt) ≡

supV (pj,t, kj,t, wt) , V (pj,t, kj,t, wt) 6= ∅,
0, V (pj,t, kj,t, wt) = ∅,
(3.8)
which captures the firm’s willingness to supply.
Claim 3.7. The firm’s willingness to supply S (pj,t, kj,t;wt) varies proportionally with the
firm’s capital stock kj,t.
Proof. The statement follows directly from the assumption that C is homogeneous of
degree one, i.e., the production technology is of constant returns to scale.
Recall that firms are unable to hold any inventory. If the goods produced are not sold,
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they would have to be discarded. To ensure that each unit of goods produced can make
a profit, output shall not exceed demand nor the firm’s willingness to supply. Hence, the
optimal output of the firm is the minimum of the demand and the supply:
Y (pj,t, kj,t,pt,kt,Dt;wt) ≡ min {D (pj,t, kj,t,pt,kt,Dt) , S (pj,t, kj,t;wt)} . (3.9)
where pt ≡ (pj,t)j∈[0,1] collects all the real prices charged by firms. For simplicity, let
Yt (pj,t, kj,t) denote the output function of firm j at time t.
Claim 3.8. Yt (pj,t, kj,t) maximizes the gross profit pi (y; pj,t, kj,t, wt) of the firm subject to
the demand constraint: y ≤ D (pj,t, kj,t,pt,kt,Dt).
Proof. Let y∗ be the output, S the supply, and D the demand. Since pi is concave in terms
of y, pi is strictly increasing on [0, S] and non-increasing for any y > S. Hence, if y∗ = S,
the gross profit is maximized. If y∗ = D < S, the output is demand constrained. Any
y < y∗ decreases the profit, while any y > y∗ is not feasible. Hence, y∗ maximizes the
gross profit.
The maximized gross profit of the firm can be expressed as:
Πt (pj,t, kj,t) ≡ pj,tYt (pj,t, kj,t)− C (Yt (pj,t, kj,t) , kj,t;wt) . (3.10)
Capital Accumulation
Each firm aims to maximize its firm value, which is the present value of its dividend flows:
∀j : max
{kj,t+1≥0}t≥0
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
Qτ
)
(Πt (pj,t, kj,t)− kj,t+1 + (1− δ) kj,t)
)
, (3.11)
where Qt+1 is the stochastic discount factor that discounts the value at time t+ 1 to t.
Partial Equilibrium
For an exogenously given stable stochastic process of the real prices {pt}t≥0, the real wage
rate {wt}t≥0, the stochastic discount factor {Qt}t≥0, and the total demand {Dt}t≥0, the
partial equilibrium is a stable stochastic process of the capital stock {kt+1}t≥0 that solves
the firm-value maximization problem (3.11) for all firms.
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3.2.2 Capacity Competition Externality
The setup so far is standard, which includes the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (DS) monopolistic
competition framework as a special case. In the rest of this section, I will introduce three
assumptions to describe a goods market structure that features a capacity competition
externality and chronic excess capacity.
Assumption 3.9. (Scalability-demand) A firm that scales up (or down) its capital stock
also scales up (or down) the demand allocated to the firm by the same proportion:
∀α > 0 : D (pj,t, αkj,t,pt,kt,Dt) = αD (pj,t, kj,t,pt,kt,Dt) .
Assumption 3.9 says that a firm can expand its market share proportionally by expanding
its capital stock or capacity. For a given amount of total demand requested Dt, if a firm
expands its capacity while other firms do not, the firm is stealing demand from others.
Therefore, in addition to the usual price competition, there is a capacity competition
among firms.
If a firm operates with a production technology of constant returns to scale, an immediate
corollary of Assumption 3.9 is that the gross profit of the firm is also scalable.
Corollary 3.10. (Scalability-gross profit) A firm that scales up (or down) its capital stock
also scales up (or down) its gross profit by the same proportion.
Proof. Let y and k be the output and the capital stock of the firm respectively. If the
capital stock of the firm is scaled by α > 0, by Assumption 3.9 and Claim 3.7, the output
of the firm is scaled by α. Because the production technology is of constant returns to
scale, the gross profit of the firm is now given by αpj,ty−αC (y, k;wt), which is also scaled
by α.
The scalability assumption implies that a firm can replicate its success in the market by
expanding its capital or capacity, an implication that is quite reasonable for small firms.
Since the gross profit function is linear in terms of capital, firms have no incentive to
merge nor to split up. Having no incentive to merge nor to split up is almost equivalent
to Assumption 3.9.
Claim 3.11. The scalability assumption (Assumption 3.9) is true for any pj,t and kj,t such
that D (pj,t, kj,t,pt,kt,Dt) < S (pj,t, kj,t;wt) if and only if firm j has no incentive to merge
with others nor to split up.
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Proof. For simplicity, let Dt (pj,t, kj,t) denote the demand and St (pj,t, kj,t) denote the
supply. First, note that the maximized gross profit function Πt is homogeneous of degree
one in capital if and only if the firm has no incentive to merge with others nor to split up.
Second, ∀α > 0, we have:
Πt (pj,t, αkj,t) = pi (Yt (pj,t, αkj,t) ; pj,t, αkj,t, wt) = αΠt (pj,t, kj,t)
= pj,tαYt (pj,t, kj,t)− C (αYt (pj,t, kj,t) , αkj,t;wt)
= pi (αYt (pj,t, kj,t) ; pj,t, αkj,t, wt) .
According to Claim 3.7, Yt (pj,t, αkj,t) and αYt (pj,t, kj,t) both belong to the interval 0 ≤
y ≤ St (pj,t, αkj,t) on which pi is strictly increasing and invertable. Hence, Yt is homoge-
neous of degree one in capital if and only if Πt is homogeneous of degree one in capital.
To prove sufficiency, note that if Dt (pj,t, kj,t) < St (pj,t, kj,t), by Corollary 3.10, we have
∀α > 0, Yt (pj,t, αkj,t) = αYt (pj,t, kj,t). If Dt (pj,t, kj,t) ≥ St (pj,t, kj,t), one can prove by
contradiction that Dt (pj,t, αkj,t) ≥ St (pj,t, αkj,t). Thus, by Claim 3.7, we have ∀α > 0,
Yt (pj,t, αkj,t) = αYt (pj,t, kj,t).
To prove necessity, note that if Dt (pj,t, kj,t) < St (pj,t, kj,t), we must have ∀α > 0,
Dt (pj,t, αkj,t) < St (pj,t, αkj,t). Otherwise, we have Yt (pj,t, αkj,t) = St (pj,t, αkj,t) =
αYt (pj,t, kj,t) = αDt (pj,t, kj,t) < αSt (pj,t, kj,t) ,a contradiction to Claim 3.7. Hence, we
have Dt (pj,t, αkj,t) = Yt (pj,t, αkj,t) = αYt (pj,t, kj,t) = αDt (pj,t, kj,t).
Claim 3.11 shows that when output is demand determined, a firm has no incentive to merge
with others nor to split up if and only if the demand faced by the firm varies proportionally
with the firm’s capital stock. Hence, like constant returns to scale, Assumption 3.9 sets a
good benchmark.
Note that Assumption 3.9 is not satisfied in the usual DS monopolistic competition market
structure, in which capital has no effect on demand and the only competition among firms
is a price competition. In this case, the gross profit function is concave in terms of capital,
and if possible, it is profitable for a big firm to be split into small sub-firms with different
brand names to increase the variety in the market. By assuming scalability, we deviate
from the usual DS monopolistic competition market structure.1
Having the ability to scale up via capacity expansion does not mean that firms have an
1Later in section 3.5, I show that Assumption 3.9 can be true in the standard DS framework if invest-
ment in capital not only increases the production potential but also expands variety.
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incentive to do so because capacity expansion is costly. Firms will not want to participate
in the capacity competition unless the net profit is positive.
Assumption 3.12. (Profitability or pricing power) Each firm j ∈ [0, 1] in equilibrium is
able to charge a price above the long run average total cost (LRAC):
pj,t > LRAC (wt) = C (1, k
∗ (1, wt) ;wt) + (r + δ) k∗ (1, wt) .
Hence, if all goods produced at full capacity can be sold, the firm can make a positive net
profit.
Assumption 3.12, together with Assumption 3.9, ensures that it is profitable for firms to
expand capacity. In this case, capacity expansion has a negative externality: if a firm
expands its capacity while other firms do not, it steals profits from others by stealing
demand. When Assumption 3.12 holds, this capacity competition externality is strong
enough such that the desire to expand capacity will not disappear unless the capacity
becomes underutilized. The following proposition shows that adding Assumption 3.12 to
Assumption 3.9 is sufficient and necessary for firms to have capacity underutilization in
the long run.
Proposition 3.13. (Capacity utilization) Suppose that the scalability assumption, i.e.,
Assumption 3.9, is true. Consider the steady state of a symmetric equilibrium in which
all firms charge the same price. If the price is higher than the LRAC, capacity will be
underutilized. If the price is equal to the LRAC, capacity will be fully utilized. If the price
is lower than the LRAC, firms will have no incentive to hold any capacity.
The following lemma is useful to prove Proposition 3.13. The lemma says that if the
price charged by the firm is sufficiently high, the firm would be happy to produce at full
capacity. Hence, if capacity is underutilized as Proposition 3.13 predicts, it is not because
the cost of utilization is too high, but because demand is not high enough compared to
the capacity accumulated. The lemma shows that the capacity underutilization caused
by the capacity competition externality is consistent with the fact that the vast majority
of firms covered in the Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization cites insufficient
demand as the main reason for capacity underutilization (Boehm et al., 2017).
Lemma 3.14. (Willingness to produce at full capacity) If the price charged by firm j ∈
[0, 1] is no smaller than the long run average total cost (LRAC), the firm is willing to
produce at full capacity.
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Proof. According to Claim 3.7, the firm’s willingness to supply varies proportionally with
capital: S (pj,t, 1;wt) kj,t. According to Claim 3.6, the capacity of the firm is also pro-
portional to the capital stock: y¯j,t = kj,tk
∗ (1, wt)−1. Let a = k∗ (1, wt)−1 > 0 and
b = S (pj,t, 1;wt). We need only prove that a ≤ b.
Suppose that a > b. Because the price is no smaller than the LRAC, we have that
pj,t ≥ C
(
1, a−1;wt
)
+ (r + δ) a−1. Hence, pi (a; pj,t, 1, wt) ≥ r+ δ. By definition, the gross
profit function pi is maximized by b: pi (b; pj,t, 1, wt) ≥ pi (a; pj,t, 1, wt). Thus, b must be
positive, otherwise, the gross profit will be zero, which cannot be larger than the gross
profit obtained at full capacity. However,
SRAC (a, 1;wt) = pj,t − pi (a; pj,t, 1, wt)− (r + δ)
a
≥ pj,t − pi (b; pj,t, 1, wt)− (r + δ)
b
= SRAC (b, 1;wt) ,
a contradiction to Claim 3.2 that a is the unique capital level that minimizes the SRAC.
Equipped with Lemma 3.14, we are now ready to give a proof for Proposition 3.13.
Proof. In the steady state of a symmetric equilibrium, we have that for all j ∈ [0, 1],
pj = p and kj = k. The optimal capital accumulation condition in steady state can be
characterized as: R + µ = r + δ, where R ≡ ∂Π(p,k)/∂k is the return of capital and µ ≥ 0
is the Lagrangian multiplier for the non-negativity constraint k ≥ 0. If the capital stock
in steady state is positive (k > 0), we have R = r + δ. If the return of capital is smaller
than the cost of capital (R < r + δ), we have k = 0 as firms have no incentive to hold
any capital stock. Because of the scalability assumption (Assumption 3.9), the return of
capital can be expressed as a function of the sales per unit of capital y˜:
R (y˜) = pi (y˜; p, 1, w) = py˜ − C (y˜, 1;w) .
which is strictly increasing for all y˜ ∈ [0, S (p, 1;w)].
First, consider the case where the price charged by firms is larger than the LRAC. If goods
are produced and sold at full capacity, the return of capital will be larger than the cost of
capital:
R
(
k∗ (1, w)−1
)
> r + δ.
By Lemma 3.14, k∗ (1, w)−1 ≤ S (p, 1;w). In addition, if the sales per unit of capital is zero
(y˜ = 0) the return of capital will be zero, R (0) = 0 < r+ δ, which is smaller than the cost
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of capital. Since R (y˜) is strictly increasing for all y˜ ∈ [0, S (p, 1;w)]. By the intermediate
value theorem, there exists a unique sales per unit of capital y˜∗ ∈
(
0, k∗ (1, w)−1
)
that
solves the steady state equilibrium condition: R (y˜∗) = r + δ. The capital stock in steady
state must be positive. If k = 0, sales is supply constrained: S (p, 0;w) = 0 < D.
Thus, if a firm chooses to invest a unit of capital, the sales gained is S (p, 1;w). The
return of capital in this case is larger than the cost of capital: R (S (p, 1;w)) > r + δ,
contradicting to the equilibrium condition. Since k > 0, the firm-level output is given by
y = y˜∗k < k∗ (1, w)−1 k = y¯, which is smaller than the firm-level capacity, i.e., capacity is
underutilized.
Second, consider the case where the price charged by firms is equal to the LRAC. If goods
are produced and sold at full capacity, the return of capital will be equal to the cost of
capital:
R
(
k∗ (1, w, r)−1
)
= r + δ.
By Lemma 3.14, we have k∗ (1, w)−1 ≤ S (p, 1;w). Hence, k∗ (1, w)−1 is the unique sales
per unit of capital y˜ ∈ (0, S (p, 1;w)] that solves the steady state equilibrium condition.
Therefore, the firm-level output is given by y = k∗ (1, w)−1 k = y¯, which means that
capacity is fully utilized.
Finally, consider the case where the price charged by firms is smaller than the LRAC. If
goods are produced and sold at full capacity the return of capital will be smaller than the
cost of capital:
R
(
k∗ (1, w)−1
)
< r + δ.
Since k∗ (1, w)−1 is already the point at which the SRAC is minimized, we have p <
LRAC (w) ≤ SRAC (S (p, 1;w) , 1;w), which implies that
pS (p, 1;w)− C (S (p, 1;w) , 1;w) < r + δ.
Thus, for all y˜ ∈ [0, S (p, 1;w)], the return of capital is always smaller than the cost of
capital: R (y˜) = py˜−C (y˜, 1;w) < r+δ. By the equilibrium condition, we have that k = 0
and y = 0 as firms have no incentive to hold any capacity.
3.2.3 Chronic Excess Capacity
However, capacity underutilization at the firm-level does not necessarily mean that capac-
ity is in excess from an aggregate perspective.
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Definition 3.15. (Excess capacity and aggregate capacity) Capacity is said to be in excess
if and only if aggregate capacity is underutilized. Aggregate capacity is the aggregate
output level at which the aggregate SRAC curve is tangent to the aggregate LRAC curve.
The aggregate SRAC is given by
SRAC (Y, k;w) ≡ C (Y, k;w) + (r + δ) kY , (3.12)
where Y > 0 is the aggregate demand and C (Y, k;w) is the aggregate variable cost incurred
to satisfy the aggregate demand. The aggregate LRAC is the minimum of the aggregate
SRAC when aggregate capital can be adjusted:
LRAC (Y;w) ≡ min
k∈{x|(Y,x)∈dom(C)}
C (Y, k;w) + (r + δ) k
Y . (3.13)
In general, the aggregate variable cost function C is different from the variable cost function
at the firm-level C as the former takes into account all the variable costs incurred to satisfy
aggregate demand. For example, suppose that Φ (D,k) units of labor are required to
demand the goods produced by firms as it could be costly for buyers to search for supply,
to process information, and to make orders, where D ≡ (Dj)j∈[0,1] collects all the demand
faced by firms. This purchasing cost shall be included in the aggregate variable cost.
Furthermore, aggregate output is a different object from the output at the firm-level. Let
A denote the aggregation function, which aggregates the goods produced by firms into a
final good:
Y = A (y,k) , (3.14)
where y ≡ (yj)j∈[0,1] collects all the goods produced by firms. It is possible that different
capital levels can cause the aggregate output to be different even though the firm-level
output is the same.
Suppose that the aggregation function A and the purchasing cost function Φ satisfy the
following properties:
1. (Non-negativity) A and Φ are non-negative.
2. (Concavity/convexity) The aggregation function A is concave and the purchasing
cost function Φ is convex.
3. (Monotone) For any α1 > α2 ≥ 0, we have A (α1y,k) > A (α2y,k) if A (y,k) > 0,
and Φ (α1D,k) ≥ Φ (α2D,k).
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4. (Symmetric) For any y′ =
(
yI(j)
)
j∈[0,1], k
′ =
(
kI(j)
)
j∈[0,1], and D
′ =
(
DI(j)
)
j∈[0,1],
where I : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a one-to-one mapping, we have A (y′,k′) = A (y,k) and
Φ (D′,k′) = Φ (D,k).
The aggregate variable cost function can now be expressed as a result of the following cost
minimization problem:
C (Y, k;w) = min
y,k,D≥0
∫ 1
0
C (yj , kj ;w) dj + wΦ (D,k) , (3.15)
subject to the aggregation function (3.14), the demand constraint yj ≤ Dj , the production
limit yj ≤ χ−1kj if there is one, and the capital stock available
∫ 1
0 kjdj ≤ k. Since the
problem is convex and symmetric, a symmetric allocation can minimize the aggregate
variable cost. Hence, yj = Dj = y and kj = k for all j ∈ [0, 1]. The optimal output
at the firm-level is given by the inverse of the aggregation function (3.14): y = a (Y, k).
Therefore, the aggregate variable cost function is
C (Y, k;w) = C (a (Y, k) , k;w) + wΦ (a (Y, k) , k) , (3.16)
where if there is a production limit, the aggregate demand Y must be feasible such that
a (Y, k) ≤ χ−1k.
Equation (3.16) shows that at both the individual firm level and the aggregate level,
capital is valuable because it can expand the production potential of firms. First, it can
save costs by increasing the productivity of labor. Second, it can expand the production
limit if there is one. At the aggregate level, if a (Y, k) or Φ (D, k) is strictly decreasing
in terms of capital, capital has additional reasons to be valuable: it can increase the
efficiency of the goods aggregation process or reducing the amount of labor services that
has to be incurred by buyers to purchase the goods from firms. Because firms are small,
these benefits will not be internalized. Thus, capacity underutilization at the firm-level
may be justified at the aggregate level.
There are two types of externalities that work in opposite directions. On one hand, for
a given amount of total demand requested, when a firm expands its capacity while other
firms do not, the firm steals profitable demand from others. Because of this negative
externality due to capacity competition, firms tends to hold too much capacity as we have
shown in Proposition 3.13. On the other hand, capacity expansion could also increase the
efficiency of the goods aggregation process or reducing the amount of labor services that
has to be incurred by buyers to purchase the goods from firms. Because of this positive
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externality, firms tends to hold too little capacity. It is, therefore, possible to have a
knife-edge condition, like the Hosios condition in the search and matching literature, with
which these two types of externalities happen to cancel out.
By assuming away the positive externality in a symmetric equilibrium, the following as-
sumption ensures that the capacity competition externality dominates.
Assumption 3.16. (No positive externality) If all firms expand (or contract) their capital
stock by the same proportion, both the aggregate output and the purchasing cost are not
affected: ∀α > 0, A (y, αk) = A (y,k) and Φ (D, αk) = Φ (D,k).
With Assumption 3.16 added, the extra capacity installed in aggregate due to the capacity
competition externality has no extra benefit and thus is a waste of resources from an
aggregate perspective. The following proposition shows that because of this mechanism,
the economy must exhibit chronic excess capacity.
Proposition 3.17. (Chronic excess capacity) With Assumptions 3.9, 3.12, and 3.16,
aggregate capacity must be underutilized in the steady state of a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. The aggregate variable cost function can now be written as
C (Y, k;w) = C (a (Y, 1) , k;w) + wΦ (a (Y, 1) , 1) .
Hence, for each Y > 0, k∗ (1, w) a (Y, 1) is the unique aggregate capital level that minimizes
the aggregate SRAC. Let Y¯ be the aggregate capacity. By definition, (Y¯, k) is the point at
which the aggregate SRAC is tangent to the aggregate LRAC; thus, k = k∗ (1, w) a
(Y¯, 1).
By Proposition 3.13 and Lemma 3.14, capacity is underutilized at the firm-level and firms
are willing to produce at full capacity: y < y¯ ≤ S (p, k;w). Thus, we have y = a (Y, 1) <
y¯ = k∗ (1, w)−1 k = a
(Y¯, 1). Since the output at the firm-level y = a (Y, 1) is strictly
increasing in aggregate output, we have Y < Y¯, which says that aggregate capacity is
underutilized.
3.3 Example I: Rational Inattention
There are several different ways to micro-found the goods market structure described in
section 3.2. For example, in Chapter 1, I developed a basic capacity underutilization
(CU) model where buyers are inattentive to prices and tend to search for capacity in an
undirected way because it is costly for buyers to think about prices. In this section, I
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review a generalized version of the basic CU model and make some further discussions on
the buyer’s problem.
3.3.1 Model Setup
Production Technology
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The goods produced by firms are
perfect substitutes for each other and can be used either as consumption or as investment.
The production technology is assumed to be Leontief:
yj,t = min
{
lj,t
αv
, Akj,t
}
, (3.17)
where yj,t is the output of firm j, kj,t is the capital stock, and αv > 0 is the required
labor per output. Each firm is a price taker in the labor market. Hence, the variable cost
function of firm j at time t ≥ 0 is given by
C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) = wtαvyj,t, (3.18)
where wt > 0 is the real wage rate; and the domain of the variable cost function is given
by
dom (C) =
{
(y, k) | y ≥ 0, k ≥ A−1y} , (3.19)
where A > 0. Thus, there is a production limit such that yj,t ≤ Akj,t. The short run
average total cost (SRAC) is
SRAC (y, k;wt) ≡ wtαvy + (r + δ) k
y
, (3.20)
where y ∈ (0, Ak], r > 0 is the real interest rate in steady state, and δ > 0 is the
depreciation rate; and the long run average total cost (LRAC) is
LRAC (wt) ≡ min
k∈{x|(y,x)∈dom(C)}
SRAC (y, k;wt)
= wtαv + (r + δ)A
−1. (3.21)
One can verify that the capacity of the firm is equal to its production limit: y¯j,t = Akj,t.
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Demand System
The purchasing process takes two steps. First, a household or a firm decides how many
goods Yt shall be consumed or invested based on the aggregate price level Pt > 0. Second,
the household or the firm sends out her buyer to purchase these goods for her. All buyers
are identical and the payoff for the buyer who purchases goods from firm j is a strictly
decreasing function of the real price charged by the firm:
vt (j) = v
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
, (3.22)
where Pj,t is the nominal price charged by firm j and v
′ < 0. The payoff function is kept
general. It will become clear later that the main properties of the model do not depend
on the particular functional form of the payoff function as long as the payoff is strictly
decreasing in the real price.
In principle, buyers want to purchase only the cheapest goods. However, following the
rational inattention literature, I assume that it is costly for the buyers to process price
information in order to direct their actions towards the desired. Without exerting any
information processing effort, the matching between the demand from buyers and the
capacity supplied by firms is assumed to be completely random:
n∗t (j) =
y¯j,t
y¯t
, (3.23)
where n∗t (j) is the likelihood of purchasing from firm j and y¯t ≡
∫ 1
0 y¯j,tdj is the total
capacity. n∗t describes the most inattentive behavior of a buyer and is called the default
purchasing behavior.
To deviate from the default, a buyer has to process some price information and incurs
some information processing cost. Let nt be the purchasing behavior eventually obtained
by a buyer. nt (j) gives the likelihood that the buyer purchases from firm j. The amount
of information that needs to be processed is given by the relative entropy of the behavior
chosen by the buyer nt with respect to the default n
∗
t :
DKL (nt||n∗t ) ≡
∫ 1
0
nt (j) ln
(
nt (j)
n∗t (j)
)
dj. (3.24)
Intuitively, the more different nt is from n
∗
t , the more information is needed to be processed.
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A representative buyer’s problem can now be characterized as:
max
nt≥0
∫ 1
0
v
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
nt (j) dj − ΛDKL (nt||n∗t ) , (3.25)
subject to
∫ 1
0 nt (j) dj = 1, where Λ > 0 is the unit cost of processing information.
As demonstrated in section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1, the behavior of the buyers yields the
following demand curve for firm j:
yj,t ≤ Dj,t = nt (j)Dt = kj,te
1
Λ
v
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
∫ 1
0 kj,te
1
Λ
v
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
dj
Dt. (3.26)
where Dj,t is the demand for the goods produced by firm j and Dt is the total demand
requested by buyers. Suppose that all demand requested can be fulfilled. The conjecture
will be verified later. The total demand requested is simply the total amount of goods
that households and firms want to buy:
Dt =
∫ 1
0
yj,tdj = Yt, (3.27)
where the second equality is true because all goods are perfect substitutes.
Profit Maximization
Each firm would choose both its price and its output to maximize its gross profit:
Πt (kj,t) = max
Pj,t≥0,yj,t≥0
(
Pj,t
Pt − wtαv
)
yj,t, (3.28)
subject to the demand constraint (3.26) and the capacity constraint yj,t ≤ Akj,t. Let
µj,t ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian multiplier for the capacity constraint. The firm’s pricing
condition is given by:
Pj,t
Pt =
εj,t
εj,t − 1 (wtαv + µj,t) , (3.29)
where εj,t is the price elasticity of demand (3.26):
εj,t = − 1
Λ
v′
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
Pj,t
Pt , (3.30)
which is inversely related to the unit cost of processing information. I assume that Λ <
−v′ (1), a condition that is sufficient to prevent firms from charging an infinitely high price
in equilibrium.
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If the capacity constraint is not binding, the price charged by firm j is given by a markup
on the marginal cost. If the capacity constraint is binding, the price charged by the firm
will be raised up until demand is equal to capacity. Hence, in equilibrium, prices will be
adjusted such that all demand requested is fulfilled, verifying our previous conjecture.
The aggregate price Pt must be such that solves PtYt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,tyj,tdj to ensure that the
money earned by firms is the same as the money spent on aggregate goods. According to
the aggregation function (3.27), the aggregate price Pt is simply the average price of the
goods purchased by buyers: Pt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,tnt (j) dj.
Capital Accumulation
Given the gross profit function (3.28), each firm aims to maximize its firm value, which is
the present value of the firm’s dividend flows:
max
{ij,t,kj,t+1≥0}∞t=0
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
Qτ
)
(Πt (kj,t)− ij,t)
)
, (3.31)
subject to the capital law of motion kj,t+1 = (1− δ) kj,t+ ij,t, where Qt+1 is the stochastic
discount factor that discounts the value at time t+ 1 to time t and ij,t is the investment.
Households
There is a unit mass of identical households. The representative household maximizes her
expected lifetime utility
max
{ct,lt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−γt − 1
1− γ − ω¯lt
)
, (3.32)
subject to the resource constraint
ct = wtlt + dt, (3.33)
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, γ−1 > 0 gives the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution, ω¯ > 0 is the marginal dis-utility of labor, ct is the amount of
consumption goods purchased, lt is the labor supply, and dt =
∫ 1
0 Πt (kj,t) − ij,tdj is the
amount of dividends received from firms. The labor market is perfectly competitive.
Hence, the household takes the real wage rate wt as exogenous. The household’s problem
implies that the stochastic discount factor is given by Qt+1 = β (ct+1/ct)
−γ .
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3.3.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, if a variable is of the form xj,t, we have xi,t = xj,t for all
i, j ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we can omit the subscripts that index a variable to a particular firm
after obtaining the equilibrium condition. The symmetric equilibrium is determined by
a stable process of five variables (ct, wt, kt+1, µt, and yt) that satisfies the household’s
consumption leisure trade-off:
c−γt wt = ω¯, (3.34)
the firm’s pricing condition
1 =
ε
ε− 1 (wtαv + µt) , (3.35)
where ε = −Λ−1v′ (1) > 1, the firm’s investment condition
1 = Et
(
β
(
ct+1
ct
)−γ (1
ε
Aut+1 +Aµt+1 + 1− δ
))
, (3.36)
where ut ≡ yt/Akt measures of the capacity utilization rate, the complementary slackness
condition for the capacity constraint
µt (Akt − yt) = 0, (3.37)
where µt ≥ 0 and Akt − yt ≥ 0, and the aggregate resource constraint combined with the
law of motion for capital
ct + kt+1 − (1− δ) kt = yt. (3.38)
Note that the equilibrium conditions of the model are exactly the same as those of the
basic CU model developed in Chapter 1. The shape of the buyer’s payoff function only
affects the demand elasticity (see equation (3.30)). Since the equilibrium is symmetric, the
effect is homogeneous and can be offset by a proper choice of the unit cost of processing
information Λ: for each v′ (1) < 0, there exists a Λ > 0 such that the demand elasticity
ε = −Λ−1v′ (1) remains unchanged.
3.3.3 Chronic Excess Capacity
Because it is costly to think about prices, buyers tend to purchase in an undirected way.
Hence, firms with a larger capacity are more likely to be visited by buyers. As the demand
function (3.26) is linear in terms of capital, the purchasing behavior of the buyers ensures
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the scalability of the demand, i.e., Assumption 3.9.
The rational inattention assumption also allows firms to enjoy some monopolistic power.
The price elasticity of demand is inversely related to the unit cost of processing informa-
tion. As long as buyers are not fully attentive to prices Λ > 0, each firm will be able to
charge some positive net markup. If the unit cost of processing information is high enough
such that
1 >
Λ
−v′ (1) > (r + δ)A
−1, (3.39)
one can verify that the real price charged by firms in equilibrium will be larger than the
LRAC of the firms:
LRAC (wt) = wtαv + (r + δ)A
−1 ≤ 1 + Λ
v′ (1)
+ (r + δ)A−1 < 1, (3.40)
where the first inequality comes from the firm’s pricing condition (3.35) and the fact that
the value of the Lagrangian is non-negative: µt ≥ 0. Hence, the profitability assumption,
i.e., Assumption 3.12, is satisfied.
Scalability and profitability together imply that firms are involved in a capacity competi-
tion that has a negative externality. According to Proposition 3.13, the capacity of firms
will be underutilized in steady state. Indeed, according to the firm’s investment condition
(3.36), the capacity utilization rate of a representative firm in steady state is given by
u =
y
y¯
=
(r + δ)A−1
1− wαv < 1, (3.41)
which is smaller than one because of the profitability condition (3.40).
Since the aggregation function (3.27) is simply the summation of all the goods produced
and no purchasing cost is paid by households or firms, the invested capital has no positive
externality and Assumption 3.16 is satisfied. According to Proposition 3.17, the economy
exhibits chronic excess capacity.
3.3.4 Further Discussions on the Buyer’s Problem
Although buyers purchase on behalf of households and firms, the buyers have their own
payoffs. This assumption is convenient as it greatly simplifies the aggregation problem by
allowing buyers to be homogeneous across potentially different households and firms.
In this sub-section, I show that a homogeneous purchasing problem can be directly ob-
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tained as a sub-problem of households and firms. If the information processing cost is paid
by households and firms in terms of goods or services and is proportional to the amount of
goods purchased, households and firms would share the same purchasing problem that is
to minimize the unit cost of acquiring goods. In this case, the payoff of purchasing a unit
of goods from firm j decreases linearly in the real price charged by the firm. However, the
main properties of the model remain unchanged.
Purchasing Problem
Suppose that households and firms have to pay an information processing cost when pur-
chasing. Without paying any information processing cost, households and firms purchase
in an undirected way as described in equation (3.23). This default behavior is summarized
by the probability density function n∗t .
To deviate from the default purchasing behavior, households and firms have to process
some price information. Suppose that the amount of information processed is proportional
to the amount of goods purchased. For each unit of goods purchased, the information
processing cost is given by wtφDKL (nt||n∗t ), where nt is the probability density function
that describes the purchasing behavior obtained by a household or a firm, DKL (nt||n∗t )
measures the relative entropy of nt with respect to n
∗
t , and φ > 0 is the amount of labor
required to process a unit of information. The expected cost per unit of goods acquired is
given by
ςt ≡
∫ 1
0
Pj,t
Pt nt (j) dj + wtφDKL (nt||n
∗
t ) , (3.42)
where nt (j) gives the likelihood of purchasing from firm j. Hence, households and firms
all aim to minimize the expected unit cost of acquiring goods, or to maximize the minus
expected unit cost of acquiring goods −ςt:
max
nt≥0
−
∫ 1
0
Pj,t
Pt nt (j) dj − wtφDKL (nt||n
∗
t ) , (3.43)
subject to
∫ 1
0 nt (j) dj = 1.
The above purchasing problem is of the same structure as the buyer’s problem described
previously in equation (3.25). Once the amount of goods that needs to be purchased
has been determined, households and firms act as buyers who decide where the goods
should be purchased from. The payoff function of purchasing from firm j is now linearly
139
decreasing in the real price of the goods purchased:
v
(
Pj,t
Pt
)
= −Pj,tPt , (3.44)
and the unit cost of processing information is related to the labor required to process a
unit of information and the real wage rate: Λt = wtφ.
The rest of the model setup is exactly the same as before. The solution to the purchasing
problem (3.43) yields the following demand system:
∀j : yj,t ≤ Dj,t = nt (j)Yt = kj,te
− 1
wtφ
Pj,t
Pt∫ 1
0 kj,te
− 1
wtφ
Pj,t
Pt dj
Yt. (3.45)
Equation (3.45) shows that the price elasticity of demand is given by εj,t = (wtφ)
−1 Pj,t/Pt >
1, which must be larger than one in equilibrium. If prices are too high, the real wage rate
will be depressed and the demand elasticity increases, preventing firms from charging an
infinitely high price. In equilibrium, all firms would charge the same price. The firm’s
pricing condition in a symmetric equilibrium is now given by:
1 =
1
1− wtφ (wtαv + µt) , (3.46)
where µt ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier for the capacity constraint.
Main Properties
As households and firms tend to purchase in an undirected way, the demand for the goods
produced by firm j is proportional to the firm’s capital stock (see, equation (3.45)). Hence,
the scalability assumption, i.e., Assumption 3.9, is satisfied.
If the labor required to process a unit of information is high enough such that
φ >
αv (r + δ)A
−1
1− (r + δ)A−1 , (3.47)
one can verify that the real price charged by firms in equilibrium will be larger than the
LRAC of the firms:
LRAC (wt) = wtαv + (r + δ)A
−1 ≤ αv
αv + φ
+ (r + δ)A−1 < 1, (3.48)
where the first inequality comes from the firm’s pricing condition (3.46) and the fact that
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the value of the Lagrangian is non-negative: µt ≥ 0. Hence, the profitability assumption,
i.e., Assumption 3.12, is satisfied.
The aggregation function (3.27) is simply the summation of all the goods produced. In
addition, the amount labor required for purchasing due to the information processing cost
is given by
Φ (D,k) = φDKL (nt||n∗t )Dt = φ
∫ 1
0
Dj,t ln
(
Dj,t/Dt
kj,t/kt
)
dj, (3.49)
which is homogeneous of degree zero in terms of capital levels. Hence, Assumption 3.16,
i.e., the no positive externality, is satisfied.
According to Propositions 3.13 and 3.17, the capacity at the firm-level is underutilized in
steady state and the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity.
When capacity is in excess, the real wage rate and the unit cost of processing informa-
tion in equilibrium are both constant: wt = (φ+ αv)
−1 and Λ = wtφ = φ (φ+ αv)−1.
Furthermore, since all firms charge the same price in equilibrium, the actual information
processing cost incurred is zero. Hence, in equilibrium, no extra hours are worked. With a
strictly decreasing payoff function (3.44) for buyers, the dynamic properties of the model
in the case where capacity is in excess are exactly the same as before.
3.4 Example II: Random Matching and Nash Bargaining
This section presents an alternative way to micro-found the goods market structure de-
scribed in section 3.2. I introduce the standard labor market search and matching frame-
work into the goods market. Prices are determined via a static Nash bargaining process
as in Michaillat and Saez (2015). With the same production technology and the same
household’s problem as in section 3.3, I show that the dynamic properties of the model
locally around the steady state where capacity is in excess are the same as those of the
basic CU model reviewed in section 3.3.
3.4.1 Model Setup
Production Technology
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The goods produced by firms are
identical and are perfect substitutes for each other. The goods can be used either as
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consumption or as investment. The production technology is the same as described in
section 3.3.
Demand System
Households and firms are price takers in the labor market. They need to hire some
labor for purchasing goods. For each unit of demand requested, φ > 0 units of labor are
required. As in the standard labor market search and matching literature (e.g., Mortensen
and Pissarides 1994), I assume that when households and firms purchase, they search for
capacity in an undirected way. The random matching process between the total demand
requested Dt and the total capacity y¯t =
∫ 1
0 y¯j,tdj supplied yields the following demand
system:
∀j : Dj,t = y¯j,t
y¯t
Dt, (3.50)
where Dj,t is the demand requested for the goods produced by firm j. The matching
technology is assumed to be Leontief:
yj,t ≤ min {Dj,t, y¯j,t} , (3.51)
which means that the goods that could be sold by firm j is constrained by the demand
requested and the capacity supplied.
Suppose that all demand matched can be fulfilled in equilibrium. This conjecture will be
verified later. The probability that a unit of demand is successfully fulfilled is simply the
ratio of the demand matched to the demand requested:
q (xt) = min
{
1,
y¯j,t
Dj,t
}
= min
{
1,
y¯t
Dt
}
= min
{
1, x−1t
}
, (3.52)
where xt ≡ Dt/y¯t measures the market tightness and q (xt) denotes the demand fulfilling
probability as a decreasing function of market tightness. Note that the demand fulfilling
probability is not firm-specific because of the random matching process. Each buyer, who
could be a household or a firm, is infinitely small and will take q (xt) as exogenous.
Because all goods are perfect substitutes, the amount of aggregate goods produced Yt is
given by
Yt =
∫ 1
0
yj,tdj; (3.53)
and the total demand that has to be requested in order to satisfy the aggregate demand
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Yt is given by:
Dt = Yt
q (xt)
. (3.54)
Nash Bargaining
Let Pj,t be the price charged by firm j. Pj,t will be determined via a static Nash bargaining
process between the buyer and the firm after matching has taken place.
For each successful matching, a unit of goods can be purchased to satisfy a unit of aggregate
demand. Since all goods are perfect substitues, the value of this matching for the buyer is
equal to the buyer’s outside option, which is the cost that would have to be incurred if the
buyer chooses to search again. Hence, the marginal surplus to the buyer who purchases
from firm j is given by
Bt (Pj,t) = 1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
− Pj,tPt , (3.55)
where q (xt)
−1 is the demand that has to be requested in order to purchase successfully a
unit of goods and Pt is the aggregate price. The marginal surplus to the firm who sells a
unit of goods to the buyer is simply given by the marginal gross profit:
Ft (Pj,t) =
Pj,t
Pt − wtαv. (3.56)
The total surplus of the matching must be positive. If not, since purchasing is costly
(φ > 0), no purchasing will take place and no labor will be hired, violating the labor
market clearing condition. The Nash bargaining process between the buyer and the firm
is to find the price that splits the total surplus according the bargaining power of each
party:
max
Pj,t≥0
Bt (Pj,t)
1−bFt (Pj,t)b , (3.57)
where b ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that captures the bargaining power of firms. Hence, the
bargained price is give by
Pj,t
Pt = b
(
1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
− wtαv
)
+ wtαv, (3.58)
which shows that if the firm has some positive bargaining power (b > 0), the price charged
by the firm will be above the marginal cost wtαv, creating effectively a positive net markup.
Since it is always profitable to sell, the firms will be happy to fulfill all the matched
demand, verifying our previous conjecture. Thus, the goods produced by the firm is given
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by
yj,t = min {Dj,t, y¯j,t} = u (xt) y¯j,t, (3.59)
where u (xt) is the capacity utilization probability or the capacity utilization rate:
u (xt) =
yj,t
y¯j,t
= min
{Dt
y¯t
, 1
}
= min {xt, 1} ; (3.60)
and the gross profit function of firm j can be written as:
Πt (kj,t) = b
(
1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
− wtαv
)
u (xt)Akj,t. (3.61)
Note that because of the random matching process, the capacity utilization rate, like the
demand fulfilling probability, is not firm-specific.
The aggregate price Pt must solve PtYt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,tyj,tdj to ensure that the money earned by
firms is the same as the money spent on aggregate goods. According to the aggregation
condition (3.27), the aggregate price Pt is simply the average price of the goods purchased:
Pt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,t (
yj,t/
∫ 1
0 yj,tdj) dj.
Capital Accumulation
The capital accumulation decision of firm j is to choose the firm’s investment ij,t and the
capital stock kj,t+1 to maximize the firm’s value:
max
{ij,t,kj,t+1≥0}∞t=0
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
τ=1
Qτ
)(
Πt (kj,t)−
(
1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
)
ij,t
))
, (3.62)
subject to the capital law of motion kj,t+1 = (1− δ) kj,t+ ij,t, where Qt+1 is the stochastic
discount factor that discounts the value at time t+ 1 to time t.
Households and Aggregate Demand
There is a continuum of identical households. The representative household’s problem,
which determines the household’s consumption ct and the labor supply lt, is to maximize
the life-time utility as described by equations (3.32) in section 3.3, subject to the resource
constraint (
1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
)
ct = wtlt + dt. (3.63)
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The household’s problem implies that the stochastic discount factor is given by Qt+1 =
β (ct+1/ct)
−γ (Φt/Φt+1), where Φt ≡
(
1 + wtφ
1
q(xt)
)
.
3.4.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is determined by a stable process of five variables (ct, wt, kt+1,
xt, and yt) that satisfies the household’s consumption leisure trade-off
c−γt
wt
1 + wtφ
1
q(xt)
= ω¯, (3.64)
the Nash bargaining condition
1 = b
(
1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
− wtαv
)
+ wtαv. (3.65)
the firm’s investment condition
1 = Et
(
β
(
ct+1
ct
)−γ ( 1− wt+1αv
1 + wt+1φ
1
q(xt+1)
Au (xt+1) + (1− δ)
))
, (3.66)
the aggregate matching technology
yt = u (xt)Akt, (3.67)
and the aggregate resource constraint (3.38) as obtained in section 3.3.
3.4.3 Chronic Excess Capacity
As shown by the linearity of the demand function (3.50), the random matching assumption
ensures the scalability of the demand, i.e., Assumption 3.9.
If the bargaining power of the firms is sufficiently strong such that
1 ≥ b > (r + δ)A
−1 (αv + φ)
φ+ (r + δ)A−1αv
, (3.68)
one can verify that the real price charged by firms in equilibrium will be larger than the
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LRAC of the firms in equilibrium:
LRAC (wt, xt) = wtαv + (r + δ)A
−1
(
1 + wtφ
1
q (xt)
)
≤ (r + δ)A
−1φ (1− b) + αv (1− b)
φb+ αv (1− b) + (r + δ)A
−1 < 1, (3.69)
where the first inequality comes from the Nash bargaining condition (3.65) and the fact
that the demand fulfilling probability is no larger than one: q (xt) ≤ 1. Hence, the
profitability assumption, i.e., Assumption 3.12, is satisfied.
Scalability and profitability together imply that firms are involved in a capacity competi-
tion that has a negative externality. According to Proposition 3.13, the capacity of firms
will be underutilized in steady state. Indeed, according to the firm’s investment condition
(3.66), the capacity utilization rate of a representative firm in steady state is given by
u (x) =
y
y¯
=
(r + δ)A−1
1− wαv
(
1 + wφ
1
q (x)
)
< 1, (3.70)
which is smaller than one because of the profitability condition (3.68).
Since the aggregation function (3.53) is simply the summation of all the goods produced
and the cost of purchasing is independent of the capital stock, Assumption 3.16, i.e., the no
positive externality assumption, is satisfied. According to Proposition 3.17, the economy
exhibits chronic excess capacity.
We can verify this conclusion. Note that the aggregate variable cost function is given by
C (Yt, kt;wt) = min{yj,t,kj,t,Dj,t≥0}j∈[0,1]
wt
(∫ 1
0
αvyj,tdj +
∫ 1
0
φDj,tdj
)
, (3.71)
subject to the aggregation function (3.53), the matching constraint (3.51), and the capital
stock available
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj ≤ kt. The problem is symmetric and convex. Hence, the aggregate
variable cost is given by C (Yt, kt;wt) = wt (αv + φ)Yt, for all Yt ≤ Akt. Thus, the
aggregate capacity is given by the production limit, which is the same as the total capacity
at the firm-level: Y¯t = Akt = y¯t. The aggregate output is also the same as the total output
at the firm-level because of the aggregation function (3.53). Therefore, as Proposition 3.17
predicts, aggregate capacity is underutilized in steady state (Y < Y¯) as long as the capacity
at the firm-level is underutilized in steady state (y < y¯).
Finally, locally around the steady state where capacity is in excess, all demand is matched
q (xt) ≡ 1 and the real wage rate wt is a constant. Hence, the dynamic properties of the
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model developed here are exactly the same as those of the basic CU model reviewed in
section 3.3.2
3.5 Example III: Investment as Variety Expansion
This section shows that the Dixit-Stiglitz (DS) monopolistic competition framework can
be adapted to provide a micro-foundation for the goods market structure described in
section 3.2. Particularly, I present a model in which investment in capital not only ex-
pands production potential but also expands variety. With a standard DS setup, if a firm
increases the variety of the goods sold, the firm increases its competitive advantage, which
allows the firm to steal demand from others. Hence, Assumption 3.9 holds. Since goods
are imperfect substitutes, firms can charge a positive net markup. If the markups charged
by firms are high enough, Assumption 3.12 is satisfied. Finally, the invested capital has
no positive externality in equilibrium as the value of variety can be internalized by firms.
I show that the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity as Proposition 3.17 predicts.
With the same household’s problem as in section 3.3, I show that the dynamic properties
of the model are exactly the same as those of the basic CU model reviewed in section 3.3.
3.5.1 Model Setup
Production Technology
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm j operates with a continuum
of production lines. Let Nj,t be the amount of production lines owned by firm j. Each
production line is indexed by a pair (j, v), where v ∈ [0, Nj,t]. Each production line requires
a certain amount of capital stock k¯ > 0 to be installed and produces a certain type of
differentiated goods. The amount of production lines owned by firm j is proportional to
the capital stock owned by the firm: kj,t = k¯Nj,t.
Let yj,v,t be the amount of goods produced by the production line v of firm j. The
aggregate goods produced are a CES aggregation of all the differentiated goods produced:
Yt = N−ϕt
(∫ 1
0
∫ Nj,t
0
y
ε−1
ε
j,v,tdvdj
) ε
ε−1
, (3.72)
2The total hours worked in the random matching model is larger than that in the basic CU model
because of the cost of purchasing. However, the percentage changes in total hours will be the same in both
models as sizes are normalized when calculating percentages.
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where Yt is the amount of aggregate goods, Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nj,tdj is the total mass of production
lines, ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods, and ϕ ≥ 0 is a
parameter that captures the potential crowd-out effect due to variety expansion.
Firms do not sell the goods produced by their production lines directly. Instead, they sell
a combination of the goods produced by their production lines:
yj,t = N
−ϕ
j,t
(∫ Nj,t
0
y
ε−1
ε
j,v,tdv
) ε
ε−1
, (3.73)
where yj,t is the effective output of firm j. Hence, the CES aggregation (3.72) can be
rewritten as
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
(
Nj,t
Nt
)ϕ ε−1
ε
y
ε−1
ε
j,t dj
) ε
ε−1
, (3.74)
which shows that firms who own more production lines than others are more attractive to
customers. Note that the CES aggregation at the firm-level (3.73) resembles the economy-
wide CES aggregation (3.72), and allows firms to take into account both the value of
variety expansion and the potential crowd-out effect due to variety expansion. However, as
equation (3.74) shows, firms with more production lines still enjoy a competitive advantage.
This advantage is not justified in a symmetric equilibrium: if all firms expand their variety
by the same proportion without changing their effective output, the aggregate output will
be the same.
To produce goods, each production line operates with a Leontief production technology,
uses the capital stock k¯ installed, and hires some variable labor lj,v,t:
yj,v,t = min
{
lj,v,t
αv
, Ak¯
}
. (3.75)
The variable cost of the firm is given by the following cost minimization problem:
C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) = min{yj,v,t≥0}
v∈[0,Nj,t]
wtαv
∫ Nj,t
0
yj,v,tdv, (3.76)
subject to the CES aggregation at the firm-level (3.73), the production limit yj,v,t ≤ Ak¯,
and the amount of production lines determined by the capital stock available k¯Nj,t =
kj,t. Since the problem is strictly convex and symmetric, the optimal solution must be
symmetric. Hence, the variable cost function is
C (yj,t, kj,t;wt) = wtαvyj,t
(
kj,t
k¯
)1+ϕ− ε
ε−1
, (3.77)
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for yj,t ≤ Ak¯ (kj,t/k¯)
ε
ε−1−ϕ. In the rest of this section, I assume that ϕ = (ε− 1)−1; thus,
the effective production technology is of constant returns to scale and the variable cost
function is homogeneous of degree one in terms of effective output and capital. In this
case, one can verify that the capacity of the firm is simply the production limit, which is
given by y¯j,t = Akj,t.
Demand System
Suppose that all demand requested can be fulfilled. The conjecture will be verified later.
If Yt units of aggregate goods are demanded, the demand requested Dj,t for the goods
produced by firm j is generated by minimizing the total cost of the goods purchased:
min
{Dj,t≥0}j∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
Pj,tDj,tdj, (3.78)
subject to the aggregation function (3.74), where Pj,t > 0 is the price charged by firm j.
The solution to the above minimization problem gives:
∀j : yj,t ≤ Dj,t = Nj,t
Nt
(
Pj,t
PI,t
)−ε
Yt = kj,t
kt
(
Pj,t
PI,t
)−ε
Yt, (3.79)
where PI,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
Nj,t
Nt
P 1−εj,t dj
) 1
1−ε
is a price index and kt =
∫ 1
0 kj,tdj is the total capital
stock. Note that the demand faced by firm j is linear in terms of the capital stock of
the firm because capital investment also works as a variety expansion that makes the firm
more attractive to customers.
Profit Maximization
Each firm chooses both its price and its effective output to maximize its gross profit, which
is given by the revenue minus the variable cost:
Πt (kj,t) = max
Pj,t≥0,yj,t≥0
(
Pj,t
Pt − wtαv
)
yj,t, (3.80)
subject to the demand constraint (3.79) and the capacity constraint yj,t ≤ Akj,t. The
firm’s pricing condition is given by:
Pj,t
Pt =
ε
ε− 1 (wtαv + µj,t) , (3.81)
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where µj,t ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian multiplier for the capacity constraint. If the capacity
constraint is not binding, the price charged by firm j is given by a constant markup on the
marginal cost. If the capacity constraint is binding, the price charged by the firm will be
raised up until demand is equal to capacity. Hence, in equilibrium, prices will be adjusted
such that all demand requested is fulfilled, verifying our previous conjecture.
The aggregate price Pt must solve PtYt =
∫ 1
0 Pj,tyj,tdj to ensure that the money earned
by firms is the same as the money spent on aggregate goods. According to the demand
system (3.79) and the aggregation function (3.74), we have that the aggregate price is
equal to the price index: Pt = PI,t.
Capital Accumulation
The capital accumulation decision is based on the same firm-value maximization problem
(3.31) as described in section 3.3, a problem that determines the firm’s investment ij,t and
the capital stock kj,t+1 for the next period.
Households and Aggregate Demand
There is a continuum of identical households. The representative household’s problem,
which determines the household’s consumption ct and labor supply lt, is the same as
described by equations (3.32) and (3.33) in section 3.3.
3.5.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, for all j ∈ [0, 1], we have that Pj,t = PI,t = Pt and yj,t = yt =
Yt.
The symmetric equilibrium of the model is characterized by a stable stochastic process
of five variables (ct, wt, kt+1, µt, and yt) that satisfies the same household’s consumption
leisure trade-off (3.34), the firm’s pricing condition (3.35), the firm’s investment condition
(3.36), the complementary slackness condition for the capacity constraint (3.37), and the
aggregate resource constraint (3.38) as obtained in section 3.3 for the basic CU model.
150
3.5.3 Chronic Excess Capacity
Note that capital investment in this model allows firms to install more production lines and
expand the variety of the goods supplied in the market. Firms who can supply a higher
variety can attract more demand. As shown by the linearity of the demand function (3.79),
the scalability of the demand, i.e., Assumption 3.9, is satisfied.
The imperfect substitution between goods allows firms to have some monopolistic power.
If the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods is small enough such that
1 < ε < A (r + δ)−1 , (3.82)
one can verify that the real price charged by firms in equilibrium will be larger than the
LRAC of the firms at full capacity:
LRAC (wt) = wtαv + (r + δ)A
−1 ≤ 1− 1
ε
+ (r + δ)A−1 < 1, (3.83)
where the first inequality comes from the firm’s pricing condition (3.35) and the fact that
the value of the Lagrangian is non-negative: µt ≥ 0. Hence, the profitability assumption,
i.e., Assumption 3.12, is satisfied.
Scalability and profitability together imply that firms are involved in a capacity competi-
tion that has a negative externality. According to Proposition 3.13, the capacity of firms
will be underutilized in steady state. Indeed, according to the firm’s investment condition
(3.36), the capacity utilization rate of a representative firm in steady state is given by
u =
y
y¯
=
(r + δ)A−1
1− wαv < 1, (3.84)
which is smaller than one because of the profitability condition (3.83).
Since the aggregation function (3.74) that aggregates the effective output of firms is ho-
mogeneous of degree zero in terms of capital levels and there is no purchasing cost, the no
positive externality assumption, i.e., Assumption 3.16, is satisfied. According to Proposi-
tion 3.17, the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity.
We can verify this conclusion. The aggregate variable cost function is given by
C (Yt, kt;wt) = min{yj,v,t≥0,Nj,t≥0}
j∈[0,1],v∈[0,Nj,t]
wtαv
∫ 1
0
∫ Nj,t
0
yj,v,tdvdj, (3.85)
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subject to the CES aggregation (3.72), the production limit yj,v,t ≤ Ak¯, and the capital
stock available k¯
∫ 1
0 Nj,tdj ≤ kt. The problem is symmetric and strictly convex. Hence,
the aggregate variable cost is given by C (Yt, kt;wt) = wtαvYt, for all Yt ≤ Akt; and the
aggregate capacity is given by the production limit, which is the same as the total capacity
at the firm-level: Y¯t = Akt = y¯t. According to the aggregation function (3.74), the aggre-
gate output is also the same as the total output at the firm-level because the equilibrium
is symmetric. Therefore, as Proposition 3.17 predicts, aggregate capacity is underutilized
in steady state (Y < Y¯) as long as the capacity at the firm-level is underutilized in steady
state (y < y¯).
Finally, note that the variety expansion model developed here and the basic CU model
reviewed in section 3.3 share the same equilibrium conditions. Hence, the dynamic prop-
erties of the two models are exactly the same.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter discusses what kind of goods market structure features the capacity com-
petition externality that can cause chronic excess capacity. Three key assumptions are
identified. First, each firm is able to expand its market share proportionally by expanding
its relative capacity. Hence, in addition to the usual price competition, there is a capacity
competition among firms. Second, each firm is able to charge a sufficiently high price
to make a positive net profit. Hence, there is a negative capacity competition external-
ity: if one firm expands its capacity while other firms do not, it steals profitable demand
from others. Third, the invested capital has no positive externality. Hence, any capacity
underutilized at the firm-level is in excess.
The scalability, the profitability, and the no positive externality assumptions together de-
scribe a goods market structure in which the capacity competition externality dominates,
and ensure that the economy exhibits chronic excess capacity. These three assumptions
capture the key mechanism that drives the results of the capacity underutilization models
studied in this thesis.
There are several different ways to micro-found this goods market structure. Firms can
make a positive net profit because of a monopolistic power or because of a bargaining
power. The market share of a firm is proportional to the firm’s capital stock because buyers
are inattentive to prices and thus search for capacity in an undirected way or because
capital investment expands variety and thus increases the competitive advantage of the
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firm. Different models correspond to different interpretations but the main properties
of the models are the same. The assumptions identified in this chapter are potentially
testable. To what extent these three assumptions are true is an important and interesting
question for future research.
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Chapter 4
Appendix
4.1 Calibrations of the Standard RBC Models
I do not use the observed average capacity utilization rate as a calibration target because
capacity is fully utilized in the steady state of the standard RBC models. The other
calibration targets are the same as in the basic CU model (see section 1.3.5). For the CD-
RBC model, the capital productivity A is not identified because for each value of A > 0,
there exists a value of αv such that the total factor productivity (TFP) α
−α
v A
1−α is the
same. To pin down the value of A, I choose A such that y/Ak is normalized to 1. Table 4.1
summarizes the calibrated parameter values of the Leontief-RBC model and the CD-RBC
model.
Table 4.1: Parameters and Calibration Targets – RBC Models
Leontief-RBC CD-RBC
Target
Parameter Value Parameter Value
δ 0.0210 δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 1.0000 γ 1.0000 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1
φ 0.8300 φ 0.8300 Price in utils 1
ω¯ 0.6200 ω¯ 0.6200 Output 1
αv 0.9120 αv 0.9120 Labor underutilization rate 0.088
β 0.9747 β 0.9747 Investment to output ratio 0.17
A 0.1235 A 0.1235 Labor share of income 0.62
α 0.6200 y/Ak normalized to 1
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4.2 Description of the Data
The data on consumption, investment, government spending, exports, imports, output,
hours, and capital is from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data on employment, unemployment,
labor force, wage rate, and labor share is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The data on capacity utilization rate is from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).
The FRB publishes a capacity utilization rate for manufacturing and a capacity utilization
rate for total industries. The latter covers manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas
utilities. These two capacity utilization rates are very close to each other. The manufac-
turing capacity utilization rate, which has a longer history, is used to compare with the
model fitted values in Figure 1.7.
The BEA data on capital is annually. To get the quarterly data, I use linear interpolation
to impute the BEA annual data on capital. Let KY be the capital stock at the end of year
Y . The capital stock at the end of year Y and quarter Q is taken to be
KY,Q = exp
(
lnKY−1 +
Q
4
(lnKY − lnKY−1)
)
.
The BEA data on hours worked by full-time and part-time employees is also annually. To
get the quarterly data, I impute the BEA annual data on hours based on the information
provided by the BLS. The BLS issues data on hours worked in business sectors at a
quarterly frequency. Let HY be the hours worked by full-time and part-time employees in
year Y and HBY,Q be the hours worked in business sectors in year Y and quarter Q. The
hours worked by full-time and part-time employees in year Y and quarter Q is taken to
be
HY,Q = HY
HBY,Q
HBY,1 +H
B
Y,2 +H
B
Y,3 +H
B
Y,4
.
To convert the nominal variables into real ones, I divide the nominal variables by the GDP
deflator obtained from the BEA.
All variables are detrended before they are used for estimations or to calculate business
cycle statistics. I estimate a quadratic trend for the log of labor productivity measured by
output to hours ratio. I also estimate a quadratic trend for the log of hours worked per
capita.
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Let LP Y,Q be the trend of labor productivity, h¯Y,Q be trend of hours worked per capita,
and L¯Y,Q be the labor force in year Y and quarter Q. The real wage rate is assumed to be
of the same trend as the labor productivity. h¯Y,QL¯Y,Q captures the potential hours that
could be worked in the economy, which is treated as the trend of hours worked by full-
time and part-time employees. h¯Y,QL¯Y,QLP Y,Q captures the potential output that could
be produced in the economy, which is treated as the trend of consumption, investment,
government spending, exports, imports, output, and capital.
Figure 4.1 shows the logarithms of the detrended consumption, investment, output, hours,
capital, and real wage rate.
Detrended U.S. Data
Figure 4.1: All variables are logarithms of the original series. The shaded areas are NBER dated
recessions.
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4.3 Estimation of the Full VU Model
I use Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate the full VU model. Thirteen calibration
targets are chosen to be matched throughout this estimation procedure. The elasticity
of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) is calibrated to 0.5. The exogenous expenditure to
output ratio in steady state is matched to the average ratio of the exogenous expenditure
to GDP from 1947 to 2016 in the BEA NIPA. The quarterly real interest rate in steady
state is calibrated to 1%. The other ten calibration targets are the same as described in
section 1.4.3, which calibrates the standard VU model.
Because of these targets, thirteen parameter values are not free to pick. Eleven param-
eters are fixed as their values follow directly from the thirteen calibration targets. Two
parameters can be expressed as functions of other parameters and the thirteen calibration
targets:
α =
ω¯ (l − αgg)
ω¯ (l − αgg) + (β−1 − 1 + δ) iδ
, (4.1)
ε =
c+ i
c+ i− (ω¯ (l − αgg) + (β−1 − 1 + δ) iδ) . (4.2)
Table 4.2 summarizes these thirteen parameters and their mostly associated calibration
targets.
The other parameters are estimated. The priors of parameters σc, σi, σg, σl, ρc, ρg, ρi,1,
ρi,2, ρl, ρci, φl, φk, φi, and αg are assumed to be the same as in the full CU model.
The parameter ξ ≡ a′′(θ)θ/a′(θ), which captures the convexity of the capital utilization cost
function in steady state, is assumed to follow a Normal distribution with a mean of 1 and
a standard deviation of 0.5.
Table 4.3 summarizes the priors and shows the mode, the mean, and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distribution of the parameters obtained by the Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) algorithm. The total number of MH draws is 100,000 and the acceptance
ratio is about 20.5%.
Based on the posterior modes of the structural parameters and the thirteen calibration
targets, the Cobb-Douglas (CD) labor share α is 0.68 and the elasticity of the demand
curve ε is 55.57.
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Table 4.2: Parameters Pinned down by the Calibration Targets – Full VU Model
Parameter Value Target
δ 0.0210 Quarterly depreciation rate 0.021
γ 2.0000 Elasticity of Inter-temporal substitution 0.5
β 0.9900 Quarterly real interest rate 0.01
g 0.2000 Exogenous expenditure to output ratio 0.2
αv 0.9120 Labor underutilization rate 0.088
ω¯ 0.6798 Output normalized 1
φ 0.6300 Price in utils normalized to 1
A 0.0988 y/Ak normalized to 1
θ 1.0000 θ normalized to 1
a (θ) 0.0000 a (θ) normalized to 0
α Eq. (4.1) Labor share of income 0.62
ε Eq. (4.2) Investment to output ratio 0.17
Table 4.3: Bayesian Estimation – Full VU Model
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean Std Dev Mode Mean 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
σc Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
σi Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
σg Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
σl Invgamma 0.03 ∞ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ρc Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
ρi,1 Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99
ρi,2 Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.23 -0.25 -0.35 -0.16
ρg Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
ρl Uniform 0.00 0.58 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.97
ρci Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.14 -0.15 -0.21 -0.08
φl Uniform 0.00 0.58 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 0.12
φk Normal 2.00 1.00 1.88 2.09 0.85 3.29
φi Normal 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.21
αg Normal 0.60 0.30 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.76
ξ Normal 1.00 0.50 0.97 1.11 0.37 1.79
Note: Std Dev stands for standard deviation (of the priors). The sample period is from the first
quarter of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017.
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4.4 Additional Estimation Results
Figure 4.2 shows the consumption demand zc,t, the investment demand zi,t, the exogenous
expenditure zg,t, and the labor productivity zl,t series extracted from the data. Except for
the labor productivity, the other exogenous stochastic processes extracted from the data
are quite similar in both models.
Extracted Exogenous Stochastic Processes
Figure 4.2: The consumption demand zc,t, the investment demand zi,t, the exogenous expenditure
zg,t, and the labor productivity zl,t extracted from the data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated
recessions.
Figure 4.3 shows the model fitted values under investment demand shocks ei,t. Since the
estimated ρci is negative, there is a negative correlation between the consumption and the
investment. According to both models, a persistent increase in consumption shall cause a
persistent increase in capital and a persistent increase in capital shall not cause a persistent
Table 4.4: Cyclicality of Consumption Under Investment Demand Shocks
Full CU Full VU
Correlation Covariance Correlation Covariance
Consumption-Output -0.004 -0.001 -0.147 -0.046
Consumption-Hours -0.204 -0.064 -0.443 -0.132
Note: The covariance between consumption and output (or hours) is reported relative to the
variance of output (or hours). The U.S. data is from the BEA and the BLS. All variables are
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered logarithms of the original series.
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Model Fitted Values Under Investment Demand Shocks
Figure 4.3: The solid lines are for the full CU model. The dash-dotted lines are for the full VU
model. The dotted lines are the U.S. data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated recessions. The
data is from the BEA, the BLS, and the FRB. All variables are logarithms of the original series.
decline in consumption. However, from 1968 to 1993, the detrended consumption and the
detrended capital move in opposite directions in the U.S. (see Figure 4.1). This divergence
is unable to be captured by the internal mechanisms of both models but can be captured
by the parameter ρci that allows the consumption demand to be negatively affected by the
investment demand (see Figure 4.4). The investment demand shocks, however, do not drive
business cycles as consumption and investment move in opposite directions. Moreover, the
movement of consumption under investment demand shocks is slightly countercyclical and
does not exhibit large declines during the NBER dated recessions (see Table 4.4).
Figure 4.5 shows the model fitted values under exogenous expenditure shocks eg,t. By
construction, eg,t has no effect on consumption, investment, and capacity utilization rate.
Figure 4.6 shows the model fitted values under labor productivity shocks el,t. Labor
productivity shocks play a small role in the full CU model but an important role in the full
VU model to drive cyclical movements in investment, the Solow residual, and the capacity
utilization rate. Labor productivity shocks, however, do not explain the fluctuations of
hours very well and consumption is a bit too smooth under the labor productivity shocks
in the full VU model.
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Consumption-Capital Divergence Captured by Investment Demand Shocks
Figure 4.4: The solid lines are the model fitted capital. The dotted lines are the model fitted
consumption. The dash-dotted lines are capital in the U.S. data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER
dated recessions. The vertical dashed lines indicate the year 1968 and the year 1993. The data is
from the BEA. All variables are logarithms of the original series.
Figure 4.7 shows the model predicted real wage rate, which is not targeted in estimation
procedures. The overall trend of the real wage rate in both models is roughly consistent
with that of the data. However, the real wage rate is a bit too volatile in the full VU
model.
Model Fitted Values Under Exogenous Expenditure Shocks
Figure 4.5: The solid lines are for the full CU model. The dash-dotted lines are for the full VU
model. The dotted lines are the U.S. data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated recessions. The
data is from the BEA, the BLS, and the FRB. All variables are logarithms of the original series.
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Model Fitted Values Under Labor Productivity Shocks
Figure 4.6: The solid lines are for the full CU model. The dash-dotted lines are for the full VU
model. The dotted lines are the U.S. data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated recessions. The
data is from the BEA, the BLS, and the FRB. All variables are logarithms of the original series.
Model Predicted Real Wage Rate and the U.S. Data
Figure 4.7: The solid lines are the model predicted values. The dash-dotted lines are the U.S.
data. Shaded areas indicate the NBER dated recessions. The data is from the BEA and the BLS.
All variables are logarithms of the original series.
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4.5 Parametric Bootstrapping
The confidence intervals shown in this thesis are estimated using the following parametric
bootstrapping procedure.
Suppose there are two observed variables (yt, xt)
T
t=1. I assume that the joint stochastic
process of the two variables is characterized by a simple linear relationship:
yt = βxt + t, (4.3)
where xt and t are independent, and each follows an auto-regressive (AR) process with
Gaussian white noise.
First, I use the ordinary least square (OLS) method to estimate β. The estimated co-
efficient is denoted by βˆ. The estimated residuals are obtained based on the estimated
coefficient: ˆt ≡ yt − βˆxt. I then use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the AR
process followed by xt and the AR process followed by t using the observed xt and the
estimated residuals ˆt. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used to select the best
number of lags.
Based on the above estimated parameter values, I re-sample the sample data 5,000 times
to find the standard error and the 95% confidence interval of the statistics that I am
interested in.
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4.6 Cyclicality of the Average Real Wage Rates
Table 4.5 shows the cyclicality of the average real wage rates of different sectors including
the business sector, the no-farm sector, and the non-financial corporations. The average
nominal wage rates are deflated using different deflators, e.g., the GDP deflator, the con-
sumer price index (CPI), and the own sector deflator. The data is from the BEA and the
BLS and the sample period is from the first quarter of 1948 to the first quarter of 2017.
The results show that the average real wage rates are roughly acyclical.
Table 4.5: Cyclical Properties of the Average Real Wage Rates
GDP Deflator CPI Own Sector Deflator
Business 0.08 [−0.03, 0.18] 0.08 [−0.05, 0.21] 0.05 [−0.07, 0.17]
No-farm 0.05 [−0.05, 0.15] 0.05 [−0.07, 0.18] 0.11 [0.00, 0.22]
Non-financial Corp. 0.04 [−0.07, 0.15] 0.04 [−0.09, 0.18] 0.02 [−0.11, 0.14]
Note: The table shows the covariance between the real wage rate and the GDP relative to the
variance of the GDP. The brackets are the 95% confidence intervals calculated using a parametric
bootstrapping method. The U.S. data is from the BEA and the BLS. All variables are Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtered logarithms of the original series.
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